ISRAELI NSA EILAND'S INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001048 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC KWBG KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSA EILAND'S INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF JERICHO ARRESTS Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Israeli National Security Adviser Giora Eiland and his chief of staff, Roy Dick, told the Ambassador and DCM on March 14 that the Israeli raid to arrest Palestinian detainees formerly monitored by U.S. and UK personnel in Jericho had been planned as early as 2002. He claimed the GOI had no choice but to move to prevent an escape by the prisoners, who are accused of murdering an Israeli cabinet member in addition to other crimes. Although he said that it is too soon to predict how the Palestinians will respond, his view is that the move puts PA President Mahmud Abbas in a "lose-lose situation" and confronts Hamas with decisions that it had hoped to postpone until after consolidating power. Eiland expressed concern that the crisis may negatively impact relations with Israel's Arab neighbors and was worried that a prolonged absence of international UNRWA and ICRC staff from Gaza and the West Bank could have "severe consequences" on aid deliveries. Septel covers Eiland's remarks on Lebanon, A/PM Ehud Olmert's plans for a possible second disengagement, and proposed changes to the NSC's role in the GOI. End summary. -------------- GOI Preparing for Arrest Operation Since 2002 -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and DCM met with Eiland at the NSC during the afternoon of March 14 while the IDF had the Jericho prison surrounded, but before the Palestinian detainees had surrendered. As background, Eiland said that Palestinian statements on the possible release of the prisoners covered by the JMM agreement had made it "quite obvious" that the GOI would have to move against the facility or risk the prisoners' escape. He claimed PM Sharon had set a "very clear" policy on this issue as far back as 2002. He added that GOI officials had met the previous week and reconfirmed their intent to take immediate action to prevent any prisoner escape after a JMM withdrawal (note: Embassy reported GOI intentions septel. End note). ¶3. (C) Eiland said the military move had been the GOI's default option and denied that the current election campaign had any influence on the decision. He confided that Israeli special forces had trained for such a mission for the past four years and had been close to executing it at an earlier date after receiving reports that prisoners would be smuggled out of the jail. The DCM asked whether the GOI planned additional moves against the PFLP. Eiland replied that such action would be difficult, because the group is more important politically than militarily and has no real infrastructure, only personnel, in the West Bank and Gaza. -------------- Eiland: Hamas Uncertain How to React -------------- ¶4. (C) Eiland said the NSC had previously predicted a relative period of calm in the next few weeks, due to Israel's preoccupation with elections and Hamas' focus on forming a government. After the JMM withdrawal, however, "today is a different day." He noted that it was too soon to predict the Palestinian response to the crisis, adding that the possibilities range from a resumption of relative quiet to the beginning of a third intifada. Pointing to a wave of kidnappings following the JMM withdrawal, he described the Palestinians as "furious." He suggested that a successful arrest operation could lead to riots and disturbances in the Palestinian area and among Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Eiland said that President Abbas is in a "lose-lose situation" and will be blamed by extremists for the failure to protect the prisoners. He added that the GOI was not surprised by the Palestinian response to the operation, noting that after each previous planning session the GOI had assessed possible ramifications against the background of existing conditions at the time. ¶5. (C) In Eiland's assessment, "the real challenge is to the Hamas government," which "must take decisions much sooner than planned." He claimed that Hamas would have preferred to postpone such decisions until after consolidating power. Although "Hamas hasn't made up their mind yet" on whether to maintain the cease-fire or to resume attacks, Eiland said his personal view is that both Hamas and Israel share an interest in maintaining calm. -------------- Negative International Repercussions -------------- ¶6. (C) Eiland expressed concern that Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors would be adversely affected by the Jericho raid. He said EGIS chief Omar Soleiman had been "disappointed and even angry" during a call to postpone a visit to Israel planned for March 15. Eiland predicted that Hizballah will use the Jericho raid as a pretense for attacks it is already planning along Israel's northern border. He described reports of withdrawals of ICRC and UNRWA international personnel from the West Bank and Gaza as "very significant." Eiland admitted that he is just beginning to study the potentially "severe consequences" of such moves, but mentioned that they could greatly affect the Palestinian economy and supply of humanitarian assistance. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES