NSG TROIKA CONDUCTS OUTREACH WITH ISRAELI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001787 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER) STATE FOR ISN/NESS (DELABARRE) DEPT OF ENERGY FOR DOE/NNSA/NA-242 (GOOREVICH) UNVIE FOR LISA HILLIARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2016 TAGS: PREL MNUC PINS PINR PGOV KNNP PARM IR IS UNSC UN GOI EXTERNAL SUBJECT: NSG TROIKA CONDUCTS OUTREACH WITH ISRAELI INTER-MINISTERIAL TEAM REF: TEL AVIV 1722 Classified By: Political Counselor Norm Olsen. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) troika representatives held discussions April 27 with an inter-ministerial team led by the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) as part of the NSG's outreach to Israel. Current NSG Chairman Ambassador Naess (Norway) updated the Israeli side on changes made to the NSG's guidelines since the June 2005 NSG plenary in Oslo. Naess and NSG Consultative Group Chairman Richard Goorevich (DOE/NNSA) noted that the NSG is currently discussing several issues, including criteria for the supply of sensor technology to third countries, the definition of "restraint," and how to control stable isotope separation technology. Naess said the NSG is constantly assessing whether an extraordinary plenary should be convened in advance of the June 2006 NSG plenary in Rio de Janeiro, in light of the Iran nuclear crisis. Naess noted that while future NSG Chairman Ambassador Jose Medeiros (Brazil) was unable to accompany the other troika members to Israel, he looks forward to meeting the Israeli ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna. ¶2. (C) The Israeli side expressed gratitude for the NSG's outreach to Israel, and pledged Israel's steadfast commitment to the NSG's nonproliferation agenda. IAEC Director General Gideon Frank pressed the NSG troika for a formal answer to Israel's request to the NSG in 2005 to be accorded NSG "adherent status." The Israeli side expressed its serious concerns about the threat a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to Israel, and asked questions to ascertain what the NSG could do to stave off that threat. The Israeli side also made presentations on how Israel views current trends in nonproliferation, and how Israel is strengthening its export control system. END SUMMARY. -------------- NSG "ADHERENT" STATUS FOR ISRAEL -------------- ¶3. (C) Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Director General Gideon Frank stressed the importance Israel places on its dialogue with the NSG, and the "utmost importance" the GOI places on implementing export control legislation. Frank noted Israel's desire to receive a response to its letter to the NSG requesting formal recognition of Israel's adherence to the NSG guidelines. Frank noted his expectation that formalizing Israel's status with the NSG would "yield tangible benefits," but did not elaborate on what those benefits would be. ¶4. (C) Frank said that he believes Israel can positively influence the development of international nonproliferation norms, and assured the troika that Israel would continue to "synchronize its activities with those of the NSG." He listed as examples of Israel's activity in the area of nonproliferation: (A) Israel's submission of a report to the UN on its fulfillment of UNSCR 1540 obligations, and its support for the Security Council Committee's efforts on UNSCR 1540 implementation; (B) Israel's active work on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and its support for the convention's adoption; (C) Israel's work on the Nuclear Terrorism Committee, and its support for the committee's work; (D) Israel's membership in the DOE's Megaports Initiative; (E) Israel's favorable consideration of the U.S. Container Security Initiative; (F) Israel's intent to join the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and to participate in the U.S. reactor fuel conversion program; and (G) Israel's support for MANPADS initiatives in the Conference on Disarmament. Frank added that Israel is active in the IAEA Experts Group on Enhancing Safeguards, and that Israel is the deputy chair of the UN Disarmament Committee. ¶5. (C) NSG Chairman Ambassador Roald Naess (Norway) explained that the NSG's delay in responding to Israel's formal request for designation as an "adherent" was due to the NSG's need to achieve consensus in drawing up a response. He noted that, since the Oslo plenary, the NSG had taken up discussion on its relations with non-adhering countries and possible association. He said that incoming NSG Chairman Ambassador Medeiros (Brazil) intends to obtain a consensus decision on "adherent" or "associate" status at the June NSG Plenary in Rio de Janeiro. Naess conveyed Medeiros's apologies for his absence, and noted the Brazilian ambassador's hope to meet Isaeli Ambassador Michaeli in Vienna in the near future. -------------- UPDATE ON PROGRESS SINCE OSLO PLENARY -------------- ¶6. (C) Naess updated the Israeli side on changes made to the NSG guidelines based on decisions from the last NSG plenary in Oslo: (A) new text was added that concerns the transport of trigger list items; (B) there is a new section D in paragraph 9 of document I concerning controls and re-transfer, that says suppliers should consider restraint; (C) there is a new paragraph 15 that has been introduced in accordance with UNSCR 1540; and (D) there is a new paragraph 16 with new language on consultative mechanisms. ¶7. (C) Goorevich updated the Israelis on the last Consultative Group meeting, noting that members agreed to recommend the addition of UF-6-resistant bellows sealed valves to the trigger list to prevent Iran and others from purchasing them. He said the Consultative Group is also developing language for review at the Rio Plenary that would control technologies associated with stable isotope separation. Goorevich cautioned that the stable isotope separation issue could prove problematic because there is increasingly a legitimate need for such technology in non-nuclear industry (e.g., in semiconductor manufacturing). The challenge is to control the technology in a way that does not unduly affect industry. Goorevich noted that discussion of this issue follows on the heels of discussions with the South Koreans on their use of lasers for isotope separation involving uranium. -------------- ISRAEL HOPES THE NSG WILL TAKE ACTION ON IRAN -------------- ¶8. (C) Responding to Frank's question about how the NSG could address Iran, Naess said that an NSG determination of IAEA safeguards noncompliance raises the question of suspending cooperation with the noncompliant country. He noted that most NSG members have already suspended supply to Iran, even while the NSG as a body has taken no decision to suspend supply to Iran. The natural follow-up to suspension would be for NSG members to terminate some contracts with Iran. Naess cautioned, however, that this would require a decision "elsewhere in the system." He added, "If the UN Security Council decides on sanctions against Iran, then we will have a new situation." ¶9. (C) Naess noted that the NSG invoked its noncompliance mechanism in October 2005, following the IAEA resolution on Iran in September. Subsequently, NSG member states in the IAEA issued statements signaling their agreement with Naess's statement and support for EU-3 and IAEA activities on Iran. Naess said that the NSG is constantly assessing whether an extraordinary plenary is needed, and is now considering the matter in light of IAEA DG ElBaradei's report on Iran to the UNSC. Based on the report, the NSG will determine if another extraordinary plenary is necessary, or if the NSG can wait for the regular plenary scheduled for June. He stressed that the NSG would only want an extraordinary plenary, however, if it would yield decisions. ¶10. (C) Gil Reich from the IAEC asked whether the troika could confirm rumors he had heard that there would be an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) in the near future. Goorevich replied that an extraordinary BOG meeting would depend on whether suppliers see an Article 12 violation leading to an extraordinary NSG meeting. If the IAEA, after consultations, rules that there has been an Article 12 violation, then this would lead to another round of consultations that could yield a decision to terminate supply. Goorevich clarified that while decisions to suspend or terminate supply apply only to the NSG's trigger list, it would be hard to see NSG members sending dual-use times to Iran in the wake of such decisions. -------------- U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVE -------------- ¶11. (C) Naess said that the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative caused much discussion in the NSG, and noted that many NSG members are waiting for answers from India, especially about its separation plan and how it intends to implement IAEA-mandated safeguards. Naess said that the U.S. and India want the NSG to make a decision on the initiative that will allow for U.S.-Indian coordination. Naess characterized this call as premature, saying that in the NSG's view, the "ball is now in India's court," and that many NSG members prefer to wait for reactions from the U.S. Congress and India's parliament before ruling on the initiative. -------------- -------------- PRESENTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION TRENDS, EXPORT CONTROLS -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) IAEC Nonproliferation Department Director Gil Reich then made a presentation on how Israel views trends in the nonproliferation arena. In his briefing, Reich emphasized that Israel's formal recognition as an adherent would help bring non-participating states into the NSG; and that Israel will never challenge the NPT or the principles on which it stands. MFA Arms Control Division Director Alon Bar stressed the need to continue work on nonproliferation. He said he hopes steps will be taken to ensure that U.S.-India nuclear cooperation will not increase proliferation risks. ¶13. (SBU) MFA Export Control Department Director Haim Waxman updated the NSG troika on the steps Israel is taking to strengthen and transform its export control system. In his presentation, he (A) stressed the key role that export controls play in combating proliferation; (B) noted that Israel has catch-all provisions in its export control legislation; and (C) pointed out that Israel will be adhering to all the major nonproliferation regimes after the Knesset passes the draft Defense Export Control Act and a control order on dual-use export controls later this year. ¶14. (SBU) Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor (MOITAL) Chemical Administration Deputy Director Zeev Berel updated the NSG troika on the steps MOITAL is taking to educate Israeli industry on new, dual-use export control reporting obligations. Berel noted a recent success story in which an Israeli company contacted MOITAL about an export license for tantalum -- a metal that has dual-use applications. Reich added that the IAEC plays a key role in educating Customs officers on sensitive nuclear and dual-use technology, and said that the IAEC still has work to do in this area. -------------- PARTICIPANTS -------------- ¶15. (U) The participants on the Israeli side were: -- IAEC Director General Gideon Frank -- IAEC Director for Nonproliferation Gil Reich -- IAEC Director for Arms Control Merav Zafary -- IAEC Assistant Director for External Relations Ronen Shaul -- Israeli Ambassador to the IAEA Israel Michaeli -- MFA Arms Control Division Director Alon Bar -- Keren Shahar Ben-Ami from the MFA's Office of the Legal Adviser -- MFA Export Controls Department Director Haim Waxman -- MOITAL Deputy Director for Chemical Administration Zeev Berel ¶16. (U) The participants on the NSG troika side were: -- Current NSG Chairman Ambassador Roald Naess (Norway) -- Past NSG Chairman Ambassador Richard Ekwall (Sweden) -- NSG Consultative Group Chairman Richard Goorevich (U.S.) -- U.S. Embassy notetaker ¶17. (U) This cable has been cleared by U.S. Consultative Group Chairman Richard Goorevich. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES