C-NE6-00442 KADIMA'S CAMPAIGN FOR CONTROL OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001061 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2011 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IS KDEM GOI INTERNAL ELECTIONS SUBJECT: C-NE6-00442 KADIMA'S CAMPAIGN FOR CONTROL OF THE KNESSET REF: A. TEL AVIV 990 ¶B. TEL AVIV 1057 ¶C. TEL AVIV 987 Classified By: Political Counselor Norman H. Olsen. Reason 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Less than two weeks before Israel's elections, the Kadima Party is on course to win a plurality of seats in the next Knesset despite minor up and down swings in the weekly polls. Kadima's broadly accepted political goal of unilaterally defining Israel's borders will allow the party to maintain its cohesiveness in the face of challenges from the right and left. Early March mudslinging at Olmert, Hanegbi and other veteran politicians by Kadima's main challengers, primarily Labor and Likud, has created a climate for once-ignored scandals to bloom -- and cancel each other out. Pundits reveled in the evidence of influence peddling found in Omri Sharon's appointment books, which came to light in early March, but subsequent sentencing of Likud MK Naomi Blumenthal has shifted the anti-corruption spotlight away from Kadima and onto Likud Chief Bibi Netanyahu's back. The challenge for Kadima and other Israeli parties over the next twelve days will be to keep the electorate, particularly at the center of the political spectrum, interested enough in the elections to actually vote on March 28. Although it is premature for Kadima insiders to fully assess the party's post-election options, Kadima's campaign manager, seconded by other Kadima strategists, said the party will look first to the right -- Likud, Yisrael Beitenu (Lieberman),and the ultra-orthodox parties (UTJ, Shas) -- to form a coalition after the elections. End Summary. -------------- --- The Kadima Platform: A Jewish, Democratic State -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Minister Ze'ev Boim, a childhood friend of A/PM Olmert, described the vision behind the formation a new political party, Kadima, in a February meeting with the Ambassador: "In the wake of the Hamas victory and changes throughout the world, the vast majority of Israelis understand that we have to change our attitude toward the conflict and find a way to solve it. We must decide on a final border of Israel so that Israel will be able to maintain itself as a Jewish and democratic state. This is the idea of Kadima." Minister Ronnie Bar-On, whose failed November bid for a ministerial appointment -- along with that ;of Boim -- marked the proximate cause of Kadima's creation, explained to the Ambassador on March 9 his perspective on the difference between Kadima and the parties from which it drew most of its members: "Likud lives in the fantasy of power, threatening to reoccupy Gaza and northern Samaria, while Labor hugs Abu Mazen." (ref A). Kadima's top "Russian" candidate, who is number six on the party list, Marina Solodkin, explained her own motivation for leaving Likud for Kadima at a public panel discussion with other candidates: "Israel is ripe for a centrist party. I'm an immigrant and Bibi and the right wing are outmoded, elitist, conservative and anti-immigrant." -------------- -- A Major Party at the Center of Israeli Politics -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Boim said he believes that Kadima's strength lies in what he claimed is its cohesiveness, which was tested following the incapacitation of PM Ariel Sharon. Boim added that Ehud (Olmert) is the natural successor to Ariel Sharon; what Boim termed a natural "second best." Olmert supported Sharon on political and security issues, notably on Israel's future moves and future with the Palestinians. Internecine conflicts have destroyed other centrist parties -- most recently Shinui, which has fractured into several factions, and earlier the personality-based, centrist parties of the past, such as Merkaz in 1999 or the short-lived Dash centrist party in the 1970s. Kadima members, on the other hand, overcame personal ambitions and avoided public, political quarrels among their leaders, Boim said. Boim commended Tzipi Livni -- Kadima's most appealing politician in the polls -- for her willingness to allow Shimon Peres to fill the coveted number two slot on the party list, even though Sharon had only promised Peres a slot among the top seven. Boim cited Livni's move as representative of a sense of understanding among Kadima's leaders that the party's power lies in its ability to stand together. Kadima's top ten candidates have far more combined Knesset and government experience than those of Labor or Likud, Bar-On claimed, even if Shimon Peres' decades of service are excluded. Both Boim and Bar-On say they are campaigning to help ensure that Kadima wins a large plurality that will enable it to govern effectively, without giving over the party's agenda to left- or right-wing extremes. Kadima's younger members and more experienced political operatives have created an organization from scratch that includes 122 local chapters spread across the country, according to Yohanan Plesner, a Kadima candidate who is responsible for organizing rallies. -------------- -------------- DISINTERESTED PUBLIC COULD DIMINISH KADIMA PLURALITY -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) News-hungry Israeli pundits and pollsters have written extensively on the ups and downs of Kadima's standing in the polls over the past month, attributing gains or losses variously either to Russian voter disenchantment and corruption, or to specific events such as the evacuation of Amona outpost, the election victory of Hamas, and now the Jericho prisoner snatch operation on March 15. From a high of 43 seats on February 10 (Yedioth Ahronoth),Kadima had slipped to 37 seats over the past month. Kadima's campaign manager, Avigdor Yitzhaki, postulated March 6 in a private conservation with poloff that supporters who leave Kadima do not move back to Labor or Likud -- they join the ranks of undecided voters. Kadima party organizer, Yohanan Plesner, who is number 32 on the Kadima slate, told emboffs March 15 that the disaffected have drifted into a large pool of undecided voters -- a group that could affect the fate of as many as 24 seats in the next Knesset, according to some polls. Alternatively, Plesner continued, these disaffected voters may not vote at all, a move that would mark a departure from the normally high level of political participation in Israeli elections, which has historically been in the high 70's, although in 2003 it dropped to 68 percent participation. A poll conducted by the Maagar Mohot Institute found that only 44 percent of the 18-32 age cohort plan to vote, according to a Yedioth Ahronoth report on March ¶8. Plesner, seconded by Labor and Likud party activists who joined him on an elections panel held at the Embassy, said he believes a high level of public disinterest would hurt Israel's three largest parties -- Kadima, Labor and Likud -- proportionally more than it would hurt the smaller parties on the left or right. He attributed voter disinterest to disaffection with perceived corruption in Israeli politics. -------------- -------------- The Challengers: Labor and Likud Blast Away at Kadima -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Kadima's own "internal" poll of March 7 gave the party 39 seats, a result that led the party's pollster, Kalman Gayer, to herald that Kadima had succeeded in blocking its modest decline in February and early March weekly polls. Olmert's decision to lay siege to the Jericho prison compound on March 15 -- the only action conceivable under the circumstances for any prime minister, acting or permanent -- and the IDF's success in apprehending the alleged assassins of Israeli Minister Ze'evi is likely to give some bounce to Kadima's leading position in the polls (ref B). Likud and Labor leaders politely applauded Olmert's action, but continue to fire broadsides at Kadima rather than at each other. In a February debate with the Kadima candidate Marina Solodkin, far-right Likud MK Uzi Landau blasted the Kadima leadership as responsible for the Hamas election victory and called the concept of disengagement a "policy of capitulation" -- a refrain that Bibi Netanyahu and other fear-mongering critics further to the right echo in their March campaign ads (ref C) that put Olmert, and even Sharon, squarely in the crosshairs of their attack. Likud MK Michael Eitan reportedly compared both Ariel and Omri Sharon to the former dictators of Iraq and Romania. Kadima Minister Ronnie Bar-On, a veteran politician who has borne the brunt of many an attack, particularly while serving as a short-lived attorney general for Netanyahu in 1997, complained to the Ambassador on March 9 that "Labor and Likud have no agenda, no candidates, no team, but just take aim at Kadima personalities since they know they don't have a chance of winning the elections." Hebrew University Professor Menachem Ben Sasson, a newcomer to politics who is number 20 in the Kadima list, told poloff that there is PR upside to the Labor and Likud attacks on Kadima: each day the morning news rings with the word Kadima. -------------- CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS SHIFT AWAY FROM KADIMA -------------- ¶6. (C) The publication of Omri Sharon's appointment books by Israel's Channel Ten on March 5 marked a short-lived public outcry over influence peddling by former Likudniks close to Sharon who share ties with Olmert and Kadima. Omri, who is appealing the prison sentence for his conviction for campaign funding violations, apparently kept detailed notes of how he arranged political appointments for Likud central committee members in return for political support. Typical of the public response generated by these revelations is that of Ma'ariv political analyst, Dan Margalit, who wrote on March 6 that "Kadima was not founded because of corruption, but because Ariel Sharon had the daring to decide on disengagement. It is a party with a peace plan; it has original positions on matters of education and economics... But it says nothing in the realm of public morals, which is eroding Israeli society, its economy and the stability of the rule of law." Alternate PM Olmert has refused to disavow or dismiss those allies, such as Minister Tzachi Hanegbi, who have been accused of peddling political influence while serving in Sharon's Likud-led government. The High Court of Justice has rejected a petition from the Movement for Quality Government, which argued that Hanegbi should step down from Olmert's interim government, but has pronounced that Hanegbi's service will, in fact, end with the elections. -------------- PARTY ORGANIZATION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE -------------- ¶7. (C) The immediate effect of these allegations has been to force at least some Kadima campaigners to be on the defensive. Former Ministry of Education Director General and Kadima candidate number 25 Ronit Tirosh told poloff on February 28 that the press would rather ask her for her views on Hanegbi's future with the party than on her plans to address the crisis in Israel's educational system. Kadima candidate Plesner told poloff March 15 that a small group of organizers, including campaign manager Avigdor Yitzhaki Minister Meir Sheetrit and Kadima legal advisors, gathered on March 12 to prepare the public rollout of Kadima's formal political structure, which, Plesner says, will demonstrate that Kadima will remain transparent, organized and disciplined. For example, Plesner indicated that Kadima plans to hold primaries among its general membership rather than establish a smaller central committee to select candidates. Both Yitzhaki and Plesner told poloff that Kadima has relied exclusively on state funding for its first Knesset campaign, a fact that they say will help insulate them from future charges of political corruption. The March 14 conviction and sentencing of Likud candidate number 18 Naomi Blumenthal on campaign bribery charges undoubtedly takes some of the heat off Kadima. -------------- -------------- More Academics, More Women, Some Russians, Few Arabs -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Yitzhaki recalled how Sharon had instructed Kadima party cadres to limit the number of incumbent MKs on the party list to the 15 original founders of the faction and the three Labor MKs (Peres, Ramon, Itzik) who joined later. Sharon's decision paved the way for Kadima to open its doors to professionals outside politics. Professor Ben Sasson explained his decision to work with Olmert's party: "In the next four-five years, we must delineate our borders -- where 95 percent of Jews will live and where 95 percent of Palestinians will live." He applauded Kadima's embrace of academicians, including colleagues drawn from all of Israel's major universities -- former rector of Haifa University Shlomo Breznitz; founder of the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center and former Dean of Tel Aviv University's Law School Uriel Reichman; and Professor Yitzhak Ben-Israel of Tel Aviv University. ¶9. (C) Ronit Tirosh, a secondary school administrator and teacher of Arabic who served as director general of the Education Ministry under two Sharon governments, told emboffs that she accepted Sharon's invitation to join Kadima after he explained to her that he wanted to deploy her management skills in a Kadima-led government. Tirosh organized a meeting of Kadima's political debutantes that convinced her of the party's depth, which she attributed to the presence of diversity (an Ethiopian, Shlomo Mola, who immigrated to Israel alone in 1984) and dynamism (four leaders of youth movements, including Secretary-General Lior Carmel of the Scouts, which is Israel's largest youth movement, and the former head of the Likud party youth movement, Yoel Hasson). Former Likud Party Member Marina Solodkin lambasted the low number of female candidates put forward by the Likud Party, and proudly pointed to the ten women on the Kadima list. Yitzhaki predicted that Kadima's six "Russian" candidates would enable Kadima to capture more than 30 percent of the Russian vote (with what he estimated as 40 percent going to Yisrael Beitenu). Yitzhaki said Kadima's focus groups discovered that including Israeli Arab candidates would result in net losses for the party. Consequently, Kadima has relegated its lone Israeli Arab to number 51, a slot not even included on the Kadima website. Plesner nonetheless claimed to emboffs that Kadima's diversity remains its strength, pointing out that its slate includes a Druze candidate (Majalli Whbee, number 18) and religious Zionists (e.g., former YESHA Council Secretary-General, Othniel Schneller, number 26). -------------- -------------- Possible Coalitions: Likud or Lieberman first, then Labor -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Yitzhaki told poloff that he anticipates Olmert will ask him to take the lead in forming a governing coalition after the elections. Yitzhaki explained that after working with PM Sharon for years he follows a basic methodology: keep one opponent inside and the other outside the coalition. Yitzhaki's preference would be to bring Likud in and keep Labor out. Yitzhaki predicted that if Likud joins the coalition Netanyahu will step down from the Likud leadership. Yitzhaki predicted that if Likud does not join, Yitzhaki would ask Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu and the ultra-orthodox United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party to join with Kadima, explaining his rationale: "UTJ would be less expensive than Shas." Plesner, too, told poloff in private that Kadima will try first to coopt the opposition to its right by enticing the Likud or Yisrael Beitenu as well as the ultra-orthodox Shas and UTJ to join its coalition. Plesner acknowledged that it is too early to tell whether Netanyahu will bow out, but he noted that Silvan Shalom is patiently waiting in the wings should Likud fail to secure strong representation in the next Knesset. On Lieberman's compatibility with Kadima, Plesner noted that Yisrael Beitenu also urges a unilateral definition and adjustment of borders rather than the population transfer of Palestinians that other parties on the right seek. Plesner also intimated that Kadima might succeed in bringing Labor on board with its coalition after bringing in the right, at which point Labor's leverage to make demands would be reduced. Asked how he envisages Kadima's economic policy shifting in the context of eventual coalition-building, Kadima political strategist Lior Chorev, replied: "It won't be the economic policy of Amir Peretz and that's all I am going to say." ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES