CHINA RATCHETS UP DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004067 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TW SUBJECT: CHINA RATCHETS UP DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON TAIWAN Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Bejing is ratcheting up its global drive to contain and undercut Taiwan, Taiwan Foreign Minister James Huang told the Director on December 6. In particular, PRC pressure in Central America and Africa is keeping the heat on Taiwan, said Huang, who just returned from relations-stabilizing trips to Central America and Southeast Asia. Huang acknowledged that he and all other cabinet members would follow suit and resign were Premier Su Tseng-chang to resign in the event of dual loss for the SIPDIS ruling DPP in the December 9 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections. End Summary. China Full-Court Press on Taiwan Diplomatic Partners -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Just returned from back-to-back trips to Central America and Southeast Asia, Taiwan's peripatetic Foreign Minister James Huang (Chih-fang) described to AIT Director Young on December 6 the heavy pressure China is exerting on Taiwan's twenty-four remaining diplomatic partners to switch relations from Taipei to Beijing. Taiwan's relations with its six Central American diplomatic partners, he said, require close monitoring. Relations with Nicaragua and President-elect Daniel Ortega appear to have stabilized for the time-being, and Taiwan is planning to send "someone important" to attend the Ortega inauguration in January. But the ultimate question of Ortega's intentions toward China remains very uncertain, Huang told us. ¶3. (C) Meanwhile, relations with Belize had suddenly come under increased pressure from Beijing, Huang told the Director, apologizing for having missed the Director's November 27 Thanksgiving dinner for President Chen so that he could fly to Belize. Huang explained that Taiwan "intelligence sources" had learned Beijing was offering Belize, a country of 300,000 people, limited income and heavy national debt, USD 50 million in grants and USD 150 million in concessional loans in return for a shift in relations. Huang, who did not indicate what he had done to stabilize Taiwan relations with Belize, told the Director resignedly, "If China is willing to pay the price, I'm not sure how long we can contend." (Note: Indicative of how closely the "intelligence" on Belize was held within MOFA, MOFA Central and South America Director-General Simon Ko insisted to AIT officers the previous day, December 5, that relations with Belize were fine and posed no problems. End Note.) ¶4. (C) FM Huang pointed to a similar campaign in Africa, locus of another five of Taiwan's diplomatic partners. China's courting technique there, Huang said, was to offer the government in question the full amount of Taiwan assistance plus a substantial increment. Beijing, however, often failed to follow through on its proffered assistance. In Chad, for example, which shifted relations from Taipei to Beijing in August, Beijing had yet to send an Ambassador or begin implementing its pledged assistance. Huang said Taiwan is using this trail of broken pledges to convince its diplomatic partners not to believe Beijing's promises and to stick with Taiwan and its proven assistance. ¶5. (C) FM Huang lamented the embarrassing public spat occupying Taiwan newspaper headlines in recent days over who will represent Taiwan at the inauguration of Gambian President Yahya Jammeh in mid-December. Both Vice President Annette Lu and Premier Su Tseng-chang, political competitors in the ruling DPP, have been trying to push this task on to the other, according to press reports. Gambia, Huang explained, is particularly important to Taiwan, because it is one of the African countries targetted by Beijing. Beijing has sought to apply pressure on Gambia via Senegal, with TAIPEI 00004067 002 OF 002 which China has diplomatic relations, and offering the same kind of financial assistance package as it did in Chad. Possible Cabinet Turnover -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to the Saturday's Taipei and Kaohiung mayoral elections, FM Huang told the Director he believed the elections would bring an "earthquake" to Taiwan politics. While DPP Chairman You Shyi-kun would definitely resign in the event of double DPP election losses, Premier Su Tseng-chang's situation was separate and distinct. When SIPDIS then-DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang and then-Premier Frank Hsieh resigned following heavy DPP losses in December 2005 local elections, Huang explained, these were unrelated events. Su, he said, resigned immediately to take responsibility for the election loss, whereas Hsieh's "resignation" was forced by President Chen because of the two men's policy differences. Huang stressed that if Premier Su Tseng-chang did resign, he and other ministers would definitely resign their positions. He surmised that if President Chen accepted Su's resignation, he would simultaneously announce his choice for a new Premier, just as he did with Su and former-Premier Frank Hsieh in January. The new Premier would then decide which holdover ministers to keep and which to replace. Last January, Premier Su returned roughly half of the old cabinet, Huang added. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Huang is under great pressure from all sides, both from across the Taiwan Strait and from within Taiwan. In Taiwan's intensely politicized atmosphere, the youthful and soft-spoken Huang is a ready target of attack from both the pro-independence deep-Green side and from the pan-Blue opposition. Having "lost" Chad in early August, when Beijing succeeded shifting relations, Huang is aware that further "losses" will likely be pinned on him. Thus, Huang's aggressive diplomacy in Central America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa to shore up Taiwan's remaining diplomatic relationships. 8.. (C) In official meetings with the Director, the soft-spoken Huang often lowers his voice even further, making it difficult for anyone other than the Director to hear him, a device apparently intended to keep information from other MOFA officials in the room. Huang, for example, told the Director that he had returned to Taipei from Southeast Asia the previous evening, but only revealed privately to the Director while walking him to the elevator that he had actually gone to Kuala Lumpur, where he held warm but secret meetings with the Malaysian Foreign Minister. YOUNG