ESTONIA: REFLECTIONS ON EU MEMBERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TALLINN 000983 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL EU EN SUBJECT: ESTONIA: REFLECTIONS ON EU MEMBERSHIP REF: A) TALLINN 00964 B)TALLINN 00968 Classified By: DCM Jeff Goldstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Estonia's attitude toward EU membership has evolved away from EU skepticism and towards a more pragmatic "good European" engagement. Public support for Estonia's EU membership has recently reached a record high. However, in foreign policy Estonian officials recognize that their tendency to disproportionately focus on Russia may be undermining credibility among other EU member states. Lack of personnel, expertise and diplomatic representation outside of Europe hinders Estonia's ability to expand its policy engagement beyond its own neighborhood. End Summary. From Britain to Finland: -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Despite initial jitters, Estonian support for further and deeper EU integration has grown since accession in 2004. According to Gert Antsu, the State Chancellery's Director for EU Affairs, Estonia's early approach to EU membership most resembled the British Euro-Skeptic attitude: GOE officials and politicians were reluctant to hand over more national sovereignty to Brussels than absolutely necessary. However, Antsu explained, over the last two years, Estonia's attitude has slowly evolved into a more constructive "integrationist approach to Europe" similar to that of Finland. Estonia has supported a number of big ticket EU initiatives including ratification of the Constitution and advocating for a Common Foreign Security Policy. ¶3. (C) GOE officials often describe Estonia's approach within EU structures as "pragmatic." Antsu noted that as a small country Estonia recognizes the extent to which it can influence EU policy. For example, when it became certain that Estonia would not meet the EU's criteria to join the Eurozone, the GOE announced in June 2006 that it would seek a one year delay. GOE officials feel they earned points in Brussels by expressing their disappointment in very moderate tones. Kristiina Meius, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) European Correspondent, who spent the last three years as a political officer in Brussels, asserted that Estonia's approach has begun to earn it credibility as a "constructive and serious" partner. In comparison, Antsu noted, Lithuania's more vocal reaction to delayed admission to the Eurozone "did not win them any friends." (Comment. It is clear that GOE officials hope that their support for EU integration initiatives and quieter dissent proves their "good European" bona fides. End Comment.) Growing EU Expertise: -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In the past, GOE ministers have tended to view their staff responsible for EU issues as "off in their corner doing EU stuff." However, Antsu noted, this is changing. Estonia has begun to build up a small coterie of officials who have experience traveling to and working in Brussels. These officials provide the GOE with an expanding base of practical EU know-how within the various ministries, which is essential for negotiations within EU fora. ¶5. (SBU) Estonia has also benefited from the close working relationship that exists between the Government and the Parliament's EU Affairs Committee. Olev Aarma, the senior permanent staff member on the Parliament's EU Affairs Committee, attends all Government meetings in which bills are drafted. Aarma said he knows of no other member state where this takes place. As a result Aarma said, "only a handful" of the government's EU-related proposals have been overturned by the Parliament -- and most of these were because of technicalities. This close cooperation has prevented a backlog of EU legislation waiting to be adopted and has placed Estonia ahead of many older member states in incorporating EU legislation into national law. The EU Still Popular: -------------- ¶6. (U) Public support for Estonia's membership in the EU has remained strong since accession. In the latest government poll, almost 80 percent of the public had a TALLINN 00000983 002 OF 003 favorable impression of EU membership. Estonia's economy has continued to grow at a remarkable pace since accession (GDP grew 9.8 percent in 2005). EU Structural Funds for infrastructure projects and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) aid to farmers (once the most hostile to EU membership) have both delivered tangible and visible benefits the public can understand. Also, the European Commission's public support for inclusion of the new member states into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program has gone over well with the public. ¶7. (SBU) As a result of this strong popular support, EU membership has not been the focus of much domestic political debate. By and large, there is a general pro-EU sentiment among the leadership of all the parties. Aarma said to us, "It is strange when you think of it, but we have parties that ought to be more hostile to the EU due to their own party principles." The Reform Party's strident economic liberalism has not prevented it from being one of the strongest EU proponents in Estonia. Neither have the nationalist parties, like Pro Patria or Res Publica, tried to drum up populist support in reaction to expanding EU powers. Unlike other new member states (i.e., Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Poland) that have seen anti-EU parties make gains, Aarma didn't think the EU would even be an issue in the upcoming parliamentary elections next year. Moving beyond Moscow: -------------- ¶8. (C) Toomas Henrik Ilves, President of Estonia, has made it his goal for Estonia to become a "generator of ideas in Europe" (Ref A),but there is a significant gap between aspiration and reality. Estonia still lacks the necessary infrastructure and expertise to produce and sustain critical analysis on broad EU issues. Antsu complained that GOE reports suffer from being so general that they "are not worth the effort." Nowhere is this lack of fresh ideas more apparent than in foreign and security policy, according to Marko Mihkelson, MP and Foreign Affairs Committee Vice- Chair. Estonia's security and foreign policy forays have been limited to Russia and immediate regional matters. Several interlocutors acknowledged the danger that Estonia is or will be viewed as a single- issue country in Brussels. ¶9. (C) Mihkelson opined that Estonia's focus on Russia has stifled any interest or initiative to engage on issues outside the region. When one compares Estonia's vocal and vigorous defense of Georgia in Lahti, Finland(Ref B) with its near silence on North Korea, the Middle East, and Iran, it is clear that Estonia prefers to defer to common EU positions on matters not related to Russia. Speaking off the record, Aadrma was concerned that this passivity for matters "non-Russian" was not in Estonia's long term interest. He said that Estonia is in danger of being dismissed even on Russia as member states feel Estonia (and other new members) "sound like a broken record." One possibility is for Estonia to focus on a select number of key European issues such as energy security, migration and others. But work on the GOE's new EU policy plan (the current expires in December 2006) will not begin until after parliamentary elections in March 2007. Hampered by a Lack of Resources -------------- ¶10. (C) According to Mihkelson, another important reason for Estonia's inability to engage on other issues is due to the lack of experienced and qualified people within and outside of Government, hardly a surprise in a country of 1.35 million. "We don't have anything to say about Iran or other parts of the world," Mihkelson said, because too few GOE officials have "experience beyond our borders." The MFA's Meius highlighted the need for more funding from Parliament to expand MFA staffing at home and abroad. Currently, the MFA division responsible for covering Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia has only four people. Coupled with the GOE's marginal diplomatic representation outside of Europe, Meius asked us how realistic it was for Estonia to be able to contribute on policy outside its immediate region. ¶11. (C) Mihkelson and others believe that having more independent think tanks in Estonia would help the TALLINN 00000983 003 OF 003 country "develop expertise in foreign affairs." Currently there are only two: the MFA-funded Estonian Foreign Policy Institute (EFPI) and MOD's International Center for Defense Studies (ICDS). Andres Kasekamp, EFPI's Director, welcomes Mihkelson's encouragement but notes that as a "one man operation" there is only so much the EFPI can produce. ICDS is a brand new organization and has yet to begin full operations. Kadri Liik, ICDS Director, said that even though they are making progress, Mihkelson's idea is "a long way from becoming a reality." (Comment. Since both think tanks are financially dependent upon the GOE, their products are vulnerable to influence. During the drafting of a study on energy security, Mikhelson himself urged Kasekamp to ensure the study's findings were "sufficiently" critical of Russia. End Comment.) WOS