AIT CHAIRMAN MEETS TAIWAN VICE PREMIER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002010 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y STATE FOR EAP/RSP/TC, STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD AND ALTBACH E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: AIT CHAIRMAN MEETS TAIWAN VICE PREMIER REF: A. TAIPEI 1481 ¶B. TAIPEI 1984 TAIPEI 00002010 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: AIT Chairman Burghardt met June 9 with Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen. Chairman Burghardt told VPM Tsai that his visit to Taiwan was primarily a "re-introductory call" and that he was not carrying any messages from President Bush to President Chen. However, his recent consultations in Washington had led him to come to Taiwan with four main themes reflecting the concerns of U.S. policy-makers. Taiwan must: focus constitutional reform on good governance; strengthen its defense; constructively engage China; and avoid actions which damage its relations with the U.S. Tsai agreed Taiwan must take greater responsibility for its own defense and remove excessive restrictions on Mainland investment. Tsai said Taiwan's educational system and domestic politics are beset by serious problems, but Taiwan's economic fundamendals remain sound. Taiwan is prepared to expand cross-Strait opening, but political difficulties and PRC manipulation make progress more difficult. End summary. Chairman Burghardt's Four Themes -------------- ¶2. (C) First, while understanding the need for pragmatic constitutional reforms, the U.S. is concerned that rumored plans for a grass-roots discussions on the issue have the potential to spin off topic to the emotional issues of sovereignty and nomenclature. Even the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Wang Zaixi privately acknowledged the need for structural reform of an outdated and unwieldy document, said Burghardt. The concern is that focusing on impossible symbolic actions rather than changes needed to make the government more efficient would recklessly increase cross-Strait tensions. ¶3. (C) Second, Taiwan needs to take responsibility for its own defense needs by agreeing to move forward on the military procurement package offered by the United States. Burghardt told Tsai that the U.S. realizes that the pan-Blue opposition is holding the package hostage to score points against the Chen administration, but the ruling party could be doing more to make the public case for a strong defense capability. �A; ¶4. (C) Third, Taiwan needs to demonstrate that it understands the growing importance of China, both politically and economically, in the region and the world. Failure to engage China in constructive ways makes Taiwan's leadership look parochial and threatens Taiwan's security and economic prosperity. ¶5. (C) Finally, Taiwan needs to show that it is aware of how its actions affect the United States. The U.S. has made a commitment to Taiwan that requires significant resources, said Burghardt. Taiwan's leadership needs to respect the nature of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and refrain from moves that increase the cost of maintaining that commitment. For example, recent efforts by Taipei to suggest the existence of a U.S./Japan/Taiwan defense alliance are not helpful and have the potential to damage Taiwan's good relations with both Japan and the U.S. ¶6. (C) Chairman Burghardt told VPM Tsai he had appreciated President Chen's reiteration of "the four no's" during their meeting June 8, but noted that the U.S. was dissatisfied with the hedging by President Chen's advisors following the announcement that the National Unification Commission (NUC) would "cease to function". He characterized Legislative Speaker Wang Jyn-ping presentation on the defense budget as confusing and full of excuses. Washington is eager to see forward movement on defense expenditures without excuses, Burghardt said. TAIPEI 00002010 002.2 OF 003 Tsai's View on Defense, Cross-Straits, Competitiveness SIPDIS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) VPM Tsai agreed that Taiwan needs to take responsibility for its own defense. The price and content of the package are less important than being seen to be responsive, she said. Because security issues have traditionally been the purview of the military, civilian leaders in both the KMT and DPP are not well versed in defense issues and are unable to make a strong case for military procurements. Instead, they are forced to rely on KMT generals who are immersed in the technical details but unable to appreciate the political imperatives. ¶8. (C) Turning to cross-Strait relations, Tsai said the government views the speed of cross-Strait capital flows as an important gauge for Taiwan's cross-Strait policy. Too much investment in China, too quickly, is dangerous for Taiwan's economy and would lead to additional measures to restrict the flow of capital to the mainland. Taiwan needs to avoid excessive investment in the mainland, she said. Lifting some restrictions on investment in China has allowed the Taiwan government to better measure the pace of this flow by capturing previously gray investments through third countries and to determine whether actions need to be taken to choke back Taiwan investment in the mainland. Although the current unemployment rate in Taiwan is only around 4%, Tsai suggested many of the recent newly created jobs were in SIPDIS the service sector. Low quality service sector jobs are not good enough for Taiwan's economy, she said. ¶9. (C) Creating good jobs requires a strong educational system, said Tsai. The quality of Taiwan's educational system has suffered from too many universities and a lack of talented and well-trained people. Taiwan needs to review its policies to allow skilled workers to come to Taiwan and improve the quality of Taiwan's manpower. Tsai regretted increasing income inequality in Taiwan and noted that while the top 20% of Taiwan citizens had seen their incomes increase, the bottom 20% had suffered a net reduction. These figures don't reflect capital gains, which further contributed to a growing sense of unfairness. ¶10. (C) Chairman Burghardt asked whether the recent drop in Taiwan's stock index (the TAIEX) reflected political concerns or was based on the economic news from the U.S. (NOTE: from a 5-year high of 7474 on May 8, the TAIEX has dropped 14% to 6440 on June 12.) VPM Tsai replied that according to Taiwan government estimates, about 3% of the fall was due to domestic political instability with the remainder a result of global trends. She noted that in spite of the decline, volume had remained relatively stable with domestic buyers picking up reduced price equities, suggesting domestic investors believed the bottom was near. Tsai said Taiwan's economic fundamentals are sound and the government has no plans to intervene in the market. Politics and Policy -------------- ¶11. (C) Returning to cross-Strait issues, Chairman Burghardt noted rumors of some progress in establishing direct flights and inquired about Taiwan's next steps. VPM Tsai acknowledged that discussions were proceeding under the Macao model and revealed that China had issued a Note Verbale to the Chinese Taipei Office at the WTO in Geneva requesting consultations on cross-Strait trade issues. Tsai said the Taiwan administration was still considering the best format in which to engage with the Chinese. However, she noted, any negotiation with the Chinese was likely to become a three-party dialogue -- the KMT will end up with a seat at the table. Tsai added that several recent cross-Strait proposals submitted by the KMT mirrored Chinese policy, suggesting the KMT and Chinese government are working hand in hand. TAIPEI 00002010 003.2 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Noting the recent spectacle of a DPP legislator eating an offending amendment to the cross-Straits Relations Act, Chairman Burghardt asked where the differences between the two parties lie. Tsai responded that the DPP wants to retain the authority to prohibit cross-Strait carriers on a case by case basis. The KMT amendments would give the government "management" control, but remove the statutory ability to prevent carriers from making cross-Strait landings. However, she added that the DPP would be willing to accept this provision if tied to a package that included passage of stalled government budget bills and military procurement. ¶13. (C) Tsai dismissed the possibility of the special Legislative session passing a military procurement bill. Such a deal would have been possible before the movement to recall President Chen. With the recall proposal slated to be considered first, approval of controversial spending bills by special session is unlikely. ¶14. (C) Burghardt asked about the progress on plans to allow Chinese tourists to come to Taiwan. VPM Tsai responded that she had proposed allowing up to 1000 tourists per day when she was Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and that this would be the limit during the initial phase, but that this limit would be lifted once appropriate mechanisms are in place. Tsai said Chinese approval would take into consideration Taiwan domestic politics. For example, agreement on charter flight mechanisms have already been reached but China has insisted there be no announcement, perhaps because they do not want to give President Chen a policy victory, suggested Tsai. KEEGAN