UZBEKISTAN'S KARIMOV THREATENED BY MILITANT ISLAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001562 DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN'S KARIMOV THREATENED BY MILITANT ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY Classified By: AMB. JON R. PURNELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)(D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a marathon discussion with President Karimov, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Boucher pressed Karimov to live up to the promise that U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relations once held. Karimov welcomed the effort at dialogue, but said that a lack of trust is at the heart of bilateral problems. Initial euphoria surrounding relations with the U.S. led to "nothing". Uzbekistan, he said, is under attack from militant Islam. He nonetheless agreed that there are important areas in which we should work to develop cooperation. Boucher laid out for him the steps Uzbekistan must take to achieve that: normal Embassy operations, and respect for our implementing partners and civil society. End summary. -------------- -------------- REVIVING BILATERAL DIALOGUE -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) SCA A/S Richard Boucher, accompanied by Ambassador and senior adviser Hayden, met with President Islom Karimov for two-and-one-half hours August 9. Newly appointed FM Vladimir Norov and veteran Deputy National Security Adviser Rakhmankulov were also present. Karimov welcomed A/S Boucher's visit, saying that an open exchange of views was the best approach to resolving outstanding issues. Development of U.S.-Uzbek relations was in both nations' interest, he said. Any worsening in those relations would create problems for Uzbekistan's future and would play into the hands of third parties. ¶3. (C) A/S Boucher recalled his earlier visits to Uzbekistan with Secretaries Powell and Albright, and reminded the President of the promise that once characterized bilateral relations. Our new chancery in Tashkent, he said, was a potent symbol of the optimism of those years. As Uzbekistan celebrates its fifteenth anniversary of independence, the basic elements of our strategic partnership are still important and can serve as a basis for future cooperation. ¶4. (C) At the same time, noted A/S Boucher, the level of bilateral cooperation has declined. The U.S., he stressed, is not in the region to overthrow governments or push other nations out of the region. It is true, he continued, that the U.S. and Uzbekistan have different views about what happened in Andijon last year and on the human rights situation in general. He had not come to Tashkent, however, with the intention of arguing about these differences. Rather, his primary focus was to look for a way of moving ahead. At the same time, support for human rights was an essential component of U.S. policy, and we would need to find a way to address these issues. (Comment: A/S Boucher pursued this theme further with FM Norov over dinner. The latter agreed that human rights could and should be part of our dialogue. He recalled that we made tangible progress in this area in 2004 when he was First Deputy FM. End comment.) A/S Boucher said he saw several areas in which he thought the U.S. and Uzbekistan could work together effectively. They included cooperation against terrorism and drug trafficking; economic development to benefit the Uzbek people; and building a healthy, modern society in Uzbekistan. ¶5. (C) It is regrettable, said A/S Boucher, that so much bad information about the U.S. is circulating in the press and among the public here. We know who is responsible for such disinformation. Secretary Rice personally requested that he convey to the President that the U.S. wants to work with Uzbekistan to improve relations, make the region safer and improve the well being of the Uzbek people. U.S. policy continues to be based on support for Uzbek independence. Any nation's independence is more secure when it has multiple options for pursuing its development. -------------- UZBEKISTAN UNDER ATTACK -------------- ¶6. (C) Before responding directly to A/S Boucher's comments, Karimov offered some insights into how he sees Uzbekistan's situation in the world today. Uzbekistan, he said, is an integral part of the extremely diverse Muslim world. Despite this great diversity, fundamental links exist that facilitate communication and understanding among all Muslim peoples, whether in the Middle East, Africa, Europe or Asia. In recent years a dangerous misunderstanding has arisen between the U.S. and the Muslim world. Today we are faced with a virtual war between the Christian and Muslim worlds. There is also a major struggle going on within the Muslim world, which Karimov characterized as enlightened Islam versus totalitarian or militant Islam. ¶7. (C) It is important for the U.S. that enlightened Islam win out. According to Karimov, however, U.S. policy in the Middle East has played into the hands of militant Islam, he said. By promoting democracy in the region, the U.S. helped create the conditions for Hamas and Hezbollah to succeed. Uzbekistan became a target for attack by militant Islam when it gained independence, and remains one to this day. "We are no different from Lebanon or Palestine," he said. If the GOU were to drop its vigilance, we would see militant Islam gain control of all the Central Asian states inside of three months. Uzbekistan, he said, is not against democracy, but is not ready for it. If it is introduced too quickly, the result will be the same as in Lebanon or Palestine. At the same time, Karimov said he understands exactly what the U.S. means when it talks about democracy and human rights. He does not have a different approach to or understanding of human rights, and he understands that they are key to democracy. The day will come when Uzbekistan is ready for democracy and human rights, but it would be a mistake to "impose" them prematurely. -------------- EUPHORIA AND TRUST GONE -------------- ¶8. (C) Uzbekistan, he said, had always been something of a soft "buffer zone" for Russia when it was part of the USSR. The Russians, however, never understood the Uzbek mentality. When independence came, there was a period of euphoria. Uzbeks did not understand that freedom alone was not enough, that they had to develop their economic independence as well. Today there is a more sober view: economic cooperation is more important than political cooperation. Politics, he said, is the concentrated expression of the economy. Had the U.S. moved quickly to establish a key position in the Uzbek economy, we probably would not have seen a cooling in relations. He also lamented that the U.S. had not supported his 2003 request that the World Bank set up a billion dollar credit line to help Uzbekistan achieve currency convertibility. ¶9. (C) Turning to the bilateral relationship, Karimov described himself as a pragmatist who wants to look forward and improve U.S.-Uzbek ties. Several factors, however, had led to a downturn in relations: a non-objective, inadequate analysis of what happened in Andijon; U.S. efforts to cooperate with certain religious groups and tolerate Hizb ut-Tahrir; an unprecedented information war against Uzbekistan; and efforts to create an image of Uzbekistan as an authoritarian totalitarian state and isolate it in the international arena. As a result, we have lost mutual trust, and third countries benefit from the downturn in relations. He went on to identify several areas in which we should try to reestablish dialogue and cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and counter-proliferation; border security and customs; military training and cooperation; economics and investment; developing civil institutions, democracy and market reforms; and humanitarian cooperation in areas such as health and education. -------------- VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶10. (C) Changing direction, Karimov offered his views on developments in Afghanistan, explaining that he is "not an optimist" with regard to the country's future. Poverty and unemployment, he said, are not decreasing in Afghanistan, and social conditions are getting worse, despite significant international assistance, because of corruption in the central government. As a result, people do not trust the government in Kabul. The Taliban are winning the information war, and a purely military victory there is impossible, as the Soviet Union found out. Pakistan can play a key role in bringing stability to Afghanistan, and President Musharraf is best placed to help. Any change of leadership in Pakistan would be counterproductive in relation to Afghanistan. ¶11. (C) A/S Boucher said he agreed with Karimov that military operations alone could not bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Confronting terrorists and drug barons requires force, but ultimately the challenge is to extend good government to all the people of Afghanistan. He also concurred that Pakistan has a crucial role to play in the region and the U.S. actively supports President Musharraf's efforts. -------------- -------------- BUILDING NEW BILATERAL RELATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Bringing Karimov back into focus on bilateral relations, A/S Boucher suggested postponing further discussion of Middle East issues until a future meeting. He noted that his own list of areas for future cooperation was quite similar to Karimov's. But to carry out any meaningful joint work the U.S. would need visas to staff our Embassy in a normal manner, an end to harassment of our NGO partners, the ability to implement education programs, an end to shutting down civil society groups, an end to pressure on U.S. companies and improvements in the business climate. If we can make progress in these areas we can begin to fulfill the promise inherent in our strategic partnership agreement. If not, then both sides will likely make decisions that will further restrict our relations. Our cooperation would be good for the independence of Uzbekistan, stability in Afghanistan and for the region as a whole. ¶13. (C) Karimov said that, in principle, he agreed with A/S Boucher's conclusion. He used the latter's reference to visas, however, to launch into a diatribe against the Embassy, claiming that Embassy personnel have maintained inappropriate contacts and interfered in Uzbekistan's internal affairs. He leveled similar criticisms at U.S. NGOs, charging that they are funding political activities in Uzbekistan. All NGOs, he said, must respect Uzbek law and refrain from funding political activities. He added, however, that he had no plans to expel diplomats, as he knew they were carrying out instructions. He hinted at a way out of the current visa impasse by suggesting that if we provided the MFA with the number of diplomats we need at the Embassy, he would see that they got visas. The number, however, must be firm. -------------- LINKING VISION AND REALITY -------------- ¶14. (C) Changing gears, Karimov spoke of his "vision" for Uzbekistan, saying that he wants to see a strong political opposition and free press in the country (sic). He wants Uzbek youth to have the same values as American youth. He urged the U.S. to work with Uzbek youth, not the fringes of society. When A/S Boucher pointed out the obvious contradiction between this vision and the Uzbek decision to close NGOs that implement U.S. education exchanges, Karimov said that IREX had broken Uzbek law by recruiting students without first having a bilateral agreement with the government. He said that if relations continue to deteriorate, education exchanges will suffer even further. ¶15. (C) Karimov concluded by stressing that a lack of trust lay at the heart of our bilateral difficulties. He chided the U.S. for allegedly searching for "a regional leader." (Comment: A clear reference to Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev. End comment.) Such a search, he said, is counterproductive and harmful. Kazakhstan, he said, is not even part of Central Asia. To think of it as a locomotive for the region is counterproductive. ¶16. (C) Closing on a positive note, A/S Boucher reiterated the importance of making progress in areas of immediate, practical interest as a first step in rebuilding trust. Karimov agreed that this should be our approach. He said he saw the discussion as the beginning of a positive dialogue. ¶17. (C) COMMENT: The presentation, often contradictory and self serving, was vintage Karimov. Even as he professes to share U.S. values and vision for the region, he is actively cutting back the U.S. presence here. He steadfastly maintains that U.S. policies and actions undermine his position and are responsible for the downturn in bilateral relations. While he suggested some flexibility on our immediate visa problems, he offered no olive branches in relation to NGOs and civil society. That said, some areas of cooperation remain active (e.g., border controls, non-proliferation, health, etc.). It could be that with a growing Russian presence here Karimov will decide that it is now time to revive his relations with the U.S. It may also be that that will have to wait until he is safely beyond the 2007 presidential elections. PURNELL