MTAG: TAIWAN AGREES TO SEND IRAN/NORTH KOREA DATA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003388 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2026 TAGS: ETTC UNSCR TW NKWG SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN AGREES TO SEND IRAN/NORTH KOREA DATA REF: A. STATE 156220 ¶B. STATE 161145 Classified By: AIT Acting Deputy Director Daniel K. Moore, REASONS 1.4 B/C ¶1. (S) Summary: On September 28, AIT delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Consular Affairs (CA) Bureau Ref A talking points on outstanding export control "gameplan" issues. CA and AIT agreed to implement before mid-October a system to allow Washington agencies to regularly review Taiwan visa data on North Korean and Iranian nationals. Separately, AIT delivered Ref B export license comments to the Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) and BOFT described recent progress in interagency cooperation. End summary. ¶2. (S) On September 28, AIT/ECON officers met with MOFA to deliver Ref A demarche on reviewing Taiwan information on visa applicants from North Korea and Iran. Representatives from the Taiwan side included MOFA CA Section Chief Chou Chung-hsing, Second Division Director Jerry S. K. Yang, and Department of North America Affairs First Section Chief Vincent C. H. Yao. Section Chief Chou, who was introduced as the person in charge of North Korea visa issues, was the principal speaker for the Taiwan side. MOFA Visa Procedures -------------- ¶3. (S) Section Chief Chou presented an overview of the visa application process for MOFA's overseas consular offices. Every visa applicant from "Category Five" "sensitive" countries like Iran and North Korea must be vetted by Taipei and is required to have a local Taiwan sponsor who vouches for the legitimacy of the applicant's intentions. Visa application information, including information on the Taiwan sponsor, is collected at the foreign post and then faxed or otherwise electronically sent back to Taiwan MOFA. ¶4. (S) After the information is received in Taipei, MOFA compares it against various "black lists" and briefly investigates the sponsor/local company (for business visas the sponsor is a local company). Typically, MOFA will only check the business license of a listed company sponsor. MOFA can then approve or deny the visa application, and relays its decision to the overseas consular office. AIT Overcomes MOFA Sovereignty Concerns -------------- ¶5. (S) MOFA CA Second Division Director Yang and Section Chief Chou discussed at great length with AIT Ref A talking points on providing information on visa applicants from North Korea and Iran. In response to the sovereignty concerns that they raised, AIT assured CA that the data exchange program would in no way infringe on Taiwan's authority to issue or deny visas to any individual, and that the final decisions on whether to issue or deny a visa would remain with Taiwan authorities. AIT explained that U.S. agencies would merely provide an additional background check to see if the applicants had any association with weapons programs or criminal activities. Taiwan could then use this information along with information from its own sources in determining whether or not a foreign national should be allowed to travel to Taiwan. Balance Ying and Yang to Achieve Harmony -------------- ¶6. (S) MOFA CA representatives also expressed concern about the one-sided nature of the information flow and asked if AIT could provide any lists of entities involved in weapons proliferation in return for the data on visa applicants. AIT said that Washington agencies would regularly reply with information on whether the Iranian or North Korean nationals applying for Taiwan visas had suspicious backgrounds. If further information exchange was needed for the sake of TAIPEI 00003388 002 OF 003 balance, AIT suggested that it could regularly provide lists of entities involved in terrorist finance activities based on public information from the U.S. Treasury Department. MOFA CA indicated such an exchange arrangement would be more palatable, and agreed the U.S. Treasury data could serve that purpose. MOFA Raises Logistical/Timing Concerns -------------- ¶7. (S) Section Chief Chou pointed out to AIT some of the logistical and timing issues that needed attention before data exchanges could take place. He said that Taiwan consular offices in some countries do not have access to reliable internet connections and transmit application information to Taipei via fax. Further, the Taiwan visa application form lacked data fields for date of birth and name of employer, as requested in Ref A. Chou also expressed concern about the length of time that would be required for U.S. agencies to review the visa applications. He pointed out that AIT and CA would need to agree on how the data would be formatted, encrypted, transmitted, stored, and shared with AIT. AIT Focuses on a Practical Approach -------------- ¶8. (S) AIT agreed that there were a number of unresolved logistical issues, but noted that Ref A talking points suggested that progress towards the gameplan goals could be achieved in stages. AIT suggested that AIT and CA immediately begin a series of tests of the proposed data exchange system to get a better idea of the numbers, timing, and difficulties involved. MOFA Agrees to Immediate Testing -------------- ¶9. (S) Chou agreed to immediately begin an initial testing phase of the data exchange system. During this phase, MOFA will supply AIT with data for visa applicants from North Korea and Iran that have most recently received Taiwan visas. CA and AIT briefly discussed whether to exchange data at weekly or monthly intervals, but decided feasibility testing was necessary to determine the appropriate interval. CA agreed that the Taiwan information will be formatted according to international standards for digital visa information. The data will include the name, passport number, date of birth, sex, visa type, number of entries, issue place, issue date, enter-before date, duration of stay, visa number, remarks (including name of employer for business travelers),and a digital photograph. Details of Testing Arrangement -------------- ¶10. (S) During the testing phase CA will inscribe its most recent visa data for North Korean and Iranian nationals onto a compact disk. In order to balance the flow of information, AIT will prepare a disk with any U.S. responses on previous visa applicants and the latest U.S. Treasury public information on entities involved in terrorist finance activities, and swap disks with CA. AIT will then transmit the visa data to ISN/MTR via the State Department Intranet system. Both CA and AIT will keep records of the number of applicants, how long it takes Washington agencies to provide comments on the applicants, the number of applicants scoring "hits" indicating suspicious intentions, and follow-up actions taken by Taiwan authorities. Bad Guys Can Be Stopped at the Border -------------- ¶11. (S) Section Chief Chou explained that in most cases visa applicants do not enter Taiwan immediately after the visa is issued. He said that even several days after issuance there would be a good chance that the person could be stopped at the border prior to entry if Washington agencies can provide TAIPEI 00003388 003 OF 003 prompt responses. He noted that even if the person could not be stopped prior to entry, it might be possible to stop them prior to exiting Taiwan, and it would certainly be possible to add their names to Taiwan's own "blacklist" to prevent future travel to Taiwan. System Test and CWC Info Coming in Near Future -------------- - ¶12. (S) AIT noted that the testing phase would provide information essential for planning how to move closer to the Ref A goal of allowing Washington agencies a chance to review visa applications prior to adjudication. Section Chief Chou agreed that after implementation of the testing phase there could be more realistic discussions on how to move forward. AIT and CA agreed that the first test of the new data exchange system will take place before mid-October. Chou also said that within the next few days MOFA will provide AIT with updated materials on Taiwan's desire for some form of participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention. BOFT Praises Effectiveness of Gameplan -------------- ¶13. (S) In a separate meeting with BOFT Export Control Task Force Head Wally Su, AIT delivered Ref B comments on specific export license applications. Su took the opportunity to relate that Taiwan Customs has recently forwarded a number of cases of possible export control violations to BOFT, which, in turn, has forwarded them to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB). Su said he was impressed with recent improvements in interagency cooperation, but was concerned that the MJIB still had few agents who understood export control issues. He added that Taiwan's National Security Bureau has asked him to develop a training program in export control for its agents. WANG