BIBI SAYS UNDECIDEDS, TURNOUT RATE MAKE ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001164 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KPAL PINR IS GOI INTERNAL ELECTIONS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL SUBJECT: BIBI SAYS UNDECIDEDS, TURNOUT RATE MAKE ELECTION PREDICTIONS IMPOSSIBLE (C-NE6-00442) Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Likud Chairman Binyamin (Bibi) Netanyahu told the Ambassador and DCM March 22 that the main factors to consider in this election are the continuing high number of undecided voters so close to election day and the possibility of a low voter turnout. Netanyahu underlined his concern that if Kadima wins a majority, A/PM Olmert will implement additional unilateral withdrawals, which, Netanyahu asserted, will only serve to strengthen Hamas. Describing Hamas as a "malignancy" that will never moderate, Netanyahu called for "shrinking it" and referred several times during the meeting to the need for "regime change." Netanyahu tied Hamas to what he claimed is an overall Islamic fundamentalist regional trend bent on continuing "religious wars." Turning to economic issues, Netanyahu emphasized the need to continue with economic reform, and denied recent press reports that he had apologized publicly for the extent and impact on the poor of social spending cuts he instituted as finance minister. The Ambassador stressed that the USG had not taken a position on additional unilateral withdrawals. End summary. -------------- Bibi Can't Predict the Outcome -------------- ¶2. (C) Netanyahu told the Ambassador and DCM March 22 that "it is hard to say what will happen" in this election. He said that exit polls on election night can only be reported after voting has ended. The major variables, Netanyahu stressed, are the turnout rate and how the currently undecided voters ultimately vote -- if they vote at all. In response to DCM's query, Netanyahu said that never before had the number of "floaters" been so high so close to election day. He added that the final voter turnout rate, which had been in a downward trend over the years, could be the lowest ever. In response to the Ambassador's query as to how Likud intends to get out the vote, Netanyahu said that his party branches will work on this effort and cited telephoning as one tool to be used. He half-joked -- in an uncharacteristically self-deprecating manner -- that he would also be making "last minute impassioned pleas" to vote for Likud. Referring to Likud polls, Netanyahu asserted that Kadima has sunk to only 32 Knesset seats, which he claimed continues a steady downward trend since January. -------------- -- Bibi: Olmert's Policy Dangerous to Israel, U.S. -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Turning to Hamas, Netanyahu charged that A/PM's proposed policies on additional unilateral withdrawals "is a very, very, very serious problem" for Israel and the United States. This policy, he asserted, will "undoubtedly" boost Hamas and help it consolidate its rule. He underscored his view that Hamas should not be helped in any way. The Ambassador noted that USG policy clearly precludes providing Hamas with any funding. Netanyahu quipped that he cannot say the same thing about Israel's government. (Note: Netanyahu was probably referring to Olmert's decision to transfer tax revenues to the PA in February. End note.) Netanyahu stressed that this election is really about what he termed a choice between the policy of defeating Hamas -- his policy -- and sustaining it -- which Netanyahu claimed would be the result of Olmert's policy. He claimed that Sharon had opposed any further unilateral moves. Olmert is zigzagging now in his policy statements, Netanyahu assessed, in order to keep both his left-leaning and right-leaning voters. In response to the Ambassador's query, Netanyahu said that the public is not focused on the Hamas issue as it does not view Hamas as an immediate critical threat. The Ambassador stressed that the USG has not taken a position on Olmert's proposed additional unilateral moves. -------------- Need Regime Change -------------- ¶4. (C) Netanyahu underlined his view that Hamas is like a "malignancy" that, left to its own devices, will only expand and never moderate. He advocated "weakening" and "removing" Hamas from power, as was done with the regime in Iraq. He said that Hamas, like Iran, can never be "bought off," and that, since it is even better organized than Fatah, it will only gain more control. Hamas is part of a greater regional trend of Islamic fundamentalism, Netanyahu argued, which encompasses the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Taliban movement, and the growth of al Qaeda. He advocated that Israel retain control of the Jordan Valley to prevent Hamas expansion into that area and what he termed the threat that Hamas would then pose to Jordan. He advocated that Jordan be strengthened against this possible threat, with economic assistance, but he did not elaborate. Asked whether Hamas might fail on its own, Netanyahu was emphatic that Hamas would not, unless it is deprived of the means to succeed. He said that Hamas could continue for several years "distributing money it receives" to the people. Hamas would retain popularity by putting a little money in a lot of pockets rather than a lot of money in a few, as Fatah had done, he said. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised the need to encourage moderation among the Palestinian people as the best way to rein in Hamas. Netanyahu countered that Hamas popularity grew not because the public rejected the PA for its corruption, or because of disengagement, but because of a broader regional Islamic trend of rejecting the modern world. He said the only way to counter this trend "is to do what you've been doing -- remove the regime" and engage democratic forces. He agreed with the Ambassador's comment that encouraging democracy involves more than supporting free elections, and requires support for democratic institutions and civil rights. In response to the DCM's query, Netanyahu assessed that it is not possible to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict apart from the larger problem of Islamic fundamentalism because, he claimed, the Palestinians will not be satisfied with recognizing the 1967 borders. The Palestinians' "real grievance" against Israel, Netanyahu claimed, is Jaffa and Akko. -------------- Hamas is in Israel -------------- ¶6. (C) Netanyahu warned of the threat posed by Hamas within Israel. The Ambassador asked about plans for development in the Negev and Galilee that could benefit Israeli Arabs, who Netanyahu had alleged are vulnerable to recruitment by Hamas elements. Netanyahu said he supports "weaning" the Israeli Arabs away from a "culture of dependence." He advocated strengthening free markets and cutting child allowances, which, he claimed, serve only to keep Israeli Arabs as well as ultra-Orthodox Jews in a poverty trap. Israeli Arabs would then move to a higher economic status and would not be as susceptible to radicalization, he said. Netanyahu stressed that providing jobs to the Israeli-Arab sector is even more important than improving their educational system, since jobs provide immediate benefits. "I refuse to look at any Israeli citizen -- Jew or Arab -- as a welfare case," Netanyahu asserted. -------------- Economics -- Bibi at his Best -------------- ¶7. (C) Noting that he would like to turn to what he termed the other issue close to his heart, Netanyahu began a long monologue on how he helped bring strong growth to the Israeli economy during the some three years that he served as finance minister under PM Sharon. He said that growth at six or seven percent annually can continue only if his free market polices are maintained. He said he would also change Israel's policy of maintaining 93 percent of its land as public land, open only to long-term lease, not to private purchase. In response to the Ambassador's query, Netanyahu said an unraveling of his policies had started as soon as he left the finance ministry, and continues. He said that the voters do not understand what he had been trying to do. Netanyahu emphatically denied press reports that he had publicly apologized for having implemented economic measures that may have hurt certain sectors. -------------- Bio Note -------------- ¶8. (C) Netanyahu met the Ambassador and DCM March 22 at his personal office in Tel Aviv, which was abuzz with campaign strategists and assistants, and decorated with Likud campaign literature and whiteboards scribbled with diagrams, arrows, and numbers. In contrast to the surrounding commotion, Bibi appeared calm and in control, spoke in a soft, confidential tone, and was impeccably dressed. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES