RAFAH: SPIEGEL AND PISTOLESE REPORT ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002570

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG EFIN IS GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM
SUBJECT: RAFAH: SPIEGEL AND PISTOLESE REPORT ON THE
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD EFFECTIVENESS AND MONEY TRANSFERS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Lt. Gen. Pietro Pistolese, head of the
European Union Border Assistance Mission (EU-BAM),and Brig.
Gen. (ret.) Baruch Spiegel, advisor in the Ministry of
Defense (MOD),on June 23 gave the Ambassador a status update
of the Rafah crossing in the Gaza Strip. According to
Pistolese, the crossing was closed June 21, open for four
hours on June 22, and closed again on June 23 because of
continuing security threats. He said that the crossing was
open on June 22 for a few hours after security forces from
the Palestinians' Presidential Guard (PG) were deployed to
the crossing. Pistolese and Spiegel praised the usefulness
of the PG at Rafah, and said that it could be deployed to
other crossings in the future. Pistolese complained to the
Ambassador about the large quantities of cash that travelers
are carrying from Egypt to Gaza through Rafah. He explained
that neither the Palestinians nor the Egyptians have a law
preventing undeclared cash transfers of funds over $10,000,
the international standard, and said that adopting the
customs protocol would help curb future large cash transfers.
He conceded to the Ambassador that the customs protocol
would not prevent the transfer of money to Gaza, but said
that it would at least help track the origin more accurately,
which would have a dampening effect. The Ambassador asked
whether money in large quantities could be treated as a
commercial "good," which should go through Kerem Shalom
crossing instead of Rafah. Spiegel said that this would
require agreement and coordination with the Egyptians, and
that they are unlikely to coordinate until the Israelis and
Palestinians have an agreement on the customs protocol. He
reported that the GOI is still deciding whether to respond to
the Ambassador's letter asking it to approve the protocol.
Pistolese commented that the EU-BAM's mandate is expiring in
five months, but said that it could be extended. He
recommended, however, that the parties agree to some changes
on the Rafah crossing for the EU-BAM to extend, such as
establishing a liaison officer on the Egyptian side of the
border. Spiegel recommended a "security hotline" for Israel,
Egypt, the PA, the EU-BAM, and the U.S., to deal with threats
in real time. It could start as a pilot project in Rafah and
Kerem Shalom and be extended to other crossings in the
future, he said. End summary.

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Rafah Closed, President Guard Useful
--------------


2. (C) Lt. Gen. Pietro Pistolese, head of the European Union
Border Assistance Mission (EU-BAM),and Brig. Gen. (ret.)
Baruch Spiegel, advisor in the Ministry of Defense (MOD),
told the Ambassador the morning of June 23 that Rafah
crossing was closed on Wednesday, June 21, and re-opened on
June 22 for four hours in the morning, at which point 1,517
people crossed the border. Pistolese said that the crossing
was closed again the afternoon of June 22 and was closed at
the time of the meeting on June 23 because of continuing
security threats. He said that 800 people were waiting to
cross on the Egyptian side of the border. Spiegel mentioned
that Rafah would likely not be opened very quickly, but did
not elaborate. (Afterward, he confided to the Ambassador
that Israel had a lead, which it hoped could resolve the
threat -- the IDF subsequently detained two Hamas members in
Gaza on June 24.) Pistolese added that he appreciated the
GOI's advance warning on June 23, unlike on June 21, that the
crossing would not be open because it saved his staff travel
time from Ashkelon. The Ambassador asked about the GOI
alert, and Spiegel responded that it is even higher than
previous threats, and that the decision to open Rafah was
only taken when the GOI knew that serious security measures
would be implemented. Pistolese showed the Ambassador a
diagram of the crossing, detailing the deployment of
approximately 20 Palestinian President Guard (PG) security
forces around Kerem Shalom on the Palestinian side and along
the Philadelphi Road. The Ambassador asked whether the road
was under threat or just the terminal, and Pistolese replied
that the Israeli soldiers at the crossing were under threat,
but not the EU-BAM per se or the Palestinians.


3. (C) Spiegel discussed the PG forces, and said that the
Palestinian Authority (PA) should start by placing them in
Rafah permanently, and then they could be deployed at other
crossings as well. The Ambassador asked whether this could
include a future seaport, and Spiegel agreed, saying that the
PG could serve as security at all the crossings in the
future. The Ambassador noted that USSC Lt. Gen. Dayton wants
to work with the PG to train them, and Pistolese added that
PA President Mahmud Abbas is also interested in widening the
role of the PG and adding more troops at Rafah. The
Ambassador said that perhaps the PG could even be deployed at
Erez at some point, and by securing its environs, discourage
attempts by militants to launch Qassam rockets at Sderot.
Spiegel agreed, and said that if the GOI decides to open Erez
for Palestinian workers to go to the Erez Industrial Zone,
the PG would be very useful at the crossing and could also
serve as a deterrent against Qassams. The Ambassador floated
the idea of establishing a crisis management mechanism to
allow Abbas to assert himself as a protector of Palestinians
while helping to stop Qassam attacks. Spiegel considered
this a good idea, admitting that there are "problems because
we don't coordinate with the Palestinians." He noted the
success of the short PG deployment to Rafah on the morning of
June 22, and said that it worked well with the EU-BAM as a
third party. Pistolese said the EU-BAM had no problem
serving as a third party, but insisted that the PG forces had
to be paid, which they had not been for four months, while
forces under Hamas had been. He also reported that
coordination with the Egyptians is problematic because they
refuse to receive EU-BAM liaison officers or send any of
their own to the Palestinian side.

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Large Cash Transfers Getting into Gaza
--------------


4. (C) Pistolese highlighted the problem of large amounts of
money being carried by individuals from Egypt to the Gaza
Strip through Rafah. He cited as an example the PA foreign
minister recently crossing into Gaza with $20 million in
cash. He said that he discussed this issue with PA Chief
Negotiator Saeb Erekat on June 21, after having written him a
letter of complaint, but said that ultimately the PA does not
have a law requiring the declaration of a transfer of cash
over $10,000, as is the case under international standards.
He claimed that Egypt also does not have a law preventing
transfers of cash through its territory, and that both the
Palestinians and the Egyptians should have tighter
legislation to prevent the transfer of money. The Ambassador
asked whether declaring the funds would stop the transfer of
funds, and Pistolese conceded that it would not, but said
that it would help determine the origin of the money and
track the amounts entering Gaza more accurately, which would
discourage some transfers. Pistolese declared that if the
situation did not stop, the EU-BAM would end its mission to
Rafah.

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Need the Customs Protocol
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked whether money in large
quantities could not just be directed through Kerem Shalom
crossing instead of Rafah if it arrives at the crossing in
what could be considered commercial quantities. Pistolese
said that this is a possibility, but that Kerem Shalom would
have to be open for imports in this case. According to
Pistolese, Rafah and Kerem Shalom, along with all agreements
and tools created to deal with the movement of goods and
people at these crossings, are connected and should work as
one system, so in this case the customs protocol could
regulate the transfer of funds. The Ambassador noted that
the Palestinians have already accepted the customs protocol,
and asked whether this meant it is in effect, or if it has to
be a bilateral agreement between the Palestinians and the
GOI. Spiegel commented that Kerem Shalom is open for
humanitarian imports from Egypt, although it is closed at the
moment because of a security alert. He said that the
crossing functions well, but to open it for commercial goods
would require agreement and cooperation with the Egyptians,
and that the Egyptians would likely wait until the
Palestinians and Israelis have an agreement on the customs
protocol before making a decision.


6. (C) Spiegel opined that Kerem Shalom can be an important
element to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza. He
agreed with Pistolese that Kerem Shalom and Rafah work
together as a system, but said that the decision on the
customs agreement is an internal GOI issue that is being
decided by the political echelon in the government. Weighing
in on the problem of money transfers into Gaza, Spiegel
speculated that it is also problematic because the money is
going to Hamas, and added that the fund transfers undermine
the international community's effort to put pressure on the
group. This is a problem to discuss at the Security Working
Group (SWG),he said, and mentioned that the groundwork needs
to be prepared for the meeting.

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EU-BAM Mandate Ends Soon
--------------


7. (C) Pistolese pointed out that the EU-BAM's mandate ends
in five months because it was meant to monitor the crossing
for only a year, unless it is extended. He said that the
EU-BAM could easily be extended, but that there should be
some changes that all parties involved should consider. He
noted the customs protocol as an example, and said that all
parties, but particularly Israel, should agree to the points
and should sign a document to give it weight. He suggested
that the Egyptians be included, but if they are not, that at
the very least there be a separate agreement with the GOE to
establish the presence of a liaison at Rafah. Spiegel added
that all the parties could re-evaluate and take the "lessons
learned" to prepare a "newish" agreement on the functioning
of the crossing. He suggested that a "security hotline" be
established to deal with threats in real time. The
Ambassador asked whether he meant that it would be a five-way
information sharing project, and Spiegel said that if there
is an alert, all the parties should be involved, including
the U.S. and the USSC. According to Spiegel, Rafah and Kerem
Shalom could be the pilot project, and the security hotline
could subsequently be extended to other crossings,
complementing the Ambassador's suggestion of a crisis
management mechanism. Spiegel acknowledged that he has not
vetted his idea within the MOD, but said that he would take
it to Defense Minister Amir Peretz soon, and would coordinate
with Shin Bet. The Ambassador noted that this is a good
opportunity for confidence-building, and Spiegel agreed,
saying that if the PG forces are at Karni crossing, they can
coordinate with the crossing's manager, Yoni Dotan.

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Security Working Group Meeting
--------------


8. (C) Referring to preparations for the SWG meeting,
Spiegel reported that MOD Pol-Mil Director Amos Gilad would
be attending as the GOI representative. He said that it is
very important for the Palestinians to be present, and asked
Pistolese who would be representing them. Pistolese replied
that it would be the head of the PG, Mahmud Damra, and the
Ambassador mentioned that he understood the GOI may have
questions about his connections to terrorist activities in
the past. Spiegel said that Lt. Gen. Dayton would be meeting
with Shin Bet Director Yuval Diskin, and that if Damra is
acceptable, it is better that a security person attend the
meeting than Erekat or Nazmi Muhanna, head of crossings on
the Palestinian side, because they "don't get security."
Spiegel said that the GOI would investigate Damra, and that
having someone on Erekat's level is not good enough because
the GOI needs a connection to someone on the ground.


9. (C) Spiegel also briefly mentioned that the MOD decided
the previous day to resume exports of empty containers at
Karni on Sunday, June 25. He said that the scanners remained
a weak link, however, because they constantly need
maintenance and spare parts.

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