POTUS Meeting June 5 With Honduran President Mel

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TEGUCIGALPA 000872 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA, WHA/PPC, WHA/EPSC, AND WHA/CEN STATE FOR EB, INL, PM, OES, CA, PRM, AND DRL STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC/CAM, LAC/RSD, AND EGAT NSC FOR DAN FISK E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV EPET SNAR EAID SENV KJUS HO SUBJECT: POTUS Meeting June 5 With Honduran President Mel Zelaya: Themes, Issues, and Areas of Bilateral Assistance ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: One hundred days into his term, President Mel Zelaya remains somewhat of an enigma. On the positive side, he has strongly supported CAFTA; cooperated fully with the DHS/ICE deportation of illegal immigrants (nearly 200 daily); acted - with limited resources - to combat the exploding drug and security problems; engaged in successful negotiations with El Salvador (a traditional enemy) to resolve the land border dispute (sea demarcation remains a problem); and he voices strong support for the U.S.-Honduran relationship. In addition, from the very first day of his election, President Zelaya has relished the opportunity to meet with President Bush, and he eagerly awaits the June 5 White House meeting. He made a point of receiving Attorney General Gonzales at his first official meeting after the inauguration - with Mexican President Vicente Fox and other leaders waiting in the wings. President Zelaya has visited the Embassy and the Ambassador's residence and his senior advisors tell us that his meetings with the Ambassador have priority over all other business. On May 4, he visited the USS Underwood, the first U.S. Navy vessel to visit mainland Honduras in twenty years. His words underscored his strong affinity for the United States. ¶2. (SBU) On the not so positive side, Zelaya is seen by many observers as disorganized, distrustful of many of his own advisors/cabinet officials, prone to populism, and influenced by divided counsel - including some with definite leftist leanings. Because he made so many campaign promises, the future is uncertain. It appears to Post that Zelaya and a few key advisors believe that the only way Zelaya can fulfill his promise to lower gasoline prices in the short term is to strike a deal with Venezuela, particularly with PetroCaribe. Although he claims this would be an economic deal only, Zelaya is in a position to be influenced by the political pressure that Chavez could bring if/when Honduras becomes dependent on Venezuelan oil. Zelaya has done little thus far to stem the rampant corruption in Honduras, though there are bright signs in reforming the tax system and actually collecting large sums of tax money from elite economic interests paying little or no taxes. END SUMMARY. -------------- --- Key Strategic Themes in Bilateral Relationship -------------- - ¶3. (SBU) The key strategic themes in our bilateral diplomatic efforts in Honduras are: the rule of law (including democratic institutions),regional security (including transnational crime),economic development to reduce poverty (through trade and investment, and investment in human resources),and assistance to American citizens and businesses. Overarching these goals is an emphasis on good governance and attacking corruption, a focus that Zelaya says he shares, as fraud/waste/abuse and the ineffective administration of justice hampers progress in all these areas. U.S. goals coincide with Zelaya's emphasis on public security/rule of law, economic development, and natural resources/environment (including the prevention insomuch as possible of natural disasters). ¶4. (SBU) Over the weekend of May 5-7, the U.S. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with support from the U.S. Military Group and other EmbOffs, held a National Security Strategy workshop for GOH, opened by Vice President Santos, presided by Minister of Defense Aristides Mejia, Chief of Honduran Defense General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, and TEGUCIGALP 00000872 002 OF 008 leading members of military and police, as well as other government officials. The workshop was a success, but development of the full strategy and implementation will take time and resources. Nevertheless, it is a critical step and the foundation toward achieving success in regional security and stability. -------------- Regional Issues, Venezuela Included -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Zelaya is very sensitive to any appearance of U.S. favoritism toward El Salvador. He is aware from press reports of President Saca's push for major non-NATO ally status for El Salvador and is very suspicious of how such a determination could upset the balance of forces in the region. ¶6. (SBU) The Zelaya Administration has pledged to support Guatemala over Venezuela for the seat on the United Nations Security Council. ¶7. (SBU) Post is working with Embassy Managua to see what might be the most useful thing the Hondurans could do in relation to the Nicaraguan elections. Due to the long standing Caribbean maritime border dispute between the two countries, Zelaya is unlikely to take significant action. Nevertheless, having recently held elections, the GOH should agree in principal and publicly to the importance of free, fair, and transparent elections for the promotion of democracy. ¶8. (SBU) USG officials should continue to underscore the concern Washington places on Chavez-run Venezuela, suggesting that there are possible consequences in terms of getting sympathetic responses to problems when a country expands its relationship with the Chavez government. -------------- Immigration: Reform, TPS, and Deportations -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Immigration Reform: GOH immigration reform remains a major problem - no change from the Maduro Administration. Just recently a new Immigration Director was appointed. Reform to immigration moves at a painstakingly tedious pace despite best USG diplomatic efforts. DHS/CIS Office of Refugee, Asylum and International Relations has discussed providing possible technical assistance to assist Honduran immigration reform. ¶10. (SBU) Temporary Protective Status (TPS): Honduras' number one earner of foreign exchange is remittances from the U.S. (about USD 1.5 billion in 2005). Given the difficult economic conditions in Honduras, the government wants TPS to continue indefinitely. The program allows about 80,000 Hondurans who were in the U.S. at the time of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 to remain in the U.S. temporarily. The authorization has been renewed annually and currently runs out in 2007. Interestingly, according to recent Honduran press reports, fewer than 5,000 Hondurans have re- subscribed to TPS. Some argue that under TPS Honduras enjoys privileged status that other deserving countries do not. The GOH is hopeful that possible U.S. immigration reform will include expanded temporary work visas. ¶11. (SBU) Deportation: Honduras has fully cooperated, but TEGUCIGALP 00000872 003 OF 008 the U.S. is still seeking to increase the number and size of flights to Honduras, mainly by opening the San Pedro Sula airport to Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS) aircraft (the San Pedro Sula airport can accommodate larger airplanes). Working with the International Organization for Migration (IOM),Post has engaged the GOH by urging them to permit JPATS flights into the northern city of San Pedro Sula and to open a Center for Returned Migrants there. All JPATS flights now must use Tegucigalpa's very difficult airport, which can not land the largest JPATS planes and is closed more often by weather than is San Pedro Sula's airport. ¶12. (SBU) The GOH has agreed in principle to this request, but seeks USG assistance to refurbish an old terminal for these purposes (USD 50,000) and to help cover operating costs of the two centers (USD 100,000 per year). Post strongly believes meeting these requests would advance U.S. interests by permitting additional removals of Hondurans unlawfully present in the United States. The GOH has been noticeably cooperative in documenting its own nationals who are illegally in the United States and Post believes providing support for the San Pedro Sula facility would also help to cement that support. DHS/ICE/DRO has indicated a willingness to pay a processing fee for each Honduran documented by Honduran consuls in the United States so that they may be deported. Post recognizes there may be legal limitations on the extent to which we can dictate how and where those fee monies should be spent, but also urges DHS/ICE/DRO to design a mechanism to permit money to flow to the opening and operation of the San Pedro Sula facility (as well as operating the Tegucigalpa center). -------------- Drugs, Gangs, and Security -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Counternarcotics and Counterterrorism: POTUS may want to ask Zelaya what he plans to do about the nearly out of control narcotics problem in certain regions of his country. This will likely result in Zelaya asking for desperately needed help. What we need is a specific GOH plan of action and clearly identified requirements to consider. The most pressing need for the GOH is maritime patrol aircraft, but the GOH also needs support for their response ability, intelligence capabilities, and continued State/INL funding (which is drying up) to strengthen the collection of evidence, investigative capacity on money laundering, and successful prosecutions. SOUTHCOM has said it does not have any counternarcotics money available to Central American partners, although helicopters from Soto Cano air base have provided airlift support in counter-drug operations. DHS/CBP and the Coast Guard have both assisted the GOH, but more help is needed to stem the massive flow of drugs through the Central American transit zone. ¶14. (SBU) The GOH is a party to all 12 UN and two OAS counterterrorism conventions/protocols in effect. USG agencies may have money available for assistance on counterterrorism issues. For example, the Honduran Customs Service (DEI) is seeking support to install container scanning equipment at land borders. This would extend the coverage of the highly-successful Container Security Initiative at the maritime port of Puerto Cortes to land entries, both facilitating trade and improving security. Another possible project could be to develop the facility at Mocoron to pursue narcotrafficers in the Mosquitia TEGUCIGALP 00000872 004 OF 008 (northeastern region of Honduras most prevalent in narcotics operations); this concept could be expanded to go after arms smugglers involved in terrorism in the region. In order for such projects to be successful, however, they must be preceded by real GOH military transformation. ¶15. (SBU) Initiation of a Special Anti-Gang Unit: Currently the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) is in the process of initiating a Special Anti-Gang Unit to be comprised of Police Officers from various existing Gang Units as well as two prosecutors from the Public Ministry's Organized Crime Unit to specifically target gang activities. The anti-gang proposal will address several aspects of this serious problem to include the following: education, prevention, interdiction, rehabilitation, and re-insertion into society. It is estimated that in order to properly address, manage, and maintain this Unit, it would take approximately USD 500,000. Just recently, USD 127,000 was repositioned for the new Special Anti-Gang Unit. In addition, beginning this month, NAS and the Public Affairs Section will lead Embassy efforts in assisting the San Pedro Sula community in an anti- gang pilot project. This project will consist of a media campaign informing youth and others of the dangers of belonging to gangs, as well as help in avoiding membership and in successfully terminating gang affiliations. Unfortunately, INL may not have funds next year to continue the contract of the sole American in charge of the Embassy NAS office. -------------- Fuel Prices and PetroCaribe -------------- ¶16. (SBU) As reported in previous cables, Honduras continues to move towards a state-run fuel import regime, under which it proposes to establish a government body to select one company to supply all the nation's fuel demands by August 2006. Awarding such a monopoly on importation of all fuel to a single company could require current importers, including U.S. companies ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, to break existing import contracts. In addition, these two U.S. firms -- which are the owners of the majority of fuel storage capacity in Honduras -- might then face a GOH demand that they share use of those supply facilities. Venezuelan national fuel company PDVSA has a clear advantage to winning the national bid through their plan PetroCaribe, which offers up to 40 percent financing, and may have an early in-road through reported deals with Honduran parastatal energy company ENEE and the Honduran private fuel importer and distributor DIPPSA. Honduran actions stem from strong internal political demands to reduce gas prices. The GOH has also expressed a strong interest in pursuing energy diversification, notably including alternative and renewable fuels such as sugar-cane ethanol, wind power, micro-hydro and full-scale hydroelectric projects, and biodiesel from African Palm plants. -------------- Environmental Concerns -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Forestry/Illegal Logging Issues: Zelaya has a very strong personal attachment to the environment and wants to rid the country of illegal logging and damage to the forest. Zelaya has this policy despite, or perhaps, because of, his time as head of the Honduran Logging Association. Forest TEGUCIGALP 00000872 005 OF 008 sector monitoring and enforcement are difficult due to inadequate knowledge of forest resources and ambiguous ownership rights. Illegal logging continues to flourish because of limited prosecution and lenient penalties for forest crimes. He has not specifically asked for U.S. help, but he may do so. The Embassy is seeking greater details on President Zelaya's plans for monitoring illegal logging so that State/OES can look into providing assistance through the POTUS Initiative Against Illegal Logging. ¶18. (SBU) Illegal logging has been a persistent problem in Honduras for many years, particularly with precious hardwoods such as Mahogany, which is extracted by the truckload from isolated sites in the eastern part of the country. The GOH owns the majority of the country's forests and is therefore ultimately responsible for their protection and at fault for the years of illegal logging that has occurred in Honduras. The GOH has historically done very little in practical terms to stop illegal logging. More recently, the Zelaya Administration has publicly declared that proper forestry practices is one of its highest priorities and has mobilized the Honduran Army to curb both illegal logging and forest fires. -------------- USG Programs and Bilateral Assistance -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA): CAFTA entered into force on April 1 for Honduras. In Honduras, CAFTA is strongly supported by most of the private sector, especially the textile and apparel industry. CAFTA was supported by not only the outgoing National Party, but also by the Liberal Party and two of the three smaller parties in Congress. Only one small leftist political party (UD) voted against the agreement. The agreement has also been opposed by some NGOs, labor unions, and rural (campesino) groups, who are concerned that small-scale Honduran farmers will be unable to compete with subsidized U.S. agricultural products. ¶20. (SBU) Zelaya's team hopes that CAFTA will lead to faster economic growth and serve as a catalyst for regional economic cooperation and integration. The agreement is absolutely vital to the survival of the textile and apparel sector in Honduras now that worldwide quotas have been eliminated. It is estimated that in 2004 Honduras received at least USD 200 million in new foreign investment, most of it from the United States, as a result of the anticipated benefits of CAFTA. The agreement's agricultural chapter will liberalize agricultural trade gradually while protecting Honduran farmers from sudden disruptions caused by subsidized imports. The agreement also will spur modernization in government procurement and services and will help lock in the GOH's structural reforms in areas such as telecommunications. ¶21. (U) Millennium Challenge Account: In 2004, Honduras was chosen as one of sixteen countries eligible (out of 75 considered) to apply for assistance from the Millennium Challenge Account. In June 2005, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) approved $215 million in funding over five years for a Transportation Project and Rural Development Project in Honduras. The Compact entered into force on September 29, 2005, and the first disbursement of USD 1.6 million was made in February 2006. MCA-Honduras is the government entity responsible for implementing the program. TEGUCIGALP 00000872 006 OF 008 Three major procurements are currently in process: Farmer Training and Development, Procurement Supervisor, and the Transportation Project Manager. The contract for the Farmer Training and Development is expected to be awarded in late summer and will be the first activity to show tangible results. ¶22. (SBU) MCC Vice President for Operations John Hewko will visit Honduras May 15-17 to emphasize to President Zelaya that all Compact implementation must be transparent, competitive, and apolitical. In addition, Hewko will stress that the Compact was designed to work in coordination with the efforts of the GOH and other donors to enable Honduras to take advantage of the opportunities presented by CAFTA. This requires GOH policies in agriculture and transportation to reinforce the projects being funded under the Compact. Unfortunately, initial policy statements indicate that GOH policies and budgets are not investing the necessary resources to complement the projects being funded by the Compact. ¶23. (SBU) PL 480 Title II: It appears that the Food For Progress program that has benefited a half million very poor Hondurans (two-thirds of the country is poor) will end in ¶2008. The Embassy is working with USAID headquarters on this, but the funds may not be available to continue the program. Post has reason to believe that Zelaya intends to raise this subject with POTUS. ¶24. (SBU) Seized assets as leverage for fishery and environmental issues: The USG will transfer USD 500,000, which represents 50 percent of the net forfeited assets from the McNab case regarding conspiracy, smuggling, and money laundering charges in connection with importing undersized lobsters into the U.S. in violation of Honduran law. The GOH must ensure that all funds transferred under this agreement are used by the Fisheries Section of the Agriculture Ministry. Another Post initiative is trying to get the GOH seized assets office to turn over a seized boat to the fisheries inspectors, further improving their inspection and monitoring capacity, while reinforcing their good behavior in becoming a functioning government entity. Both of these efforts could not only improve environmental protections and reduce the chance of violations by Honduran seafood and shellfish fishermen, but they could also send a strong signal of how doing the right thing (such as convicting smugglers, seizing criminal assets, and reforming law enforcement agencies) can lead to increased resources and therefore a better GOH ability to deliver services to its people. ¶25. (SBU) Bird Flu prevention - USG provides USD 100,000: Since 2001, through SOUTHCOM's Humanitarian Assistance Program, the USG has been conducting a Disease Surveillance project in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, in conjunction with the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine - West, to precisely try to identify problems soon enough to act and hopefully prevent them from becoming bigger problems if they hit any of these countries. USD 100,000 has recently been allotted to assist public health personnel in Honduras to carry out diseases surveillance programs specifically on "Bird Flu". ¶26. (U) Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI): GPOI funds for Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala will be used to provide peace support operations training and equipment for use in the Central American Armed TEGUCIGALP 00000872 007 OF 008 Forces Confederation (CFAC) peacekeeping battalion such as, but not limited to, computers, audio/visual, and vehicles; transportation of personnel to the Coban Regional Peacekeeping Training Center in Guatemala; and for other related activities. Honduras will receive $495,521 in individual soldier and communications equipment from the State contractor. The State equipment includes helmets, flak jackets, billy clubs, whistles, GPSs, compasses, handheld radios, base stations, HF radios, etc. This equipment is scheduled to arrive in Honduras in May, with a donation ceremony to be held at the end of May. There is also an additional approximate USD 845,000 allotted for larger items at a later date. -------------- Pending issues for Bilateral Consideration -------------- ¶27. (SBU) Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT): The Embassy has encouraged the GOH to become a party to the OAS MLAT, as well as the Optional Protocol. The Convention and Protocol provide a legal mechanism for providing mutual legal assistance between states parties in investigations, prosecutions, and proceedings that pertain to crimes over which the requesting state has jurisdiction. The Convention provides, among other things, an obligation on the states parties to establish Central Authorities to facilitate the speedy execution of requests, and establishes procedures for the handling of witnesses and evidence. The Protocol is an important adjunct to the Convention that enables the Parties to obtain cooperation for tax crimes, not just tax crimes involving proceeds from other crimes covered under the Convention. Post has proposed to several GOH representatives, including high levels of the Foreign Ministry, Honduran Ambassador to the U.S. Flores Bermudez, and the Attorney General, that Honduras become a Party to the Convention. All have expressed interest. Post recommends the USG officials raise this matter with President Zelaya. ¶28. (U) House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC): Post has strongly recommended that Honduras be selected for receiving the House Democracy Assistance Commission's (HDAC) assistance in 2007. USAID proposed Honduras as a Western Hemisphere candidate country since the newly elected Honduran Congress would benefit substantially from legislative assistance, particularly with the provision of technical expertise improving its efficiency and transparency. Honduras has a new Congress that was elected in November 2005. Given more than an 80 percent turnover in the Congress as a result of landmark electoral reforms, the timing would be optimum for strengthening this critical branch of government. This new, more independent Congress presents an opportunity for transforming it into a more responsive body to the people. The assistance also would support the implementation of CAFTA by strengthening the capacity of the new Congress to support the new economic framework and opportunities. ¶29. (SBU) Soto Cano Air Force Base: This joint Honduran Air Force/U.S. Air Force installation about an hour and 15 minutes from Tegucigalpa is the home to about 10 U.S. helicopters and over 500 U.S. servicemen that serve U.S. policy goals in the region and help Honduras during times of natural disasters and various medical/humanitarian programs. The U.S. may want to expand the base in the future, including transferring Coronet Oak, a hub for four C-130 air TEGUCIGALP 00000872 008 OF 008 cargo transport planes, to Soto Cano from Puerto Rico. The Maduro Administration agreed to Coronet Oak. Zelaya supports the base, has not yet been asked to formally commit to Coronet Oak, and wants to establish joint military and commercial use for export/import of goods under CAFTA. SOUTHCOM and the Embassy stand ready to discuss this proposal with the GOH, but there are significant costs and security considerations that must be met before joint use can happen. Ford