ADVISOR TELLS PERETZ: IT'S SYRIA, SYRIA, SYRIA!

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 003040 E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG IS SY LE SUBJECT: ADVISOR TELLS PERETZ: IT'S SYRIA, SYRIA, SYRIA! Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Pini Medan, an unofficial advisor to Defense Minister Peretz, told POL/C August 2 that he is advising Peretz at every opportunity that "recruiting Syria" is critical to achieving success against Hizballah and saving Israel's position vis a vis Lebanon. Syrian involvement is equally critical for the United States, he said, as it counters what Medan terms the USG's greatest challenge: Iran. Medan, a former career Mossad officer and former foreign policy advisor to then-PM Ehud Barak, said that in his unofficial role as one of several advisors to Peretz, he has pressed the following points about the Lebanon conflict and the Israeli public: -- The gap between a cease-fire and deployment of an international force will be at least six to eight weeks in the most ideal conditions and more likely three to four months. -- Israel must stay in Lebanon until an international force deploys. The LAF is not enough. -- Israeli troops can remain in Lebanon during that gap -- if the incoming troops have a solid mandate -- but only for the time it takes an international force to stand up. -- Israeli "public tension" over the conflict is high and the public worries that Hizballah will continue to terrorize the troops during that time. The public remembers well, he said, that Israel went into Lebanon "for a month and stayed 24 years." -- The existence of a solid international mandate for an intervention force, offers of troops from supportive countries, and negotiations on prisoner exchanges would reduce that public tension. -- Prisoner exchange negotiations must deal only with Israeli and Lebanese prisoners, not Palestinians. Israel must cut any appearance of a tie between Hamas and Hizballah. -- Israel cannot tolerate Syria's re-supply and re-arming of Hizballah and must retaliate against any such efforts. The question is what will be the result. Israel cannot tolerate convoys of missiles coming into Lebanon. On the other hand, Israel needs to address what a ceasefire would look like if a low level of shooting were to continue. -- It's not enough to seal the land borders. The ports also need to be sealed to prevent arms transfers. Israel is not worried about fishing boats, which can be monitored and checked by the Israeli navy and other elements, but it must worry about container ships coming in with thousands of containers that cannot be checked. Israel will need a third party to ensure that such shipments cannot get through, and a arrangement under which Lebanon can accept this "overruling" of its sovereignty. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In an August 2 conversation, unofficial MinDef Peretz advisor Pini Medan told Pol/C that among all the issues Peretz is facing, Medan stresses to the minister the need to cut the link between Syria and Iran, or, more importantly, "how to recruit Syria to our side." The problem, he said, is that Israeli leaders are getting signals from the United States "that Asad is a bad guy" and that Israel will anger the United States if it seeks to deal with Asad. "Some of us think Syria is a key player"; Israel needs to recognize this to pull it away from Iran. He stressed that he does not believe in the democratization of Syria that some USG officials call for -- the result would be the Muslim Brotherhood. "Forget regime change, I don't believe in it." ¶3. (C) Peretz, he said, is listening to the voices saying that Israel must do something with Syria. Peretz is not afraid personally of the fact that, in any dealings with Syria Israel will, at some point, have to discuss the Golan Heights. "He's not rejecting it," Medan said, but Israel is "very concerned about confronting the U.S. and about the personal feelings" (toward Syria) of the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense. The United States he argued needs to put aside its feelings about Syria and focus on Iran. The Israel-Palestine conflict is not the most important thing for the United States right now, nor is Lebanon, he said. Many Americans would say the biggest issues are Iraq and Iran, he added, but if you neutralize Syria, that enhances the U.S. vis-a-vis both Iraq and Iran. The United States need to focus on Syria not for Israel's sake, he said, but for its own. ¶4. (C) On Palestinian issues, Medan said that he looks to the international force that will be deployed in Lebanon, and its mandate, as the models, with some adjustments, for what he said is a necessary force in Gaza. "The region has many leaders who want peace but can't deliver -- Siniora, Abu Mazen, Haniyeh -- they can't do the job without supervision," he added. Because of that, he said, he sees a two-state solution: one Palestinian state in Gaza and another in the West Bank, with two non-qualified leaders both of whom are "run by Masha'al and Ahmadinejad." The prospect, he said, "brings us back to Syria,... as a platform, proxy and host,... and as a tool" of Iran. ¶5. (C) The United States and Russia are key players in addressing Syria, he said. Even though "we don't like them," Russian troops need to be standing alongside the French in any Lebanon intervention force. And while "we have a problem with their relations with Iran," they can talk to Asad. Likewise, "Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are terrified of radical Islam," so bring them into the intervention force, along with Egypt and Jordan, both of which know the Middle East rules of the game. The objective, he asserted, is to make a Qaddafi of Asad, and cut him from Iran. Unless Syria is brought into the Lebanon issue, any ceasefire "will be very shaky,... "we'll shoot back. We'll hope that a multilateral force will come in," and, once in, keep control of the situation. ¶6. (C) Medan recalled that Israel's new demand for an international force is a turnaround from the views of former PM Ariel Sharon. Everyone tends to forget that then-NSC chief Giora Eiland proposed an international force for Gaza three years ago, but Sharon would never allow it. Now, he said, Israel has Italian Carabinieri General Pistolese and his team manning the Rafah crossing with no mandate because, under Sharon, no planning for international participation was done. Had Israel been prepared in November, when the Agreement on Movement and Access was being finalized, the Pistolese team could have come in with a clear mandate. -------------- THE PERETZ TEAM -------------- ¶7. (C) Medan said that he is one of several unofficial advisors to Peretz. Others include former MK and Minister of Labor Uzi Baram, David Kimche, and to a lesser extent, Dalia Rabin. Medan said that he gives open, unvarnished advice, carries no official duties, and does not in any way speak for the minister. He said that he has not been tasked with any "envoy work" to date, but could be so tasked in the future, as he anticipates Kimche will also be. Ranking Peretz's advisors in terms of importance, he put in first place new MOD DG Gabi Ashkenazi, whom Medan pointed out was the unsuccessful contender against Dan Halutz for the IDF COS slot. Asked about the potential for conflict between Halutz and Ashkenazi, Medan said the possibility would be small as long as Ashkenazi sticks with the DG's traditional job description. In second place, he put political advisor Haggai Alon, whom he said enjoys a close relationship with Peretz, but who has only limited experience and knowledge. Medan termed himself Alon's mentor, and said that he is trying to teach both Alon and others "how to look at policy." Medan put himself in third place as a Peretz advisor. ¶8. (C) Asked about the rest of the evolving Peretz team, Medan said that little will change as long as the war continues. He characterized the current team as "all good guys. At some point, present Military Aide Eitan Dangot will probably leave, to be replaced by someone that Peretz knows. Retired Brigadier General and current advisor to the minister Ami Shafran, will probably go back to the military, be promoted, and move on to another slot, probably as head of military research and development. Amos Gilad may be moved out, since "he's not Amir's man." Peretz, he said, is a quick learner, and the day after the war there will be a lot of re-examination. Olmert and Peretz, having only recently come to office, are not responsible for the preparations for this war and the results of that re-examination could affect senior jobs throughout the military. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES