INOPERABILITY PROBLEMS ENDANGER ESTONIAN MISSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000767 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF IZ EN SUBJECT: INOPERABILITY PROBLEMS ENDANGER ESTONIAN MISSIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN Classified By: CDA Jeff Goldstein for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) This is an action request, please see para 6. ¶2. (C) Summary: The lack of interoperability between U.S., UK, and Estonian jamming devices used against improvised explosive devices (IED) in Afghanistan and Iraq has created a dangerous force protection situation that could potentially derail Estonia?s military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. End Summary. ¶3. (C) According to Taimar Peterkop, MOD Director for Operations, in May, an IED exploded underneath an EDF vehicle while it was on patrol with U.S. troops outside of Baghdad. An Estonian officer who was driving ahead of his unit with the lead U.S. convoy vehicle noticed the IED. However, his Motorola radio was jammed by the U.S. WARLOCK jamming equipment U.S. soldiers routinely use, and he was unable to warn his unit. While the U.S. vehicles passed the IED safely the EDF vehicle did not. Fortunately, the recently upgraded vehicle absorbed both the explosive force and shrapnel, preventing any casualties. Major Stan Reimann, EDF J3-Current Operations, told us that Estonian commanders in Iraq believe the WARLOCK may have inadvertently also jammed the EDF's own jamming equipment, IRIS. The interoperability problem persists in both Iraq and Afghanistan, forcing EDF forces to switch off their IRIS equipment when working with U.S. and UK troops. ¶4. (C) Given Estonia's small size, an IED explosion resulting in multiple fatalities could easily cause a significant public backlash. The impact would be multiplied if it turned out that problems such as those experienced in May contributed. This could force the GOE to reconsider its troop deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As EDF forces operate in frontline missions in Baghdad and Helmand Province, multiple fatalities from IEDs are a real possibility. ¶5. (C) In several meetings between Emboffs and MOD and MFA officials, the GOE has informally asked our assistance in finding a long term solution to the interoperability problem. They are very uncomfortable with the ad hoc approach Estonian soldiers are forced to employ on the ground. GOE officials suggested two ways to deal with the issue: First, the U.S. and UK could provide regular updates on the frequencies terrorists use in Iraq and Afghanistan so that EDF can update its IRIS system; and, second, U.S. forces could provide the EDF with WARLOCK's frequencies so that EDF radios and IRIS can be set to operate on different frequencies. To date, the MOD has not requested the WARLOCK equipment. (Note: The interoperability problem between IRIS and WARLOCK could extend beyond the EDF, as Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands have approached the GOE about procuring the IRIS system.) ¶6. (C) Action Request: Given the security sensitivities and regulations regarding U.S. military frequencies, Post seeks interagency guidance on how to respond to the GOE's requests. GOLDSTEIN