Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TASHKENT777
2006-04-21 03:35:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

INL COORDINATOR/DCM TRIP REPORT: TERMEZ AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL AF TI UZ 
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VZCZCXRO0058
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #0777/01 1110335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210335Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5585
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 7816
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1906
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 2431
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2332
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1416
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000777 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INL/AAE (PRAHAR AND HOOKER) AND SCA/CEN
DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR OPDAT (LEHMAN)
ALMATY FOR SCOTT WALDO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF TI UZ
SUBJECT: INL COORDINATOR/DCM TRIP REPORT: TERMEZ AND
SARIOSIYA

REF: TASHKENT 262

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000777 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INL/AAE (PRAHAR AND HOOKER) AND SCA/CEN DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR OPDAT (LEHMAN) ALMATY FOR SCOTT WALDO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL AF TI UZ SUBJECT: INL COORDINATOR/DCM TRIP REPORT: TERMEZ AND SARIOSIYA REF: TASHKENT 262 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (U) Summary: Visiting INL Coordinator and DCM visited the Surkhandarya Province for inspection and observation of border post facilities and procedures. Emboffs assessed the use of equipment and training provided to Uzbek Customs and Border Guard officials by USG-funded programs through the United Nations Office for Drug Control (UNODC) at Afghanistan and Tajikistan border crossings. Emboffs also observed established operations for pedestrians, small vehicles and trucks attempting to enter or exit Uzbekistan. End Summary. HAIRATON/FRIENDSHIP BRIDGE (UZBEKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN) -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) April 3 Site overview: UNODC is in the final process of completing the Friendship Bridge project. The bridge and land checkpoints are open and the law enforcement agents assigned to the post function in a professional manner. The crossing itself is similar to a typical site at the U.S.-Mexico border and perhaps surpasses many of our own border checkpoints in terms of technology. The bridge is open only during daylight hours and has 45 Customs officers and slightly fewer Border Guard personnel assigned to it. Personnel rotate every two to three years, and junior officers are trained by senior officers upon arrival. Uzbek personnel speak Uzbek and Russian while a few speak Dari and Pashto to communicate with Afghan counterparts. ¶3. (U) Construction of the railway platform near the bridge was completed in October 2005. The site is in need of a crane to unload containers from freight cars, since currently all suspicious containers that are detected must be sent back to the Termez station for unloading and inspection. One long cargo train crossed into Afghanistan during our visit. We saw more than 60 train wagons, including 25 gasoline rail cars, waiting to enter Afghanistan. Uzbek personnel told us that three to four cargo trains cross to Afghanistan daily; no passengers are allowed on these trains; and all staff employed on the trains are Uzbek. ¶4. (U) We were not given access to the river port; however, the UNODC project manager met with port representatives the day b
efore the visit and was told that it is in need of a large x-ray machine to scan freight. He was told that most narcotics trafficking at the crossing is now done by boat. The Border Guard and Customs representatives denied us access to the river port since it was not listed in the diplomatic note requesting permission to visit, but we intend to visit the site in the near future. Interestingly, the river port falls under direct control of the regional Border Guard and Customs offices in Termez, not the Airatom Border Guard and Customs units. ¶5. (U) All equipment provided by INL has been delivered and installed, including the video surveillance equipment, weighbridges, and forklifts for unloading cargo from trucks. DTRA WMD portal monitors are also installed at the entry gates on both sides of the Uzbek bridge checkpoint and appear operational . ¶6. (U) Observations: The INL-funded video surveillance equipment includes 57 cameras, six of which rotate 360 degrees and have zoom capability. The surveillance room is staffed by a duty officer and contains seven monitors that at the time of the visit were displaying the pedestrian check, vehicle check, and the front gate. The information is recorded digitally and is kept for one month before the cameras re-record. We saw a long cargo train crossing the bridge to Afghanistan on the video during the visit. ¶7. (U) All pedestrians and vehicle passengers who cross the border enter a screening area that contains two x-ray machines for luggage. Post representatives reported that anywhere from 50 to 100 people enter or exit Uzbekistan on a typical day. Uzbek, Afghan, EU, the occasional AMCIT, and international organization staff typically cross, with the majority of individuals being Afghan citizens. TASHKENT 00000777 002 OF 003 ¶8. (U) Border Guard representatives told us that the checkpoint has been effective and few individuals currently attempt to cross with narcotics. The agents recently found several grams of hashish that someone discarded in the middle of the bridge outside of the surveillance area before arriving to the checkpoint. ¶9. (U) A poster is displayed in the screening area that lists hashish seizure statistics at the bridge: 1993 ) 1 ton; 1996 ) 4 tons; from 1998 to present, only small amounts of hashish have been detected. Other posters showed amounts of humanitarian shipments by country of origin through Airatom for 2002 and 2003, but no statistics were available for 2004 and 2005. ¶10. (U) Post personnel reported that cargo going to Afghanistan typically consists of humanitarian assistance, construction material, food, and oil and is shipped primarily on the railroad. Cargo from Afghanistan is typically fruit and vegetables ) some of it transshipped from Pakistan - and is shipped primarily by truck or boat. The railroad cars typically return empty to Uzbekistan. ¶11. (U) The vehicle checkpoint contains trenches for searching underneath trucks. We observed the full search procedures of a truck, which entailed a canine narcotics sniffer, partial unloading of the vehicle, and an underneath search. The vehicle inspection area is equipped with four sets of CT-30 kits and narcotics test equipment (two sets of each at entry and two at exit). The buster and fiberscope that we inspected have clearly been used and had dust and other residue. Post representatives said that their personnel had been trained to use the equipment through search and detection courses. ¶12. (SBU) Analysis: The Friendship Bridge is an impressive project, both in terms of infrastructure and technology. The observed search techniques and canine utilization were thorough and professional. Now that the bridge and land checkpoint projects are complete, we should consider focusing our efforts in Termez on the river port. An Embassy Tashkent representative should attend the ceremony planned by UNODC in April (Note: Now postponed. End Note.) to mark the substantial completion of this multi-donor project and request to tour the river port prior to arrival. Based on his/her assessment, INL and the Embassy will consider allocating a portion of CN pipeline project funding to UNODC for the purchase of an x-ray machine and other necessary detection equipment and training for the port. SARIOSIYA CHECKPOINT (UZBEKISTAN-TAJIKISTAN) -------------- ¶13. (U) April 4 Site overview: The Sariosiya-Tursunzada crossing is the most direct way to travel by road from Tashkent to Dushanbe throughout the year, although this is still at least a ten hour drive from Tashkent via Termez to the border. According to Uzbek personnel, approximately 300-400 people cross each day (pedestrians and passengers). An estimated 10 to 15 trucks transit the post in an average day. Government bus services crossing the border stopped in 1995 and private bus services in 1998, according to Uzbek personnel. The railroad crossing is approximately 20 km from the land crossing and approximately 5-6 cargo trains pass through in an average day and 2-3 passenger trains each week. We did not visit the railroad checkpoint. Uzbek personnel speak Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian. ¶14. (U) Observations: Sariosiya (Uzbek side) contains a metal detector that all individuals pass through before going through passport control. Passport control includes one booth for entering records into the database. Another window is used for examining export control documents. The passport database is updated weekly with the current &black list.8 The database does not store individuals, information, but rather records the number of people transiting. Information is saved to CDs when the hard drive is full, but no data is transferred back to Tashkent. ¶15. (U) While not as impressive as Termez, the Sariosiya checkpoint has all the necessary elements of a professional TASHKENT 00000777 003 OF 003 checkpoint: trenches for underneath truck searches, CT-30 kits containing busters, fiberscopes, and mirrors, four canines at the land crossing (seven at the railroad) that were trained in Tashkent. The post has an x-ray machine, but personnel reported that it is broken. They also reported that electricity is sporadic and that they are in need of a more powerful generator. There is no DTRA WMD portal monitor. ¶16. (U) Most of the people crossing to Uzbekistan are Tajiks not requiring visas under the Uzbekistan/Tajikistan bilateral agreement permitting citizens of each other's country residing in border districts to visit the opposite border district for short periods without a visa. Uzbek personnel estimated only 8 to 10 percent of the Tajiks crossing the border had Uzbek visas. Unlike the Airatom/Friendship Bridge checkpoint, Sariosiya is open 24/7. It is particularly busy during national holidays, such as Navruz, when many families cross to visit relatives on the other side. ¶17. (SBU) Analysis: The post is professional and generally well-equipped, but it is in need of an x-ray machine, generator, and a forklift for unloading trucks. The Tajik post is located a short distance away, so communication generally entails simply walking to speak with their counterparts on the other side. The Uzbek personnel did not feel that a communications system with the Tajik side (either telephone or radios) is necessary since they prefer to walk the short distance to speak with their counterparts. An Embassy rep should also visit the railroad crossing to see checking procedures, as it appears that a substantial number of passengers and freight also cross via trains, a traditional means of smuggling narcotics in Central Asia. PURNELL

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