Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TEGUCIGALPA16
2006-01-05 18:36:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES - TEGUCIGALPA

Tags:  AEMR AMED AMGT ASEC CASC HO KFLO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 000016 

SIPDIS

S/ES-O/CMS, DS/IP/WHA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AEMR AMED AMGT ASEC CASC HO KFLO
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES - TEGUCIGALPA

REF: STATE 219189

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 000016 SIPDIS S/ES-O/CMS, DS/IP/WHA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AEMR AMED AMGT ASEC CASC HO KFLO SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES - TEGUCIGALPA REF: STATE 219189 ¶1. (SBU) Per reftel A, Post EAC met on 12/28/2005 in order to discuss Avian Influenza (AI) tripwires and to develop contingency plans for both "shelter in place" as well as drawdown of personnel. EAC members in attendance were A/DCM, RSO, JMO, PC, PAO, PAS, ECON, DAO, MILGRP, MSG, POL, USAID, CONS, MED, and ORA. Post specific tripwires were formulated and have been posted on the Tripwire Reporting and Integrated Planning System (TRIPS) located on the classified network. ¶2. (SBU) The MED Officer advised the EAC that Honduran medical treatment facilities are extremely limited, and that in the event of an AI outbreak, they would not have the capability to effectively deal with the situation. At this time, the medical resources required to handle any epidemic, much less AI, are woefully inadequate in the capital city of Tegucigalpa. The fact that there are only six (6) Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds and ventilators in Tegucigalpa illustrates this deficiency. There are some virology labs within various medical units, but all of these facilities have inadequate supplies of AI test kits, if any at all. ¶3. (SBU) MED has consulted with various health care facilities that are willing to assist the U.S. Mission with seriously ill patients in the event of an AI outbreak; however, the EAC agreed that their priorities would most likely be diverted to their own citizens first. MED advised that only one facility, Hospital Militar, has actually offered assistance in formulating a plan of action and a specific location to treat official U.S. Mission members. Other health care facilities have not been able to commit their very limited resources. MED noted that these facilities may be willing to help if Post could provide medications and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for their staff. MED also noted though, that this is not a possibility as of now, for their own stock of PPE supplies is currently insufficient (although Post has ordered additional supplies to help rectify this shortage). ¶4. (SBU) MED advised EAC members that they met with epidemiologists from the Honduran Ministry of Health and from the World Health Organization (WHO) in order to assess host country capabilities in dealing with AI. It was determined that the ability of the Honduran public health system to identify and respond to AI cases is severely restricted due to a lack of nearly all resources - from surveillance and testing to rapid reporting. MED stated that they have identified a critical lack of awareness in the Ministry of Health and other NGOs about this situation. The Embassy has targeted key medical, political, and agricultural personnel and has begun educating them about pandemic strategies. These plans of action can be implemented in order to contain an epidemic. PAO also advised the EAC that they are sponsoring the first AI Conference on January 10, 2006. ¶5. (SBU) The EAC determined that Post's ability to shelter in place is restricted to the lack of facilities, equipment, and medically trained personnel. Only a limited number of AI cases could be dealt with, and Post could only maintain this posture for perhaps one month. MED noted that quarantines in homes would be a viable option, but the EAC agreed that it would be difficult to manage a home quarantine situation. The EAC pointed out that it would be nearly impossible, for example, to prevent an infected U.S Mission member from attempting to travel back to the U.S for proper care, given that resources are so severely limited in country. ¶6. (SBU) In regards to coordination with DOD assets not under COM authority, the MILGRP representative to the EAC reported that he, as the U.S. Senior Defense Representative, is active in Post's EAC and will coordinate with the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Country Team during any emergency situation, including the threat of AI. ¶7. (U) POC for Post's AI tripwires is ARSO Robert A. Rentz. Ford

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