MA YING-JEOU: READY FOR THE U.S. STAGE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000902 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR TW SUBJECT: MA YING-JEOU: READY FOR THE U.S. STAGE? REF: TAIWAN 0865 Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Taipei Mayor and Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou sees his upcoming visit to Washington as a key step in his run for the presidency in 2008. He hopes to burnish his credentials as a statesman who knows how to handle the big political and security issues including U.S.-Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. Ma, however, stumbled repeatedly over the independence-unification issue during his recent visit to Europe. Barring a last-minute compromise, he also failed to get his party's legislative caucus to approve an alternative defense procurement proposal. All sides of the political spectrum are waiting to see how Ma will handle the grilling they expect he will receive from the USG, media and overseas Chinese during his U.S. visit. End summary. Ma for President -------------- ¶2. (C) Following years of division, demoralization, and lackluster leadership in the former ruling Kuomintang (KMT), the youthful and energetic Ma has brought new hope to the party, whose members expect him to win the 2008 presidential election. Prior to January 1, 2006, Ma had put together a dramatic string of political successes. He defeated the popular incumbent, Chen Shui-bian, in 1998 to become Taipei mayor and was reelected by an overwhelming margin in 2002, despite a mediocre first term performance. In the KMT's first contested race for Chairman, Ma appealed directly to the party's grassroots members and defeated the popular KMT-machine politician, LY President Wang Jin-pyng, by a three-to-one margin. Ma then campaigned vigorously against the DPP, focusing on the DPP's corruption scandals and poor government performance, in the December 2005 local election campaign, and the so-called "Ma Ying-jeou effect" was a major factor in the KMT's impressive victory in that election. ¶3. (C) Ma has gained ground against the DPP by arguing that the ruling party is more interested in playing politics and cutting suspicious deals than in solving the economic and social problems of ordinary people. Many moderate "swing" voters, who once saw the DPP as an improvement over the KMT, now seem fed up with the ruling party, because of corruption scandals, and they have been receptive to Ma's message. Ma has benefited from the "squeaky clean" reformer image he has carefully cultivated since the beginning of his political career and also from his "movie star" appearance. In polls following the December local elections, Ma's approval rating reached extraordinary heights, about 80 percent. Agenda for U.S. Visit -------------- (1) Unification vs. Independence -------------- ¶4. (C) Ma comes to the U.S. knowing he must handle well three key issues: (1) unification-independence, (2) cross-Strait relations, and (3) national security, including arms purchases. Ma has been on the defensive lately, after issuing confusing or contradictory statements on the KMT stance toward independence and unification. As a "Mainlander," he is vulnerable to DPP attacks that he is prone to "sell out" Taiwan to China. Ma has tried, but not very successfully so far, to develop a more nuanced KMT policy: maintain the status quo for the foreseeable future, let the people of Taiwan decide its future, and acknowledge that unification and independence are options for the Taiwan people, though independence is not a KMT option. Ma's various statements on this issue in recent months have generated a firestorm of controversy within and outside the KMT, and the Taiwan press will press Ma at every opportunity to say more on unification and independence while he is in the U.S. While some Taiwan observers question why Ma raised such a sensitive issue two years before the presidential election, others believe he would rather deal with it now than have it hit him just prior to the election. TAIPEI 00000902 002 OF 004 (2) Cross-Strait Relations -------------- ¶5. (C) Ma is working to harmonize conflicting interests on cross-Strait policy and defense needs. Ma has endorsed the "five point consensus" reached by Lien Chan and Hu Jintao in April 2005, which contemplates improved cross-Strait relations through increased party-to-party dialogue and expanded trade and cultural links. Ma has entrusted management of the KMT cross-Strait portfolio to Lien, which affords him some separation from policies opponents might attack as too pro-China. Ma also keeps the PRC at arms-length by attacking is human rights record and failure to redress the Tiananmen massacre. (3) National Security -------------- ¶6. (C) Ma has stated publicly that Taiwan must increase its military capability to a level "sufficient to show (its) determination to defend itself," and that the KMT must "rationalize" its discussion of Taiwan's defense needs. Ma failed, however, on the eve of his U.S. visit to secure party consensus on a compromise arms procurement plan, which reportedly featured acquiring P-3C ASW aircraft, while rejecting PAC-3 missiles and diesel electric submarines. Opposition to arms purchases runs deep within the pan-Blue camp, and KMT legislators refused to go along with Ma, citing their outrage over what they view as President Chen's moves to stoke tensions with China, particularly his February 27 decision to "cease the functioning/application" of the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines. Ma claims to understand the importance of Taiwan improving its self-defense capabilities, but his failure to manage the KMT's legislators raises questions about the effectiveness of his leadership (see reftel). ¶7. (C) In the last day or two Taiwanese KMT insiders have begun to rationalize Ma's failure to secure KMT consensus on the arms procurement bill, claiming they do not see this as a defeat for Ma. A majority of the KMT oppose arms purchases, and President Chen's decision to "cease" the NUC/NUG strengthened the hand of the KMT's anti-procurement hardliners. Ma looked weak by not standing up to Chen sooner on the NUC/NUG, and if the KMT had moved forward with an arms procurement bill, it would have been viewed by the Taiwan public as yet another submission to Chen. In short, they say, Ma had no choice but to put the arms procurement issue on hold, so that the KMT could demonstrate its disagreement with the President, and its ability to frustrate his arms procurement agenda. Strengths and Weaknesses -------------- (1) The Ethnic Issue -------------- ¶8. (C) Ma is a Mainlander and must attract a sizable portion of ethnic Taiwanese voters to win the presidency. However, KMT contacts say Ma is out of touch with the sensibilities of ethnic Taiwanese because his most trusted advisors are all Mainlanders. Contacts cite his seemingly tone-deaf December 2005 pronouncement that "unification is the ultimate goal of the KMT" as proof of Ma's lack of sensitivity to Taiwanese views. Ethnic Taiwanese contacts within the KMT say that to avoid similar gaffes in the future and to expand Taiwanese support for his candidacy, Ma needs to broaden his circle of advisers to include Taiwanese and to improve relations with Lien Chan (half Taiwanese) and Wang Jin-pyng (Taiwanese). (2) Telegenic, But Not Always Personable -------------- ¶9. (C) Though Ma enjoys strong support from voters, especially women and youth, he receives only grudging support and cooperation from much of the KMT senior leadership. Ma is telegenic and moderately effective in working crowds, but on a personal basis he tends to be standoffish and unforthcoming. In keeping with his temperament, Ma has not TAIPEI 00000902 003 OF 004 cultivated the network of business leaders and KMT political operatives that most high-flying KMT politicians rely on. The upside is that Ma has been able to preserve his reputation for strict integrity. The downside is that many senior KMT officials are less willing to cooperate with Ma because they don't know him very well, or even actively dislike him because they believe he is working against their interests. (3) Cautious to a Fault? -------------- ¶10. (C) Ma sometimes appears indecisive or to lack boldness and vision. A recent example is his initially muted reaction to President Chen's decision to consider "abolishing" the NUC/NUG. While KMT legislators were calling to recall or even impeach Chen, Ma simply urged Chen to reconsider his "unwise" move. When Chen "ceased" operation of the NUC/NUG, pressure from KMT supporters and legislators forced Ma off the fence into supporting the legislators' recall movement. KMT legislator Ting Shou-chung, a long-time Ma supporter, lamented to AIT that Ma is just too cautious. He is a wonderful family man and works extremely hard, but....... Challenges -------------- (1) Pan-Blue Unity -------------- ¶11. (C) Although Ma faces no direct challenge to his leadership of the KMT, he still must manage complex relationships with Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan and LY President Wang Jin-pyng. Ma needs both men -- Lien to gain full cooperation from other KMT leaders and bureaucrats and Wang to work out deals with local political factions, which the KMT has long relied on to mobilize voters. There has, however, been considerable friction between Ma and Wang in recent months, in part because Ma objects to Wang's dealings with President Chen. Lien has tried to bridge differences between Ma and Wang. Lien has also challenged Ma over Ma's penchant for deciding sensitive party policy issues on his own, without consulting Lien or other old guard leaders. ¶12. (C) As Ma's star has risen dramatically over the past eight months, Pan-Blue coalition partner People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong's star has fallen, and significant numbers of both legislators and supporters have defected from the PFP to the KMT. Nonetheless, Ma continues to coddle Soong because he needs the remaining PFP supporters to back his presidential campaign in 2008. In addition, PFP cooperation is critical to maintaining pan-Blue control of the legislature. The PFP still holds 24 seats in the LY, which, combined with the 88 KMT seats, afford the Pan-Blue a very narrow two-seat majority in the 221-seat Legislative Yuan (LY). Soong, however, is threatening to run for Taipei mayor in December, which could lead to a DPP victory in a three-way contest. In return for dropping out, Soong has demanded, and the KMT has so far refused, to set aside a number of nominations for PFP candidates in the December 2007 LY elections. (2) Party Reform -------------- ¶13. (C) Ma has taken steps to democratize the KMT, downsize its bureaucracy, sell party assets, and clean up the party and reform its image as corrupt. In late 2005, Ma pushed through changes in party regulations that provided for the full Party Congress to elect the Central Standing Committee, rather than allowing the Chairman to hand-pick the members. In recent months he has slashed the number of party workers from 1,600 to 900. Over the past year, the KMT has sold off a variety of properties, and Ma has ordered all remaining assets, totaling perhaps NT$30 billion (nearly USD one billion),to be liquidated before the end of this year so that the DPP will be unable to use the issue against the party in the 2007 LY elections and against him in the 2008 presidential race. In April, the KMT will move out of its luxurious Party Headquarters Building, which is located on prime real estate across from the Presidential Palace but has TAIPEI 00000902 004 OF 004 been an albatross on the party's image. While Ma has made clear he intends to take action against party members indicted or convicted on corruption charges, he has yet to push forward broader anti-corruption reforms. Ready for the U.S. Stage? -------------- ¶14. (C) Ma's trip to the U.S. has him visiting a number of think tanks and academic institutions where he has been a frequent visitor and has many friends. Ma expects that his message on cross-Strait relations, corruption and economic issues will be a welcome counterpoint to Chen's positions for many in the U.S. His challenges will be two: relating to the Taiwanese-American community; and handling the Taiwan press. Both will be looking to see if Ma stumbles once more over issues of Taiwan identity and independence. In Taiwan, the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green will be watching Ma's every step, as well as the USG reaction to him. Will it be a royal process? Will the U.S. welcome him as the moderate hope for the future? Or, will Ma stumble once more, as he is perceived to have stumbled in Great Britain? KEEGAN