MAC CHAIRMAN UPBEAT ON CROSS-STRAIT INITIATIVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002618 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON CH TW SUBJECT: MAC CHAIRMAN UPBEAT ON CROSS-STRAIT INITIATIVES REF: A. TAIPEI 1852 ¶B. TAIPEI 2411 ¶C. TAIPEI 2542 ¶D. TAIPEI 2590 TAIPEI 00002618 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Taiwan will implement the 58 cross-Strait "consensus proposals" by the end of August, then begin considering the more controversial 14 "other items" from last week's Sustainable Economic Development Conference (SEDC), Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu told the Director. Existing initiatives to expand cross-Strait charter flights and tourism will continue on a separate track unaffected by the SEDC. Wu expressed exasperation over Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) obstructionism at the conference, which the Executive Yuan overrode by including controversial non-consensus proposals as "other items." On cross-Strait relations, these "other items" included proposals for direct cross-Strait flights and raising the 40 percent limit on Taiwan investments in the PRC. End Summary. ¶2. (C) MAC Chairman Joseph Wu (Jaushieh) told AIT Director August 1 that the "Global Deployment and Cross-strait Economic and Trade Relations" session he chaired at the July 27-28 SEDC in Taipei (Ref C) was particularly well attended. While some of the other four sessions were more sparsely attended -- the government efficiency session had only four participants at one point -- the cross-Strait session remained packed. The cross-Strait session approved 58 "consensus proposals" and appended another 14 "other items" to its report, an English translation of which Wu gave the Director. Dealing with TSU Obstructionism -------------- ¶3. (C) Wu lamented that he had tried to negotiate and satisfy everyone, but TSU proved too recalcitrant and excessively obstructionist. It threatened to withdraw from the conference unless the organizers required "consensus" (i.e., 100 percent) on all proposals. It opposed any increase in the 40 percent (of a company's net value) limit on investment in the PRC and any movement toward regularizing cross-Strait flights. TSU also opposed including any non-consensus proposals in the final report. ¶4. (C) Chairman Wu said that in the end, the Executive Yuan and conference organizers decided to include non-consensus proposals as "other items" and let TSU go ahead with its threat to walk out of the conference. The Director noted that, given the high consensus threshhold, Premier Su had been wise to allow other opinions in the final report, otherwise the consensus requirement would have left the conference report with nothing but non-substantial "motherhood and apple pie" proposals. Implementing Non-Controversial Consensus Proposals First -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Wu told the Director that MAC was now focused on implementing the 58 SEDC formal proposals approved by consensus, which President Chen had charged government agencies to complete in one month. He specifically highlighted a number of "potential areas for progress": -- Liberalize admission of PRC nationals engaged in commercial activities, which currently is limited to groups of 30 people, to allow larger groups on an ad hoc basis. (Note: Microsoft is inviting over 500 mainland invitees to a regional conference in Taiwan in late August, and MAC has approved this group as a splashy first step to liberalizing the old 30-person ceiling. End Note.) -- Liberalize financial exchanges. -- Pursue a banking and securities agreement. -- Review level of high technology investment that can be TAIPEI 00002618 002.2 OF 003 exported to China. (Note: Economic Minister Morgan Huang told the press August 1 that the Executive Yuan was preparing new regulations allowing .18 micron semi-conductor manufacturing investment in the PRC with MAC and EY approval. End Note.) -- Expand categories of imports. Mulling Controversial "Other Items" -------------- ¶6. (C) Wu was more circumspect about the 14-odd "other items" in the cross-Strait group report (note: the text of the cross-Strait proposals that Wu provided to the Director contains 18 "other items," but these are incorrectly numbered and repetitive. end note). MAC, he explained, will need more time to consider these proposals on which there was no consensus. He acknowledged the 40 percent limit was "not working" and implied the Chen administration was open to reconsidering the limit -- while there was no consensus for lifting the investment ceiling, he opined, there was also no consensus on not changing the limit. Any consideration to relaxing the investment limit, he continued, might not involve an across-the-board change, but rather some kind of a sector by sector ceiling, with the limits on some sectors reduced and others -- such as high technology -- raised. (Note: The following day, August 2, the Executive Yuan announced that "currently" it would not increase the 40 per cent limit. While this appears to belie Wu's more optimistic statements to the Director the previous day, the operative word appears to be "currently," indicating Premier Su may be content to bide his time for the present and perhaps consider creative ways to finesse relaxing the investment limit that will not directly confront deep-Green critics.) A Separate Track -------------- ¶7. (C) Wu told the Director that ongoing efforts on cross-Strait charter flights and expanding PRC tourism (Ref A) will continue on a separate track, unaffected by the SEDC. He stressed that he is optimistic about both sets of negotiations. On charter flights, the two sides are in contact and working to build on the June 14 charter flight breakthrough. On PRC tourism, the two sides are making steady, though not rapid, progress negotiating an expansion of PRC tourism with a goal of 1,000 PRC tourists per day, hopefully by the end of 2006, and further expansion later if this proves successful. Beijing, Wu noted, had finally responded on July 27, accepting Taiwan's proposed new organization, the "Cross-Strait Tourism Association" (CTA, haixia liangan guanguang xiehui),as a counterpart to and negotiating partner for its own Cross-Strait Travel Exchange Association on tourism (see Ref B). The CTA, which Su will formally announce once it has been formally registered, will consist of representatives of civil organizations and "some government officials." Taiwan-PRC Interaction -------------- ¶8. (C) Wu told the Director there are several venues in which contacts and even negotiations with the PRC have occurred. Taiwan recently held its first "cross-Strait negotiation" with the PRC in Geneva under WTO auspices on the issue of PRC towel exports to Taiwan. Wu explained that Taiwan hopes to continue and expand these WTO discussions with the PRC to include investment protection, IPR, agricultural product names, but is keeping this quiet fearing that publicity about WTO negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC could "make Beijing reluctant." Taiwan also hopes for other venues for direct negotiations, for example through the now-quiescent SEF-ARATS mechanism (Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation and PRC's Association for RELATIONS Across the Taiwan Strait). ¶9. (C) In addition, Wu continued, there is ad hoc interaction on criminal deportations. Taiwan police have some direct contact with their PRC counterparts on criminal matters, but the PRC side is reluctant to negotiate TAIPEI 00002618 003.2 OF 003 institutional cooperation. Taiwan is checking to see if Beijing would be interested in a mutual legal assistance agreement. Coordination on repatriation of PRC residents has been sporadic, and the current level of repatriation is not adequate. Wu, however, did acknowledge that Taiwan's three PRC resident detention facilities currently have less than 500 detainees, compared to a backlog of a thousand or more during periods of cross-Strait POLITICAL tension when Beijing halts repatriations. The Director noted that it was signicant Taiwan and the PRC could work on these issues without a government-to-government mechanism, indicating the two sides have room for creative interaction. President Chen, Beijing, KMT -------------- ¶10. (C) The Director asked Wu whether, given President Chen's announced devolution of power to the Executive Yuan, the President supported these SEDC proposals opening up possibility for further opening to the PRC. Wu responded that while the President is responsible for managing cross-Strait policy he focuses primarily on the broad guidelines, not the details. The SEDC proposals are fully in accord with President Chen's "active management" prescription, he insisted, particularly the proposals on risk management and encouraging investment in Taiwan. Active management and effective opening, Wu continued, go together and are logically sequential. ¶11. (C) The Director asked Wu why he thought Beijing had earlier agreed to the June 14 charter flight deal (See Ref A) at a time when President Chen was in trouble and facing a legislative recall drive. Wu surmised that Beijing has already counted President Chen and the DPP out of the 2007 legislative and 2008 presidential elections and is, thus, less averse to dealing with him and his government. This take on Beijing's June decision, the Director suggested, indicates that more cross-Strait movement is possible between now and 2008. ¶12. (C) The Director asked Wu if MAC had any contact with the KMT, particularly former Chairman Lien Chan, on cross-Strait issues. Wu laughed derisively, responding that the KMT never talked with, and was dismissive of, MAC. (Note: That afternoon, August 1, KMT Cross-Strait Director Chang Jung-kung announced that the KMT has invited PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director Chen Yunlin to visit Taiwan in October to participate in an agricultural conference; a miffed MAC official told AIT that the KMT did not give MAC advance warning and surmised this was POLITICAL ploy by the KMT to box in MAC and the Chen government in a win-win situation for the KMT. End Note.) YOUNG