MOSSAD CHIEF DAGAN ON LEBANON, HEZBOLLAH AND IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002879 SIPDIS CODEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2016 TAGS: PREL PINR PTER KPAL KWBG IS LE SUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF DAGAN ON LEBANON, HEZBOLLAH AND IRAN Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons: 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Mossad Director Meir Dagan briefed CODEL Hoekstra on the Israeli campaign against Hizballah and the greater long term threat posed by Iran. Dagan stated that the initial aims of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon were focused on eliminating strategic weapons held by Hizballah and symbolically striking the organization,s heart. The current phase is to hit local units in South Lebanon that are responsible for the firing of Katyusha rockets into Northern Israel. Dagan said that the GOI is sensitive to the impact on civilians, and that only Hizballah-controlled areas are being targeted. Dagan also discussed Iran and its nuclear program. He described it as the number one threat to regional stability and laid out a strategy with which to confront Iran. END SUMMARY -------------- CURRENT STATE OF CONFLICT -------------- ¶2. (C) Dagan stated that the primary objective during the first phase of the conflict was to eliminate the threat posed by Hizballah,s long and medium range missiles, which he asserted are supplied by Iran and Syria. He went on to say that these weapons have a range of at least 225km and are primarily stored around Beirut, and if they were to be deployed south of Sidon, all major Israeli cities except Eilat would be in range. The initial campaign focused on known storage sites and cutting North-South transportation links, including all major roads and bridges, as well as routes between Lebanon and Syria. Dagan estimated that 35-40% of Hizballah,s long-range capability has been destroyed. Dagan also emphasized that the use of these missiles by Hizballah must be directly authorized by Tehran. ¶3. (C) Dagan continued by pointing out that another early objective in the conflict was to target Hizballah command and control centers to strike a symbolic blow at the organization,s heart. He stated that Hizballah leadership, including Hasan Nassrallah, are legitimate targets, but that, it is extremely difficult to locate individuals hiding among supporters within the civilian population. The current phase of the conflict has expanded to targeting local units in southern Lebanon responsible for firing the short and longer-range Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. ¶4. (C) Dagan stated that there is sensitivity within the GOI for the impact of the campaign on civilians in Lebanon. He made it a point to stress several times that only areas where Hizballah is active are being struck. Contrary to what is on the news, he claimed, that northern Lebanon is peaceful and non-Shia areas of Beirut are not targets. In response to questions from the CODEL, Dagan said the strike on the airport was justified and that runways are easily repaired, however, in his opinion the strategic value of the strike on the fuel depot may not have been worth the propaganda cost. ¶5. (C) Dagan expressed concern over the battle for public opinion. In response to a question, he said it was a goal of the incursions to be able to publicly show how Hizballah has embedded itself in the civilian population and is using private homes to store weapons and rocket launch sites. He went on to say that Al-Jazeera is shaping the propaganda war and pursing an anti-Israeli and anti-American agenda. Dagan said that Lebanon will need a tremendous amount of support to rebuild and that it is critical that Iran and Syria not be allowed to contribute lest they increase their own and Hizballah,s influence. -------------- Syria, Iran and Lebanese Politics -------------- ¶6. (C) Dagan said that the primary supporters of Hizballah are not Lebanese, but rather are the governments of Syria and Iran who are pursuing their own agendas. Syria desires to control every aspect of Lebanese society and needs an armed body to exert its influence. This has allowed Syria until recently to control political appointments such as that of President Emile Lahud and reap economic benefits such as construction contracts that provided the largest source of foreign currency for the Assad government. According to Dagan, Iran is using Hizballah to project its power into the Shia community for two reasons: (1) To spread the regime,s ideology and have a Shia-dominated state (as is their goal in Iraq) and (2) To create leverage over ISRAEL by funneling money through Hizballah to the Palestinian Territories to derail the peace process and prevent ISRAEL from interfering with Tehran,s nuclear program. ¶7. (C) Dagan said he is optimistic about the political future of Lebanon if Hizballah can be neutralized. He said that factors working in Lebanon,s favor are having the Christian community unified around Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, the Druze community around Walid Jumblatt, the Sunnis with Prime Minister Siniora and MP Sa'ad Haririand the Shia being split with an important segment firmly against Hizballah. When asked about Michel Aoun making a common cause pact with Hizballah, Dagan said that Aoun wants to be president and it is like making a pact with the devil to further his political ambition. Dagan emphasized that Hizballah can not/not be allowed to emerge from the conflict being seen as a winner by any measure. ¶8. (C) Dagan assured the CODEL that ISRAEL has no intention of occupying Southern Lebanon. The objective of the conflict is simple: (1) Free the captured soldiers and (2) See the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1559. -------------- - Iran,s Nuclear Program and Regional Stability -------------- - ¶9. (C) Dagan discussed Iran at length and stated that Tehran will not stop in its attempt to develop a nuclear weapon. For ISRAEL it is a question of survival, with the threatening comments made by Khameini and Ahmedinejad reflecting the regime,s core philosophy towards Israel. Iran has already developed the Shihab-3 missile with a range of 1,500 km, putting every Israeli city in reach. Dagan said that Iran,s plan to eventually utilize 54,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment could only be for military purposes. The arms race that Tehran is starting will have regional implications, he said, especially among Sunni-Arab States, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that are already concerned about Iran's projection of power. ¶10. (C) Dagan said that the criticism of Hizballah by Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are a reflection of the uneasiness caused by Iran. Dagan went on to explain that Iran is engaged in trying to increase its influence among Shias in Bahrain, organizing a Hizballah party in Kuwait and funding armed groups in Yemen, besides the well-known activities amongst the Shia in Iraq. ¶11. (C) Dagan said it is wrong to ask when will Iran have the bomb, but rather when can we stop Iran from acquiring the bomb, and he said now is the right time. He laid out a strategy for dealing with Iran that included: ¶1. Mount political pressure by bringing Iran to the UN Security Council and asking for sanctions that would be painful for the regime. ¶2. Prevent technology and knowledge transfer to Iran. ¶3. Encourage indigenous opposition groups that favor democracy within Iran. ¶12. (C) While not counting on internal disruptions derailing the regime, Dagan did point to some positives including wide-spread dissatisfaction among large ethnic communities including the Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis and Arabs. As Persians make up less than 50% of the population in Iran, Dagan said that internal frictions between ethnic communities could become a destabilizing factor within the country. Dagan said that these ethnic groups could form the basis for a domestic opposition and then Tehran could get a taste of its own medicine. To be successful, however, the opposition needs to be organized, and have a unified, inspirational leadership. Both of these aspects are missing. Dagan also said that the regime is not stupid, and if it senses internal disorder it will allocate resources to take care of the problem. Despite this, Dagan said, he believes that if this strategy is followed, then Tehran will be forced to carefully weigh where to invest its resources. ¶13. (U) Besids the House Intellegence Committe Chairman Peter Hoekstra, the CODEL consisted of Representatives Jane Harman, Rick Renzi and Darrell Issa, all members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The CODEL did not have an opportunity to clear this message before departing post. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES