FM LIVNI: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST DO ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003195 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2016 TAGS: IS KPAL LE PINR PREL SUBJECT: FM LIVNI: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST DO ITS PART ON ARMS EMBARGO Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4(b) and ( d) ¶1. (C) During her August 14th late morning briefing of the Diplomatic Corps in Jerusalem, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni opened by expressing the hope that UNSCR 1701 would reshape the region and asserting that the Government of Lebanon (GOL) and the international community shared the burden of its implementation. She asserted that the GOL plus the international community must now act to ensure the two most important elements of the resolution were caried out; first, that Hezbollah be disarmed, and second, that the GOL exercise its sovereignty throughout the country. She noted that questions remained as to the best way to implement 1701, adding that ISRAEL and others believed that the key was a robust foreign force contingent, given the current LAF weakness and the probability that they were not up to the job. She called upon the international community to exert maximum efforts to ensure that Hezbollah did not have any opportunity to rearm. ISRAEL would maintain its naval blockade and restrictions over air travel into Lebanon until such as time as a real and effective enforcement of an arms embargo took shape. She insisted that ISRAEL wanted to &reopen the doors of Lebanon8 upon its departure but that depended on strict interdiction of the certain efforts by Iran and Syria to resupply Hezbollah. ¶2. (C) Livni reiterated several times throughout her presentation that now was the time for PM Siniora,s government to take responsibility of governance. ISRAEL &could not afford GOL weakness anymore.8 She claimed that despite pressure from the military from the start of the campaign, the GOI chose not to attack Lebanon "as a state" since the Siniora government was seen as an &achievement of the international community.8 ISRAEL intentionally did not undermine the GOL during its military operations even though it was not always easy to differentiate between Hezbollah and the GOL while the IDF operated in Lebanon, and that decision of restraint entailed certain risks to IDF personnel. ¶3. (C) She asserted that the G-8 statement, the Rome gathering and the UN Security Council had called for the unconditional release of the two Israeli abductees. Citing the risks that the Olmert government had taken by showing restraint in the conduct of the military campaign, she said that ISRAEL needed the two soldiers back without any reference to Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. The return of the two soldiers was the only humanitarian issue that Israel had put on the table for itself and it was prompting a rising crescendo among Israelis demanding their return. ¶4. (C) Livni asserted that an effective end to the fighting under 1701 required a "complete rpt complete" cessation of hostilities by both sides. If Hezbollah leader Nasrallah,s claim that he would continue to attack the IDF while on Lebanese soil remained operative, ISRAEL would react quickly to these attacks and the situation could deteriorate rapidly. Livni claimed that this Israeli interpretation had been part and parcel of the cessation issue discussion regarding the UNSCR. ¶5. (C) Regarding the provision of humanitarian aid, Livni said that ISRAEL looked forward to establishing effective procedures for its delivery but the success of any humanitarian project would depend on how the cessation of hostilities regime works. If the situation is stable, the people of south Lebanon can return home. She noted that according to the UNSCR one of the important responsibilities of the new international force would be to help with humanitarian issues. ¶6. (C) Responding to a question whether ISRAEL would consider international forces to help resolve Israel,s other problems, for example with the Palestinians, Livni gave a resounding &No,8 referring to Israel,s historically uneasy relationship with the international community (especially the Europeans.) This had been reflected once again in the rapid change from the international community's early support for Israeli actions against Hezbollah to strident criticism of Israel over &disproportionality8 regarding its conduct of the military campaign. Livni argued that Israel's precedent-setting acceptance of the force under Chapter 7 (later changed in the UNSCR) had required a wrenching and difficult change of heart here but that did not mean the GOI had now adopted a new and more welcoming approach to international community intervention in the region's disputes. 7.(C) Finally, a very defensive and combative Livni responded to a question of whether ISRAEL had now recognized its "mistakes" in conducting unilateral diplomacy in Lebanon, Gaza, and possibly in future moves in the West Bank and would return to negotiations with its various Arab partners. Livni responded that ISRAEL had been forced to go down that road and taken those steps out of a true desire for peace. In return, it had only reaped international criticism and had been subjected to unprovoked attacks. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** CRETZ