ISRAELI NSA EILAND'S INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001048

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC KWBG KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSA EILAND'S INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT
OF JERICHO ARRESTS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Israeli National Security Adviser Giora
Eiland and his chief of staff, Roy Dick, told the Ambassador
and DCM on March 14 that the Israeli raid to arrest
Palestinian detainees formerly monitored by U.S. and UK
personnel in Jericho had been planned as early as 2002. He
claimed the GOI had no choice but to move to prevent an
escape by the prisoners, who are accused of murdering an
Israeli cabinet member in addition to other crimes. Although
he said that it is too soon to predict how the Palestinians
will respond, his view is that the move puts PA President
Mahmud Abbas in a "lose-lose situation" and confronts Hamas
with decisions that it had hoped to postpone until after
consolidating power. Eiland expressed concern that the
crisis may negatively impact relations with Israel's Arab
neighbors and was worried that a prolonged absence of
international UNRWA and ICRC staff from Gaza and the West
Bank could have "severe consequences" on aid deliveries.
Septel covers Eiland's remarks on Lebanon, A/PM Ehud Olmert's
plans for a possible second disengagement, and proposed
changes to the NSC's role in the GOI. End summary.

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GOI Preparing for Arrest Operation Since 2002
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2. (C) The Ambassador and DCM met with Eiland at the NSC
during the afternoon of March 14 while the IDF had the
Jericho prison surrounded, but before the Palestinian
detainees had surrendered. As background, Eiland said that
Palestinian statements on the possible release of the
prisoners covered by the JMM agreement had made it "quite
obvious" that the GOI would have to move against the facility
or risk the prisoners' escape. He claimed PM Sharon had set
a "very clear" policy on this issue as far back as 2002. He
added that GOI officials had met the previous week and
reconfirmed their intent to take immediate action to prevent
any prisoner escape after a JMM withdrawal (note: Embassy
reported GOI intentions septel. End note).


3. (C) Eiland said the military move had been the GOI's
default option and denied that the current election campaign
had any influence on the decision. He confided that Israeli
special forces had trained for such a mission for the past
four years and had been close to executing it at an earlier
date after receiving reports that prisoners would be smuggled
out of the jail. The DCM asked whether the GOI planned
additional moves against the PFLP. Eiland replied that such
action would be difficult, because the group is more
important politically than militarily and has no real
infrastructure, only personnel, in the West Bank and Gaza.

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Eiland: Hamas Uncertain How to React
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4. (C) Eiland said the NSC had previously predicted a
relative period of calm in the next few weeks, due to
Israel's preoccupation with elections and Hamas' focus on
forming a government. After the JMM withdrawal, however,
"today is a different day." He noted that it was too soon to
predict the Palestinian response to the crisis, adding that
the possibilities range from a resumption of relative quiet
to the beginning of a third intifada. Pointing to a wave of
kidnappings following the JMM withdrawal, he described the
Palestinians as "furious." He suggested that a successful
arrest operation could lead to riots and disturbances in the
Palestinian area and among Palestinian prisoners in Israeli
jails. Eiland said that President Abbas is in a "lose-lose
situation" and will be blamed by extremists for the failure
to protect the prisoners. He added that the GOI was not
surprised by the Palestinian response to the operation,
noting that after each previous planning session the GOI had
assessed possible ramifications against the background of
existing conditions at the time.


5. (C) In Eiland's assessment, "the real challenge is to the
Hamas government," which "must take decisions much sooner
than planned." He claimed that Hamas would have preferred to
postpone such decisions until after consolidating power.
Although "Hamas hasn't made up their mind yet" on whether to
maintain the cease-fire or to resume attacks, Eiland said his
personal view is that both Hamas and Israel share an interest
in maintaining calm.

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Negative International Repercussions
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6. (C) Eiland expressed concern that Israel's relations with
its Arab neighbors would be adversely affected by the Jericho
raid. He said EGIS chief Omar Soleiman had been
"disappointed and even angry" during a call to postpone a
visit to Israel planned for March 15. Eiland predicted that
Hizballah will use the Jericho raid as a pretense for attacks
it is already planning along Israel's northern border. He
described reports of withdrawals of ICRC and UNRWA
international personnel from the West Bank and Gaza as "very
significant." Eiland admitted that he is just beginning to
study the potentially "severe consequences" of such moves,
but mentioned that they could greatly affect the Palestinian
economy and supply of humanitarian assistance.

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JONES