SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000333 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, S/CT, AND WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016 TAGS: ASEC KSAC PGOV HO SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) REF: A. SECSTATE 17684 ¶B. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 00557 ¶C. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 767 ¶D. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 1859 ¶E. TEGUCIGALPA 0288 ¶F. TEGUCIGALPA 0104 Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIARD Reason 1.4 (C) and (D). ¶1. (U) The following responses are keyed to the Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (reftel A). -------------- POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Demonstrations: (A.) Yes. Additionally, there are a number of organizations and groups under the loose collective leadership of (and affiliated with) the Bloque Popular that have been carrying out demonstrations against U.S. foreign policy, as well as demonstrations targeting local issues. The following organizations have been involved in anti-American political activities to varying degrees. They are listed in alphabetical order, utilizing Spanish acronyms where applicable. Post notes that the majority of those organizations are left-leaning NGOs or unions, many of whom maintain good relations with the Embassy. (List updated February 2006): - ARTISTAS DE LA UNAH Artists of the National Autonomous University of Honduras (A-UNAH) - BLOQUE POPULAR Popular Block - COCOH Farmers' Cooperatives Union - CODECOH Honduran Consumer Protection Committee - CODEH Honduran Committee for Human Rights - COFADEH Honduran Committee of Family Members of the Detained and Disappeared - COHAPAZ Honduran Committee for Action for Peace - COLPROSUMAH Honduran Professional Teachers College (a teachers' union) - COMPA-H People of the Americas Convergence Movement (COMPA)-Honduras - COPEMH Honduran Association of Secondary School Teachers - COPINH Civic Council of Popular Organizations and Indigenous Groups of Honduras (also appears as COPIN) - COPRUMH Honduran Professional Association Teachers' Union - CGT General Workers Central (the largest of Honduras' three national labor confederations) - CTH Confederation of Honduran Workers (arguably, the strongest of the three national labor confederations) - CUTH United Confederation of Honduran Workers (the most left of the three national labor confederations) - FPR Popular Revolution Forces, a shadowy alleged revolutionary group. - FUTH United Federation of Honduran Workers (the largest component of CUTH, above) - FSM Feminist Movement (details needed) - FUR University Revolutionary Front - GRUPO LOS NECIOS DE LA UNAH UNAH Fools Group - Activist group in UNAH that "cheerleads" and motivates demos - MEH Honduran Student Movement - PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE LA FACULTAD DE PEDAGOGIA DE LA UNAH Teaching Faculty Workers' Party of UNAH - RADIO GUALCHO Leftist/Activist radio station (1510Mhz) that works closely with Bloque Popular and is actively involved in most demonstrations - REPRESENTANTE DE FRENTE Y REFORMA DE LA UNAH Reform Front Representative of UNAH - SERUNAH New UNAH coalition group, like Bloque Popular (but not as prominent) - SITRAINFOP National Institute of Professional Formation Workers' Union - SITRAINA National Agrarian Institute Workers' Union - SITRAIHSS Institute of Social Security Workers' Union - SITRAUNAH UNAH Workers' Union - SITRAUPEN A Workers' Union (details needed) - STIBYS Beverage and Associated Industries Workers' Union (plays a key organizing and logistics role for many demos)- Leader of STIBYS is also the leader of the Popular Block. - SITRAPANI Child Welfare Association Workers' Union - UD Democratic Unification Party (remnants of the Communist Party of Honduras and other former Marxist parties; represented in the National Congress) - UNAH National Autonomous University of Honduras - URP Revolutionary People's Union NOTE: The most fervent anti-U.S. groups are: MEH, URP, UD, Bloque Popular, STIBYS, COPINH, and COMPA-H. The following groups have committed and participated in acts of political vandalism (against the Honduran Government and other entities) that resulted in the destruction of public and private property: Bloque Popular, COPINH, Democratic Unification Party (UD),and The Revolutionary People's Union (URP). (B.) Yes. There have been approximately 31 demonstrations in Tegucigalpa since February 2005, including 7 demonstrations either held outside or near the U.S. Embassy. However, most demonstrations are not directed against the U.S. Government, although some are convoked to protest against U.S. foreign policy initiators, such as the ongoing war in Iraq or the Central American Free Trade Agreement. (C.) Roughly 25 percent of the demonstrations noted above have taken place near U.S. Mission facilities. There have been no demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy during the last six months. (D.) The size of demonstrations at the Embassy, when they do occur, varies from twenty to over three hundred participants. The larger demos usually consist of supporters from six to more than twelve different organizations, which operate as a loosely structured coalition under the guidance of Bloque Popular. (E.) Over the most recent months, and largely due to expectations of a new liberal party government to "right past wrongs", the focus of demonstrations has been shifting back towards unresolved domestic issues: civil service salaries, privatization, gasoline prices, and public transportation. Objections to U.S. foreign policy still trigger demonstrations, mainly over the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) as well as ongoing U.S. actions in Iraq and previous U.S. involvement in Venezuela and Haiti. The following statements, demands, and gestures have been made repeatedly during past demos at the Embassy: No to war in Iraq, No to war, Stop Plan Colombia, Pro-Human rights, World Peace, Stop Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), U.S. Forces out of Honduras (Soto Cano AB),U.S. Military out of Cuba, U.S. destroy your WMD, Stop intervention in Venezuela, Stop Standard Fruit from exploiting the indigenous people, Opposition to CAFTA, No to privatization, Stop intervention in Haiti. The following is a summary of some demonstrations triggered by both U.S foreign policy initiatives and local issues: -- On March 8, 2005, several groups protested against the CAFTA resolution which was passed by the Honduran Congress on March 3 (reftel B). -- On April 8, the Honduran public sector unions protested against alleged back pay, and the Honduran police used water and tear gas to break up the crowd (reftel C). -- On May 11, approximately 150 people from the Consejo Civico de Organizaciones Populares e Inigenas de Honduras (COPINH) and the Bloque Popular again protested against CAFTA. -- On September 7 and 8, protesters comprised of mainly public transportation (taxi) drivers blocked streets in protest against an increase in gasoline and other basic products. Access and egress from the main airport in Tegucigalpa were shut-off for approximately 14 hours (reftel D). -- On January 19, 2006, approximately 600 people from various worker's unions, supported by the Bloque Poplular, gathered in front of the Congress to protest the privatization of the national telephone company, Hondutel, and to protest against CAFTA. --On February 14, 2006 a thousand protesters from the Honduran Unitary Federation of Workers (FUTH) blocked roads near the Honduran Presidential Palace. The workers were protesting the possible dismissal of large numbers of the public sector workforce by the new ZELAYA ADMINISTRATION, both for reductions in staff of government offices and the traditional replacement of politically appointed personnel, even in the lower ranks of government (reftel E). --On February 16, 2006, approximately 600 protesters from FUTH marched to the National Congress building to again protest the dismissal of public workers. (F.) Generally peaceful, but demonstrators have burned U.S. flags and thrown rocks. (G.) N/A. (H.) N/A. (I.) Yes. (J.) Yes. Occasionally they will pass by the Embassy. (K.) The average size varies from 200-1000 people. (L.) Generally peaceful, but fences, grillwork, and windows have been destroyed near the National Congress, as well as many tires burned. At times, suspected plain-clothes police have been held and beaten by hard-core protesters within the demonstrations. On occasions, small groups of thug-like cadre have initiated/instigated violence against static police guards by attempting to strike them in the lower leg areas, which are not protected by riot shields with heavy placard poles with large nails embedded in the ends. Several police officials have been injured in unsuccessful attempts to get the police to use force. (M.) N/A. -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions: -------------- -------------- (A.) No. (B.) N/A. (C.) N/A. (D.) N/A. -------------- ¶3. (C) Host Country Capabilities: -------------- (A.) No. Police are somewhat mediocre in professionalism and training; they are also somewhat apathetic toward post residential security requirements, including response to alarms and investigation of incidents in Mission neighborhoods; they have definite resource/manpower limitations that inhibit their deterrence or response effectiveness. The National Preventive Police and Criminal Investigations Directorate General (DGIC). Both departments suffer from a lack of manpower, training, equipment, low pay, and motivation. Honduras has the lowest per capita ratio of police in Latin America. They lack the capital to purchase and maintain vehicles (including gas) and radio equipment. There is no standard service weapon. Despite numerous training programs and efforts by many nations, including the U.S., the DGIC is lacking in morale, leadership, and resources. In numerous traffic accidents involving Mission personnel, the response time has exceeded several hours by the transit police. The courts, prosecutors, and police are extremely susceptible to bribery and influence, causing reversals in judgments against the Embassy. Terminations have been numerous for both political as well as criminal reasons and extend beyond positions normally considered political appointees. In other cases, certain high-ranking police cannot be terminated for technical reason. Morale and integrity in the DGIC is seen as low. It remains to be seen whether the existing conditions will improve or decline with the newly elected Liberal Party government. President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya was inaugurated on January 27, 2006 to serve a constitutionally-mandated maximum term of four years. (B.) Yes. Training by U.S. Border Patrol Tactical (BorTac) teams is good, but GOH security infrastructure needs major improvements. (C.) Yes. Corruption is widespread throughout almost all agencies within the GOH, including the national law enforcement departments. Corruption is especially rampant within the Honduran Immigration system. Most recently, RSO has been working in conjunction with Department of Homeland Security (DHS),in the investigation of an ongoing smuggling ring involving immigration officials from Guatemala and Honduras. This ring is smuggling Brazilian nationals from Sao Paulo to the United States. Recently, one group of Brazilians were detained by Honduran officials and they provided information about how the operation works. RSO and DHS has learned as many as three Honduran immigration officials may be involved, a Honduran Frontier Police Captain, who is not directly involved in this illicit operation, may be corrupt (reftel F). (D.) No. However, GOH intelligence units have an institutional awareness of and a modest capability of penetrating indigenous radical groups. (E.) Yes. (F.) No. (They have almost no capability to detect or disrupt international terrorist activities). (G.) Yes. (H.) Poor. There is widespread corruption within immigration and customs and a measurable lack of security coordination within the airport. Physical security is also inadequate, as the perimeter lacks effective fencing, vehicle barriers, and lighting. (I.) Ineffective. Corrupt officials are easily bribed, and therefore pose a real threat to U.S security interests. Honduran passports, for example, have been fraudulently obtained through immigration and customs officials for use by subjects not legitimately entitled to them. (J.) Average/Ineffective. A unit within the Ministry of Public Security called the Frontier Police handles border patrol duties. The unit is making positive steps towards border control, but lack of funding and manpower are limiting the effectiveness of the unit. -------------- - ¶4. (SBU) Indigenous Terrorism-Anti American Terrorist Groups: -------------- - (A.) No. (B.) N/A. (C.) N/A. (D.) N/A. (E.) N/A. (F.) N/A. (G.) N/A. (H.) N/A. -------------- - ¶5. (SBU) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups: -------------- - (A.) No. (B.) N/A. (C.) N/A. (D.) N/A. (E.) N/A. -------------- --- ¶6. (C/NF) Transnational Terrorism -------------- --- (6-A.) No. However, there are rumors that in the past there have been Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),IRA, and Chiapas (Zapatistas) sympathizers in Honduras who could be involved in advising indigenous groups. Some Hondurans are studying in Cuba and also conceivably could be receiving training in subversion and terrorism, although it is more likely they are being indoctrinated as agents of influence. As this Cuban program for Hondurans is in its infancy, there have been no indications that such training is taking place. Additionally, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has a limited presence in Honduras, especially in the northern coastal areas, where they trade arms for drugs / drugs for arms. There is evidence that weapons originally sold to Honduras have been turned-in or seized in Colombia. Some individuals associated with the FARC, or who have facilitated arms trafficking from Honduras to Colombia, have been apprehended in the last year. (B.) N/A. (C.) N/A. (D.) N/A and No. (E.) N/A. (F.) The only known hostile intelligence presence of note is Cuban. While the Cuban mission appears to have extensive contacts with leftists and indigenous groups, there is no indication they are planning or supporting terrorism. Likewise, while there is concern over alleged Venezuelan contact with and possible funding of Leftist organizations, there is no indication that they are planning or supporting terrorism. (G.) There is no shortage of weapons in Honduras. It would also not be difficult for hostile terrorist elements to import weapons and/or explosives from neighboring countries. Ford