GIDEON EZRA DISCUSSES AMONA COMMITTEE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001066 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV SENV KWBG IS SETTLEMENTS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS SUBJECT: GIDEON EZRA DISCUSSES AMONA COMMITTEE, POST-ELECTION DISENGAGEMENT, E-1, AND ENVIRONMENT WITH AMBASSADOR REF: A. JERUSALEM 01077 ¶B. EMAIL FROM JOHN FIELD (OES) TO BOB TANSEY/ANDY ABELL/RUTHANNA RUFFER Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Public Security Minister Gideon Ezra told the Ambassador on March 14 that the Israeli National Police (INP) knew it would encounter significant resistance during the demolitions of Amona, but that the operation had to be implemented regardless because the High Court made a decision. He said that the INP and IDF are conducting a post mortem of the operation, but that they have not drawn any conclusions yet. Ezra became visibly tense at the mention of the Knesset inquiry into Amona, and argued that the focus should be to "target" those who attacked the police, not the security forces themselves. He explained that the police are suffering from low morale because it is "blamed every day about not doing something or doing too much." With respect to Kadima's post-election strategy, Ezra said that the GOI would give Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas a "chance to prove something," but that Hamas must adhere to the three Quartet pre-conditions before Israel would deal with it. If this does not happen, the GOI will unilaterally evacuate from settlements east of the separation barrier, and maintain an IDF presence in the West Bank until final status talks. Ezra claimed that the President's April 14 letter had acknowledged that Ma'ale Adumim and E-1 would remain in Israeli hands, adding that the GOI had always intended to build E-1, but had been temporarily prevented from doing so by the recently concluded court cases. He denied that the move was in any way connected to the ongoing election campaign. The Ambassador reminded him of U.S. policy that any border adjustments be "mutually agreed" with the PA and of U.S. concerns about construction in E-1. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: Ezra described the incident of an Israeli family setting off firecrackers in the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth on March 3 as an isolated case, and said that the GOI's relations with Christians in northern Israel are good. Ezra then gave various officials from the INP the opportunity to describe the GOI's good working relations with Embassy officers, the DEA, and the Secret Service. ¶3. (C) Switching to environmental issues (Ezra is also environment minister),Dr. Miriam Haran, the Environment Ministry's director general, also expressed her appreciation for a recent visit by U.S. EPA officials to provide technical advice and expertise for the Ramat Hovav industrial and hazardous waste disposal site in the Negev. She said the GOI and EPA are cooperating on an air pollution study. The Ambassador delivered demarche points on the International Whaling Commission, and Haran replied that although whaling is not an environmental issue in Israel, she would discuss it with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ¶4. (C) Ezra asked about the need for a travel warning, and the Ambassador explained our "no-double standard" policy with respect to warnings to Embassy staff and other U.S. citizens. Ezra also asked for the release of Jonathan Pollard, and suggested the GOI could release Palestinians prisoners if "we get Pollard." End summary. -------------- Police Perspective on Amona Demolitions -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador on March 14 asked Public Security Minister Gideon Ezra, who is also environment minister, what the GOI, and particularly the Israeli National Police (INP), learned from the demolitions of the nine permanent houses in Amona outpost on February 1. Ezra responded that the police are undertaking a study with the IDF to see how to improve INP procedures, but that they have not drawn any conclusions yet. He said, however, that the INP knows that with enough forces and an agreement with the settlers, it can avoid clashes on other operations, and cited the agreement reached on the Hebron market as an example. He noted that the INP knew it would not be easy to demolish the houses and confront the settlers, but that the High Court made a decision to carry out the demolitions, and the operation had to be implemented. He claimed that the GOI could not reach an agreement with the settlers for them to destroy the houses themselves despite doing "everything possible to speak to them," so the police had to go in. ¶6. (C) Ezra asserted that the GOI knew people in Amona would resist the demolitions to show that they would not go as easily as Gaza Disengagement. He said that approximately 4,500 people were present at the outpost, and that in the end, over 200 people were injured. He reported that some police are still off duty recovering from their injuries. He commented that he did not know how future evacuations or demolitions would go, but said that High Court decisions would be implemented regardless. -------------- Knesset Inquiry Causes Low Police Morale -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked about the Knesset committee set up to study the demolitions at Amona. Ezra became visibly tense, and argued that some of the members of the committee are MKs who fought the police on the day of the demolitions -- Effi Eitam, Arieh Eldad, and Uri Ariel. Ezra claimed that he and the defense minister have a right to go to the committee in place of the police and soldiers, and he said he took advantage of this right because he feels the "target" should be those who fought against the security forces, not the forces themselves. He commented that at least three police officers' private cars have been burned or attacked since the demolitions, but concluded nevertheless that the GOI should "speak to settlers all the time" if it plans to carry out further evacuations. Ezra's chief of staff said that the level of force used during the demolitions was in accordance with the violence that was used. ¶8. (C) Ezra also remarked that he was in a difficult position, because by being forced to defend the police against complaints of violence from settlers who attacked his officers, it could make the police afraid to use force in the future. He explained that in Israel, the INP is "blamed every day about not doing something or doing too much," and, as a result, policemen are losing their "pride." The Ambassador agreed that Ezra should do his best to protect his police officers because a democratic country must follow the rule of law, and the police are in charge of enforcing court verdicts. He explained that to protect democracy, the police must feel empowered or they will lose force. Ezra agreed, and said that Alternate Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would visit the police the following day to boost their spirits. -------------- Kadima's Post-Election Strategy On Settlements and Separation Barrier -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked about Kadima's intentions after the election, and Ezra replied that Kadima will try to negotiate with anyone who will be ready, according to the agreements the GOI has made with the U.S. and the Palestinian Authority (PA). He said Kadima would give PA President Mahmud Abbas a "chance to prove something," but emphasized that if he does not and Hamas does not agree with the Quartet's three pre-conditions, then Israel would "do something else," implying further unilateral evacuations. Ezra remarked, however, that unilateral evacuations from the West Bank would be different than those of Gaza Disengagement because "not one soldier was left" in Gaza after disengagement. In the West Bank, even if some settlements were evacuated, the IDF would remain in charge until an agreement was reached with the PA on final status, according to Ezra. He noted that at the end of the day, however, the most important thing is for Israel to be a Jewish and democratic state, and that it does not want to have control over the lives of thousands of Palestinians. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked what exactly defines a settlement bloc, given that there is a significant difference between the existing built-up areas of settlements and their GOI-approved municipal boundaries. Rani Falk, the ministry's director general, responded that it changes every day because sections of the separation barrier are not built yet and many areas are still under discussion in the High Court. The Ambassador asked whether construction of the barrier would be accelerated as GOI statements have claimed, and Falk responded that the GOI would have to follow High Court rulings. -------------- Police Station in E-1 -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted press reports that construction had started on the police district headquarters in the E-1 extension of Ma'ale Adumim (ref A). Ezra's chief of staff defended the project by saying that the approval process had continued throughout Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's term in office, and that it had been successfully defended by the State in the High Court. He characterized the project as a "natural development," and said that the police "really (had) to move" to a proper headquarters. He estimated that the new building would house a few hundred employees. Falk agreed that the station had gone through the proper process, and said that the High Court had issued its decision a few weeks ago. Ezra claimed that the President's April 14 letter had acknowledged that Ma'ale Adumim and E-1 would remain in Israeli hands, adding that the GOI had always intended to build E-1, but had been temporarily prevented from doing so by the recently concluded court cases. He denied that the move was in any way connected to the ongoing election campaign. He also emphasized that Ma'ale Adumim is very important for Israel, and that E-1 is necessary to connect Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem. Ezra added (erroneously),"We understand your concern is the eastern border of Ma'ale Adumim," suggesting that the USG's problem with the Ma'ale Adumim bloc is its reach to the east, and not the construction of E-1 itself. The Ambassador responded that the President's letter had stressed that any changes to borders to account for existing population centers would only take place by "mutual agreement" with the PA. The Ambassador emphasized that this was one reason why defining settlement "blocs" was so important. Ezra noted that "no one was living there before except the Bedouin," so the construction of Ma'ale Adumim should not be a problem. The Ambassador replied that the main concern was the impact expansion of Ma'ale Adumim and construction in E-1 would have on the contiguity of a Palestinian state and the north-south transportation of Palestinians in the West Bank. Ezra said, without elaborating, that an important tunnel road would be built for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. He concluded that, "we'll separate, and it will be good for them and good for us." -------------- Nazareth Incident -------------- ¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked for Ezra's assessment of the events that took place on March 3 at the Church of the Annunciation, in which an Israeli family set off firecrackers in the Church. Ezra responded that he thinks it will be an isolated incident, and that the GOI has good relations with Christians in northern Israel. He said that the Christian Society of Nazareth and the Bishop of Haifa helped calm the situation, and that generally relations with Israeli Arabs are good. Ezra cited as an example a recent soccer game between Beitar Jerusalem and the only Arab team in the league. He said that he had ordered the police to secure the game in case riots broke out, but noted that "nothing happened even though the Arab team lost" on its home turf. -------------- GOI Appreciates USG Security Cooperation -------------- ¶13. (C) Falk told the Ambassador that eight months ago, a delegation from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security had been in Israel to develop joint working groups on security matters. He said that Hurricane Katrina had impeded the U.S. officials from returning to Israel, but noted that on March 4 he received word from the Israeli Embassy in Washington that the groups would be re-started. Falk said that the groups would be busy and have good working relations. Ezra then thanked the Ambassador for the USG's cooperation on the extradition of Ze'ev Rosenstein. Commander Irit Bouton, head of the Special Operations Division of the INP's Intelligence Department, praised the good relations the INP has with Federal Bureau of Investigation officials at post, the Drug Enforcement Agency representative at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus, and the U.S. Secret Service agent in Rome, who provides the INP with expertise on anti-money laundering and anti-counterfeiting methods. -------------- Ramat Hovav Chemical Plant -------------- ¶14. (C) Dr. Miriam Haran, director general of the environment ministry, told the Ambassador that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) came to Israel in December 2005 to provide advice and suggestions toward sustainable solutions for the Ramat Hovav industrial and hazardous waste disposal site in the Negev. She characterized it as a good visit, and said that the Ministry of Environment (MOE) is interested in further cooperation, training, and cleaning of chemicals, particularly asbestos. She said this type of cooperation with the USG is especially important for Negev development. Haran said that the EPA had helped the MOE decide on a solution for wastewater treatment, explaining that the options before had been either transfer to the sea or evaporation. She remarked that evaporation is very expensive, but that the EPA and a private environmental consulting firm from Holland had recommended the use of ponds if industry is forced by regulation to clean their waste to the standards allowed for chemical discharge into rivers. She said the pond project would cost NIS 230 million, and assured the Ambassador that U.S. companies would be able to compete in the bids. The Ambassador asked what type of chemicals the Ramat Hovav plant processes, and Haran responded that they are pesticides and other chemical components such as bromine. She said there are thousands of workers in the bromine industry in Israel, and that the only countries who produce bromine are the U.S., Israel, China, and France. Haran also noted that the MOE is planning an air pollution study with the EPA. She said a private NGO had applied for funds from the MOE and EPA to study were pollution particles originate. -------------- International Whaling Commission -------------- ¶15. (C) Haran commented that she understands the U.S. is interested in the GOI joining the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Haran remarked that Israel does not have whales or whale-hunters, so this is why Israel has not joined the IWC to date. She said it would be difficult to explain to Israelis why they have to pay to join the IWC when whaling is not a problem in Israel, and the GOI already has two laws to protect endangered species. The Ambassador delivered demarche points (ref B),and explained to Haran that whales are a shared natural resource that benefits all mankind. The U.S. urged Israel to join the whaling convention in time for the June IWC meeting. Haran and Ezra said that although whaling is not an environmental issue in Israel, they would discuss joining the IWC with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. -------------- Travel Warning -------------- ¶16. (C) Ezra questioned the need for a travel warning from the U.S. The Ambassador responded that the USG only added five lines to the travel warning for Israel because crime has taken place in several popular places, including Herzliyya Pituach where many U.S. diplomats and other American citizens live. He explained that the Embassy had a duty to warn its employees of crime dangers, and under the "no-double standard" policy in place since the Pan Am 103 bombing, must therefore warn all U.S. citizens. Ezra asked whether it is possible to cancel the travel warning, and the Ambassador emphasized that the advisory is in place mainly to warn U.S. citizens about terrorism in Israel, not crime. Micky Rosenfeld, representative from the INP's Foreign Press Office, said that it was legitimate for the U.S. to write a few lines about crime, but that the problem was that the warning had shown up on the front page of Yediot Aharanot. Ezra asked the Ambassador if it would be possible for him to tell the press that its reporting had exaggerated the warning, and the Ambassador said he would because he agreed with that assessment. -------------- Release Pollard -------------- ¶17. (C) Ezra closed the meeting by asking for the release of Jonathan Pollard. He said "no one understands" why Pollard is in jail when Soviet spies have been released from U.S. jails, and added tongue-in-cheek that "we gave you Rosenstein." He said that the GOI could let some Palestinian prisoners go if "we get Pollard." The Ambassador responded that this issue is in the President's hands, but that he would report to Washington Ezra's remarks. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES