MTAG: UPDATE ON TAIWAN EXPORT CONTROL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001899 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR DEPT PLEASE PASS TO NSC WASHDC, PRIORITY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2026 TAGS: ECCT PARM MTCRE JP TW SUBJECT: MTAG: UPDATE ON TAIWAN EXPORT CONTROL REF: A. TAIPEI 328 ¶B. TAIPEI 1566 ¶C. TAIPEI 429 ¶D. STATE 36441 ¶E. STATE 79175 Classified By: AIT DEPUTY DIRECTOR David J. Keegan, REASONS 1.4 B/C ¶1. (S) Summary and introduction: AIT believes that while problems remain in Taiwan's export control regime, the "gameplan" developed by ISN/MTR and AIT in August 2005 has led to significant improvements. Since January 2006, when AIT prepared ref A evaluation of Taiwan's overall export control situation, there has been further progress. The most significant recent improvements include Taiwan's June 1 implementation of the gameplan commitment to expand its sensitive commodity list (SCL) (ref B),and improved information sharing with law enforcement officials from other countries, notably, Japan. There has also been some improvement in Taiwan interagency coordination. Among the ongoing problems we see are resistance from industry, and Taiwan's legislative gridlock. End summary and introduction. ¶2. (S) On June 1 Taiwan took another step forward in implementing its export control gameplan commitments when an expanded SCL and stricter transit/transshipment regulations came into effect (described ref B). The Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) has been busy in recent weeks trying to educate both private industry and enforcement officials about the new requirements. On May 30, AIT joined a BOFT outreach event attended by about 80 officials from a variety of Taiwan agencies and 60 company representatives and heard the following concerns, which BOFT promised to later raise with U.S. agencies: -- Some companies complained that they have no idea why their products have been added to the SCL. The BOFT response to these complaints was "we sympathize and want to minimize the damage to Taiwan industrial competitiveness, but the U.S. wants these additional items added." Note: When BOFT requested U.S. assistance in explaining why specific items needed to be added to the SCL, U.S. agencies accused Taiwan of deliberately delaying implementation (refs C&D). End note. -- One company representative noted that the export permits are only valid for one month and that manufacturers will need to apply for the permit before they sign a sales contract. Since some commodities take several months to produce the permit may expire before the commodity is shipped. -- Several companies complained that they had already signed contracts to supply commodities on the expanded SCL with firm delivery dates. They worried they would be charged with breach of contract due to the 30-day delay for export permit approval. BOFT responded that it would prepare an English language announcement of the new requirement that exporters could show to their customers to explain the delay. -- One company representative noted that it could not supply information about the end users needed in the export permit application because the importers are trading companies or wholesale dealers. ¶3. (S) BOFT is proud of the progress it has made in recent months in export control coordination with other countries, another element of the gameplan. As examples of coordination, BOFT cited export control training in Japan in February, the Japan-sponsored industry outreach seminar in Taipei this March, and several joint investigations into cases where Japanese products were being exported via Taiwan to restricted areas. In May, Taiwan export control officials toured Customs operations in Australia. Germany has invited BOFT officials to attend an end user verification seminar in TAIPEI 00001899 002 OF 002 Berlin mid-June. However, discussions with the UK have not yet resulted in concrete exchanges. ¶4. (S) Since January, Taiwan has responded to several U.S. requests for investigation and information. For example, ref C, in addition to requesting assistance in explaining why items had been added to the SCL, also reported that Taiwan had provided several key documents related to Iran Multimat Company's attempts to procure goods in Taiwan. BOFT again went out on a legal limb in supplying us with confidential documents that could still result in prosecution of the officials involved in supplying them to us. Most recently, in response to ref E demarche, BOFT reports that it has already sent a letter to the Roundtop Company requesting detailed information on its dealings with Iran companies, and has instructed Taiwan Customs to put Roundtop on a Customs watch list. ¶5. (S) An ongoing problem in Taiwan's export control system is the inability of the Executive (EY) to compel the legislature to pass needed legislation. The lingering Sensitive Technology Protection Law still has not passed its first reading in the legislature, and seems unlikely to be considered before the legislature re-convenes in September. As has happened with IPR and U.S. beef, Taiwan's EY finds it politically expedient to cast the U.S. as the "heavy" forcing officials to do things they would rather not. AIT will continue to work with Taiwan EY officials and legislators to convince them that effective export control serves Taiwan's own best interests. YOUNG