PAN-BLUE RIVALS TARNISH, FRUSTRATE MA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002179

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: PAN-BLUE RIVALS TARNISH, FRUSTRATE MA

REF: A. TAIPEI 1915


B. TAIPEI 1328

Classified By: Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: Both PFP Chairman James Soong and KMT
Legislative Yuan (LY) President Wang Jin-pyng resent KMT
Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's rise to power, which they see as
eroding their own positions. They are taking steps
separately to try to shore up their influence. Tapping Deep
Blue anger, Soong recently launched a movement to recall
President Chen, and the more moderate Ma ended up yielding to
pressure and following Soong's lead. However, Ma is now
resisting Soong's pressure to support his plan to call for an
early vote of no confidence against Premier Su. Wang
Jin-pyng has been trying to position himself as a voice of
the moderate Taiwanese wing of the KMT and a bridge between
Blue and Green. Having run afoul of Ma over his dealings
with President Chen, Wang may not be entirely unhappy to see
Ma fumbling over a host of issues in the legislature, from
stalled arms procurement to defeat of a prosecutor general
nominee to the recall movement. For now, Ma has to deal
carefully with both Soong and Wang because their political
influence remains critical to maintaining the narrow Pan-Blue
majority in the LY. End Summary.

Soong's Recall Initiative Raises Doubts About Ma
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2. (C) People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong recently
upstaged Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou by tapping
Deep Blue anger and leading the call for President Chen's
recall. At first, Ma urged Chen to resign and resisted the
recall move, arguing that it was not warranted until there
was more evidence. Ma's caution frustrated Deep Blue
supporters, who accused him of being weak, indecisive, and
soft on Chen. Ma soon yielded to the intense pressure and
publicly endorsed the recall effort (Ref A). His
susceptibility to manipulation by James Soong has raised
questions about whether Ma has what it takes to control the
Pan-Blue, guide the KMT to victory in 2008, and be an
effective president. Soong is now trying to manipulate Ma
into supporting his call for an early no confidence vote
against Premier Su once the recall effort fails. Some
members of the KMT LY caucus are opposed, fearing the no
confidence vote might lead to a snap legislative election
which could cost them their seats. One KMT legislator from
southern Taiwan advised Ma publicly not to allow James Soong
to "rape" him a second time. Sensing the mood in the LY
caucus, Ma has so far resisted the new pressure from Soong.


3. (C) In recent months, Ma and the KMT have increasingly
tried to marginalize Soong and the PFP, wooing away a number
of the most prominent PFP legislators, who believe their
electoral future will be more secure with the KMT rather than
the rapidly declining PFP. Soong doubtless views the recall
movement as an opportunity to boost his influence and make a
partial comeback. He may believe now is the time to act
while he still has some leverage with Ma, controlling votes
in the LY that are critical to maintaining the narrow
Pan-Blue majority. Soong probably realizes that his
influence is likely to decline sharply as the 2007
legislative elections approach. The new single-member
district election format and smaller LY configuration both
favor the major parties, and the KMT is likely to emerge from
the 2007 election with an LY majority, in which case it will
have no need for Soong and his PFP. Soong's other potential
source of leverage is the KMT desire to have him support Ma's
presidential campaign in 2008, but Soong's influence may be
sharply reduced by that time. While Soong has shown interest
in running for Taipei mayor this year, his single digit
polling numbers make that an unrealistic goal. KMT policy
insiders tell AIT that Soong and the PFP are heading toward
oblivion. Soong will be finished if he runs and loses the
Taipei mayoral race, while not running may exacerbate the
heavy defeat the PFP is expected to suffer in the December
2007 LY elections.

Wang Pushing His Own Agenda, Not Ma's
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TAIPEI 00002179 002 OF 002



4. (C) Wang Jin-pyng, a traditional machine politician, is
keeping his distance from both Soong and from Ma Ying-jeou,
an outsider with popular appeal but no strong roots in the
KMT party apparatus. While Wang is identified with the
central and southern Taiwanese wing of the party, the
Mainland-born Ma is invariably identified with the Deep Blue
Mainlander base centered in the Taipei area, despite his
relatively moderate stance. Relations between Wang and Ma
remain strained, as evidenced by Wang's rejection of the idea
of a Ma-Wang ticket in 2008, and his refusal to accept Ma's
repeated offers of a KMT vice chairmanship. Wang has crossed
Ma on more than one occasion, for example, supporting,
against Ma's wishes, a bill to increase the size of the LY
and not voicing support for Ma's campaign to unseat President
Chen in midterm.


5. (C) Wang has turned to Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan for
support to keep Ma at bay. Wang's relations with Lien have
always been better than Ma's relations with the former KMT
chairman. While Wang has taken pains to show deference to
Lien, Ma refuses to do so. KMT insiders tell AIT that Lien
views himself as Ma's teacher, a characterization Ma rejects.
The perception gap creates an opportunity for Wang to
ingratiate himself with Lien, and use Lien as leverage in his
competition with Ma.


6. (C) Wang has also used his position as LY President (and
moderate Taiwanese politician) to maintain relatively good
relations with President Chen Shui-bian. Ma, who wants
nothing to do with Chen, takes strong exception to Wang's
relationship with the President. Ma and Wang had major
differences over Chen's idea to appoint Wang as premier, and
Wang did not bother to tell Ma about another Chen initiative,
to name Wang as his personal representative to APEC. Wang
has not followed Ma's lead in attacking President Chen.
While Ma attacked Chen over the recent U.S. transit debacle,
Wang suggested that Chen should be respected for defending
Taiwan's dignity.


7. (C) Like Soong, Wang is acting to shore up his influence
against the perceived threat posed by Ma's ascendance.
Still, Wang wants to maintain some kind of relationship with
Ma while he considers what he will do in 2007-2008. Possible
options include retaining his seat as a KMT party
representative LY member or possibly running as a district LY
member, which would give him more independence. (Note: Wang
was moved from the constituency list to the party
proportional list in the 2004 LY election because most KMT
analysts feared he would be defeated if he ran in his home
constituency. End Note.) Wang has dismissed the idea of
running for president in 2008, saying that his job is to help
the LY pass legislation that is good for the Taiwan people.
Though doubtless viewing Wang as trouble, Ma is careful not
to step too heavily on him because Wang controls a group of
loyal legislators who might follow Wang if he were to defect
from the party. Ma also regards Wang as important for
cutting deals with the local party and faction bosses, who
look toward Wang rather than Ma for leadership.


8. (C) Despite his leadership shortcomings and the limited
challenges he faces from Soong and Wang, Ma's position is
solid because he appeals to Pan-Blue supporters in a way that
Soong, Wang or other Pan-Blue leaders cannot begin to match.
On June 18, Ma showed up at a Pan-Blue rally in Changhua
County while Soong was in the middle of delivering a speech.
The large crowd promptly ignored Soong, who had to cut his
speech short, and then roared their enthusiastic support for
Ma.
KEEGAN