RAFAH: SPIEGEL AND PISTOLESE REPORT ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002570 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG EFIN IS GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM SUBJECT: RAFAH: SPIEGEL AND PISTOLESE REPORT ON THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD EFFECTIVENESS AND MONEY TRANSFERS Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Lt. Gen. Pietro Pistolese, head of the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EU-BAM),and Brig. Gen. (ret.) Baruch Spiegel, advisor in the Ministry of Defense (MOD),on June 23 gave the Ambassador a status update of the Rafah crossing in the Gaza Strip. According to Pistolese, the crossing was closed June 21, open for four hours on June 22, and closed again on June 23 because of continuing security threats. He said that the crossing was open on June 22 for a few hours after security forces from the Palestinians' Presidential Guard (PG) were deployed to the crossing. Pistolese and Spiegel praised the usefulness of the PG at Rafah, and said that it could be deployed to other crossings in the future. Pistolese complained to the Ambassador about the large quantities of cash that travelers are carrying from Egypt to Gaza through Rafah. He explained that neither the Palestinians nor the Egyptians have a law preventing undeclared cash transfers of funds over $10,000, the international standard, and said that adopting the customs protocol would help curb future large cash transfers. He conceded to the Ambassador that the customs protocol would not prevent the transfer of money to Gaza, but said that it would at least help track the origin more accurately, which would have a dampening effect. The Ambassador asked whether money in large quantities could be treated as a commercial "good," which should go through Kerem Shalom crossing instead of Rafah. Spiegel said that this would require agreement and coordination with the Egyptians, and that they are unlikely to coordinate until the Israelis and Palestinians have an agreement on the customs protocol. He reported that the GOI is still deciding whether to respond to the Ambassador's letter asking it to approve the protocol. Pistolese commented that the EU-BAM's mandate is expiring in five months, but said that it could be extended. He recommended, however, that the parties agree to some changes on the Rafah crossing for the EU-BAM to extend, such as establishing a liaison officer on the Egyptian side of the border. Spiegel recommended a "security hotline" for Israel, Egypt, the PA, the EU-BAM, and the U.S., to deal with threats in real time. It could start as a pilot project in Rafah and Kerem Shalom and be extended to other crossings in the future, he said. End summary. -------------- Rafah Closed, President Guard Useful -------------- ¶2. (C) Lt. Gen. Pietro Pistolese, head of the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EU-BAM),and Brig. Gen. (ret.) Baruch Spiegel, advisor in the Ministry of Defense (MOD), told the Ambassador the morning of June 23 that Rafah crossing was closed on Wednesday, June 21, and re-opened on June 22 for four hours in the morning, at which point 1,517 people crossed the border. Pistolese said that the crossing was closed again the afternoon of June 22 and was closed at the time of the meeting on June 23 because of continuing security threats. He said that 800 people were waiting to cross on the Egyptian side of the border. Spiegel mentioned that Rafah would likely not be opened very quickly, but did not elaborate. (Afterward, he confided to the Ambassador that Israel had a lead, which it hoped could resolve the threat -- the IDF subsequently detained two Hamas members in Gaza on June 24.) Pistolese added that he appreciated the GOI's advance warning on June 23, unlike on June 21, that the crossing would not be open because it saved his staff travel time from Ashkelon. The Ambassador asked about the GOI alert, and Spiegel responded that it is even higher than previous threats, and that the decision to open Rafah was only taken when the GOI knew that serious security measures would be implemented. Pistolese showed the Ambassador a diagram of the crossing, detailing the deployment of approximately 20 Palestinian President Guard (PG) security forces around Kerem Shalom on the Palestinian side and along the Philadelphi Road. The Ambassador asked whether the road was under threat or just the terminal, and Pistolese replied that the Israeli soldiers at the crossing were under threat, but not the EU-BAM per se or the Palestinians. ¶3. (C) Spiegel discussed the PG forces, and said that the Palestinian Authority (PA) should start by placing them in Rafah permanently, and then they could be deployed at other crossings as well. The Ambassador asked whether this could include a future seaport, and Spiegel agreed, saying that the PG could serve as security at all the crossings in the future. The Ambassador noted that USSC Lt. Gen. Dayton wants to work with the PG to train them, and Pistolese added that PA President Mahmud Abbas is also interested in widening the role of the PG and adding more troops at Rafah. The Ambassador said that perhaps the PG could even be deployed at Erez at some point, and by securing its environs, discourage attempts by militants to launch Qassam rockets at Sderot. Spiegel agreed, and said that if the GOI decides to open Erez for Palestinian workers to go to the Erez Industrial Zone, the PG would be very useful at the crossing and could also serve as a deterrent against Qassams. The Ambassador floated the idea of establishing a crisis management mechanism to allow Abbas to assert himself as a protector of Palestinians while helping to stop Qassam attacks. Spiegel considered this a good idea, admitting that there are "problems because we don't coordinate with the Palestinians." He noted the success of the short PG deployment to Rafah on the morning of June 22, and said that it worked well with the EU-BAM as a third party. Pistolese said the EU-BAM had no problem serving as a third party, but insisted that the PG forces had to be paid, which they had not been for four months, while forces under Hamas had been. He also reported that coordination with the Egyptians is problematic because they refuse to receive EU-BAM liaison officers or send any of their own to the Palestinian side. -------------- Large Cash Transfers Getting into Gaza -------------- ¶4. (C) Pistolese highlighted the problem of large amounts of money being carried by individuals from Egypt to the Gaza Strip through Rafah. He cited as an example the PA foreign minister recently crossing into Gaza with $20 million in cash. He said that he discussed this issue with PA Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat on June 21, after having written him a letter of complaint, but said that ultimately the PA does not have a law requiring the declaration of a transfer of cash over $10,000, as is the case under international standards. He claimed that Egypt also does not have a law preventing transfers of cash through its territory, and that both the Palestinians and the Egyptians should have tighter legislation to prevent the transfer of money. The Ambassador asked whether declaring the funds would stop the transfer of funds, and Pistolese conceded that it would not, but said that it would help determine the origin of the money and track the amounts entering Gaza more accurately, which would discourage some transfers. Pistolese declared that if the situation did not stop, the EU-BAM would end its mission to Rafah. -------------- Need the Customs Protocol -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked whether money in large quantities could not just be directed through Kerem Shalom crossing instead of Rafah if it arrives at the crossing in what could be considered commercial quantities. Pistolese said that this is a possibility, but that Kerem Shalom would have to be open for imports in this case. According to Pistolese, Rafah and Kerem Shalom, along with all agreements and tools created to deal with the movement of goods and people at these crossings, are connected and should work as one system, so in this case the customs protocol could regulate the transfer of funds. The Ambassador noted that the Palestinians have already accepted the customs protocol, and asked whether this meant it is in effect, or if it has to be a bilateral agreement between the Palestinians and the GOI. Spiegel commented that Kerem Shalom is open for humanitarian imports from Egypt, although it is closed at the moment because of a security alert. He said that the crossing functions well, but to open it for commercial goods would require agreement and cooperation with the Egyptians, and that the Egyptians would likely wait until the Palestinians and Israelis have an agreement on the customs protocol before making a decision. ¶6. (C) Spiegel opined that Kerem Shalom can be an important element to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza. He agreed with Pistolese that Kerem Shalom and Rafah work together as a system, but said that the decision on the customs agreement is an internal GOI issue that is being decided by the political echelon in the government. Weighing in on the problem of money transfers into Gaza, Spiegel speculated that it is also problematic because the money is going to Hamas, and added that the fund transfers undermine the international community's effort to put pressure on the group. This is a problem to discuss at the Security Working Group (SWG),he said, and mentioned that the groundwork needs to be prepared for the meeting. -------------- EU-BAM Mandate Ends Soon -------------- ¶7. (C) Pistolese pointed out that the EU-BAM's mandate ends in five months because it was meant to monitor the crossing for only a year, unless it is extended. He said that the EU-BAM could easily be extended, but that there should be some changes that all parties involved should consider. He noted the customs protocol as an example, and said that all parties, but particularly Israel, should agree to the points and should sign a document to give it weight. He suggested that the Egyptians be included, but if they are not, that at the very least there be a separate agreement with the GOE to establish the presence of a liaison at Rafah. Spiegel added that all the parties could re-evaluate and take the "lessons learned" to prepare a "newish" agreement on the functioning of the crossing. He suggested that a "security hotline" be established to deal with threats in real time. The Ambassador asked whether he meant that it would be a five-way information sharing project, and Spiegel said that if there is an alert, all the parties should be involved, including the U.S. and the USSC. According to Spiegel, Rafah and Kerem Shalom could be the pilot project, and the security hotline could subsequently be extended to other crossings, complementing the Ambassador's suggestion of a crisis management mechanism. Spiegel acknowledged that he has not vetted his idea within the MOD, but said that he would take it to Defense Minister Amir Peretz soon, and would coordinate with Shin Bet. The Ambassador noted that this is a good opportunity for confidence-building, and Spiegel agreed, saying that if the PG forces are at Karni crossing, they can coordinate with the crossing's manager, Yoni Dotan. -------------- Security Working Group Meeting -------------- ¶8. (C) Referring to preparations for the SWG meeting, Spiegel reported that MOD Pol-Mil Director Amos Gilad would be attending as the GOI representative. He said that it is very important for the Palestinians to be present, and asked Pistolese who would be representing them. Pistolese replied that it would be the head of the PG, Mahmud Damra, and the Ambassador mentioned that he understood the GOI may have questions about his connections to terrorist activities in the past. Spiegel said that Lt. Gen. Dayton would be meeting with Shin Bet Director Yuval Diskin, and that if Damra is acceptable, it is better that a security person attend the meeting than Erekat or Nazmi Muhanna, head of crossings on the Palestinian side, because they "don't get security." Spiegel said that the GOI would investigate Damra, and that having someone on Erekat's level is not good enough because the GOI needs a connection to someone on the ground. ¶9. (C) Spiegel also briefly mentioned that the MOD decided the previous day to resume exports of empty containers at Karni on Sunday, June 25. He said that the scanners remained a weak link, however, because they constantly need maintenance and spare parts. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES