OIL COMPANIES AND GOH NOW TALKING, THOUGH NO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001559 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EB/ESC, WHA/EPSC, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN, STATE FOR D, E, P, AND WHA, TREASURY FOR DDOUGLASS, STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAM, NSC FOR DAN FISK E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2031 TAGS: PINR EPET ENRG PGOV HO VE SUBJECT: OIL COMPANIES AND GOH NOW TALKING, THOUGH NO CONSTRUCTIVE (OR LEGAL) RESULTS YET Classified By: Ambassador Charles Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Throughout the week of August 18, President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya Rosales reverted to his former style of publicly hurling invectives, largely blaming the international oil companies, particularly Esso and Texaco, for his continuing difficulties in implementing the proposed fuel imports bid solicitation. The Ambassador, in two private meetings with the President, urged him personally to meet with the petroleum importers to attempt to re-gain their confidence and initiate a dialogue. Subsequently, Zelaya dispatched former Congressman Arturo Corrales to meet with oil company representatives to solicit their views. Zelaya then asked to meet personally with the company representatives on August 21. Esso and Texaco representatives were pleased that the GOH has finally started to listen, rather than merely convoking them to meetings where they are ambushed with fait accompli decisions. In spite of its professed new willingness to listen and seek solutions to the dispute, the GOH appears intent on going forward with the bid tender. At present neither side has found a mutually acceptable (or legal) exit strategy to the bid dispute. Esso and Texaco have agreed to reconsider their participation in the bid once the new terms of reference (TORs) are published, but they remain pessimistic that the GOH can draft TORs that are acceptable and conform to anti-trust, CAFTA and WTO regulations. Meanwhile, the GOH may allow the bid process to get tied up in litigation, essentially killing it. End summary. ¶2. (C) Beginning on August 17, President Zelaya renewed his public campaign against the multinational oil companies present in Honduras, particularly Esso and Texaco. (The issue had gone quiet while the Zelaya Administration dealt for several weeks with public protests mounted by the teachers' unions -- reported reftels.) While speaking to a group of farmers at the Francisco Morazan state fair, Zelaya attacked Esso,s and Texaco,s decisions not to participate in the international fuel bid tender, stating that the multinationals were threatening the stability of the nation. Zelaya took as the basis for his speech the respectful but firm letters from the two companies that had been delivered two weeks previously, and in which the companies declined to participate in the bid or to lease their facilities to third parties. Esso and Texaco were somewhat surprised by Zelaya,s aggressive comments and saw them as both sudden and inappropriate considering Zelaya had not mentioned the bid tender or the oil companies in the previous two weeks since receiving the letters. Esso and Texaco complained to Minister of the Presidency Yani Rosenthal, expressing their inability to discuss the bid tender constructively while being slandered in the press. The Ambassador, in two separate meetings with the President, argued that it was now time for the President himself to intervene, meet with the companies, and make a final, genuine attempt to find common ground. ¶3. (S) Subsequently, on August 20, Presidential confidant and former Congressman Arturo Corrales contacted the major fuel importers to discuss the current stalemate over the proposed nationalization of imports and fuel bid solicitation. Esso representatives, Daniel Mencia (protect) and Alfredo Fernandez Sivori (protect),told Ambassador that Corrales floated a possible solution. He asked the importers to enter the bid tender with the intention of letting Honduran gasoline retailer DIPPSA win, essentially negotiating a fixed price between the companies. DIPPSA would then allow Esso, Texaco and Puma (Trafigura) to continue importing with a small surcharge. Mencia also believed that President Zelaya would reap financial benefits from the deal, skimming a part of the surcharge into his and his compatriots, private accounts. Esso was very clear when they bluntly told Corrales that they would not participate in such a deal as it was tantamount to collusion which would violate anti-trust laws, and was potentially also a violation of the Foreign Corrupt TEGUCIGALP 00001559 002 OF 003 Practices Act (FCPA). (Comment: Esso and Texaco approached Post immediately to report this situation, and to make it perfectly clear that they understood the legal implications of such a deal, and that they are unwilling to even entertain such a proposal. End Comment.) ¶4. (S) Esso and Texaco representatives told Econoffs that the Zelaya administration is perhaps finally starting to realize it is stuck between a rock and hard place. For that reason, President Zelaya called them into a meeting on August 21, without the usual dog and pony show of press and protestors, to speak candidly about the bid process. They said that Zelaya appears to be intent on holding the bid tender and that he appears to be honest when stating that he never had the intention of harming the interests of Esso, Texaco, et al. Nevertheless, Zelaya again asked the fuel importers, representatives if they could possibly accede to the type of arrangement floated by Corrales over the weekend. Daniel Mencia, as spokesman for the group of importers, explained obliquely that it was not legally possible for them to participate in such a scheme. Mencia and Texaco representative Luis Vega (protect) told Econoffs that they were not sure that Zelaya understood the legal implications of the deal he was proposing. (Comment. It is surprising that Zelaya would again suggest an exit strategy based on price collusion, bid rigging, and market segmentation. Post believes Corrales conveyed to Zelaya immediately after his August 20 meeting with the fuel importers their initial emphatic &no8 and explained the legal and ethical conflicts inherent in the proposed deal. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Mencia and Vega concurred that the Zelaya administration is clearly intent on taking the bid process to conclusion. They also believe that members of the administration, including Zelaya and Corrales, truly do not agree that a liberalized fuel market is the way to go for Honduras. As a consolation to the GOH, the companies told Zelaya that they would reconsider their participation in the bid once the new TORs are released. Nonetheless the companies privately told Post that they can envision no circumstance under which they would wish to participate in the kind of bid solicitation being proposed, even if the numerous and daunting legal impediments could be overcome. Each also reiterated that their home offices were fundamentally opposed to the bid tender. ¶6. (C) Econoffs asked Mencia and Vega if they saw any exit strategy that would allow the GOH to back out of the bid while gaining some sort of face-saving benefit for the people of Honduras. Mencia and Vega told econoffs that their U.S. offices are actively trying to find an alternate solution to the current impasse, but they are pessimistic. They stated that they cannot reduce the price of gasoline more than one lempira (approximately USD 0.05),nor can they cut corners on quality to lower prices, for example by lowering the octane level of the gas. They cannot import other octane gasoline into Honduras because they would then lose the economy of scale afforded by supplying multiple Central American countries as sequential stops on a single delivery voyage. Other counties in the region have agreed to harmonize gasoline standards, and to arbitrarily change Honduran standards would violate that agreement and leave the Honduran market isolated from the rest of the region. When econoffs floated the idea of perhaps offering some other benefit instead, such as supporting GOH biodiesel research efforts, both Mencia and Vega said that the GOH has kept them away from biodiesel since it is a pet project of Miguel Facusse, the owner of Quimicos de NAM and a significant economic and political actor. (Note: Ambassador met again August 23 with Corrales, who said that Zelaya and his team were considering a way to bury the bid by sending it to the Attorney General for an extended &legal review.8 COHEP, a Honduran business group, has recently identified at least 15 violations of existing laws and treaties made by the TORs. End Note.) TEGUCIGALP 00001559 003 OF 003 ¶7. (C) Meanwhile, the GOH has only paid ESSO two weeks worth of reimbursements for fuel price freezes that the firm has been forced by the GOH to absorb since April 2006. According to Vega, the GOH and has not reimbursed Texaco at all. As import prices rise but pump prices remain frozen by government edict, these losses are accruing at an accelerating rate. The two companies are now owed over USD six million, according to Mencia. Of note, the GOH has paid DIPPSA in full. (Comment. While Post is not thrilled by the disparate treatment received by a Honduran firm over its U.S competitors, Post is persuaded that full reimbursement to DIPPSA is actually a good thing. DIPPSA does not have the financial flexibility or cash flow that ESSO and Texaco enjoy, and GOH arrears were beginning to impact the firm's ability to continue operations. DIPPSA was suffering significantly, and owner Henry Arevalo felt the arrears were being used by the GOH as pressure to participate in the bid, or to sell the firm outright. Post notes that of the four suitors to buy DIPPSA that have come forward in recent months, three were unmasked as front companies, at least two of which had strong connections to Venezuela. The fourth firm, Trafigura, is a legitimate company and its affiliate PUMA is a longtime business partner of DIPPSA, but Trafigura, too, has ties to the GOV. Trafigura was the supplier of emergency fuel imports to Venezuela in 2002 and 2003 that allowed the Chavez regime to break the back of PDVSA's union and then purge the ranks of PDVSA members who were not deemed sufficiently Bolivarian. End comment.) ¶8. (S) Comment. The two positive developments ) the companies' dialog with the GOH, and their (token) decision to reconsider their participation in the bid following the release of the new TORs ) help to take some of the poison out of the air. Nonetheless, the GOH has pushed the bid tender so forcefully in the public eye that it appears politically impossible for Zelaya to back down and admit it is not a viable option. At this point, ESSO and Texaco will not participate in any bid tender, raising the spectre of protracted litigation. In addition to the potential domestic political turmoil such a development could cause, a legal battle over investors' rights on this scale would almost certainly -- regardless of who wins -- raise doubts in the minds of potential investors about Honduras, dedication to the principles of rule of law and free trade as expressed in CAFTA. As Post has repeatedly explained to the GOH, in such a battle, even the winners will lose. We are cautiously optimistic the GOH might finally be taking this message to heart, but we worry that it might be too little, too late. Whether a last minute attempt to bury the TORs in legal review can succeed remains questionable, with world gasoline prices still high and government subsidies becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. No obvious policy of "peace with honor" suggests itself to the GOH, the companies, or Post, though we will all continue to seek one. End comment. FORD