KMT DEFENSE COUNTER-PROPOSAL: ROUND TWO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001339 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS MCAP TW SUBJECT: KMT DEFENSE COUNTER-PROPOSAL: ROUND TWO REF: A. TAIPEI 0865 ¶B. TAIPEI 0229 ¶C. TAIPEI 1300 TAIPEI 00001339 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan. Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou is making another push for a KMT alternative defense proposal after failing to achieve party consensus before his late March visit to Washington. While Ma appears sincere in his effort to "get the defense issue behind him" before the 2008 presidential season begins, he faces a major challenge in lining up his party's legislators. Last week they voted down the Defense Special Budget for the fifty-first time and rejected an important judicial appointment that Ma supported. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Meeting with AIT to discuss Chairman Ma's recent U.S. visit, KMT legislator Su Chi, who accompanied Ma on the trip, told AIT that the KMT received loud and clear the U.S. message of concern over Taiwan's commitment to its own defense. So much so, Su noted, that several days after returning to Taiwan Ma called him in to discuss defense issues, then directed him to put together a team of defense-minded KMT legislators to win over KMT colleagues who opposed Ma's effort to develop a KMT alternative defense budget proposal in March (Ref A). Su Chi acknowledged to AIT that this would be a challenge, since many KMT legislators are still incensed over President Chen Shui-bian's National Unification Council/Guidelines action and want only to "stiff" the Chen government. ¶3. (C) Ma's plan, Su continued, is to gain support for the KMT defense proposal first from the KMT legislative caucus, then from Pan-Blue partner People First Party (PFP),and finally from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). PFP would not be a problem, Su argued, because PFP Chairman James Soong "did not disagree" with Ma's proposal for a "reasonable" defense procurement package in their April 2 meeting. ¶4. (C) Chairman Ma remains committed to the defense proposal that was rejected on March 14 by the KMT legislative caucus (Ref A),Su told AIT. This proposal supports purchase of P-3C ASW aircraft, but rejects submarines and PAC-3 missiles, though the submarines might be possible in the future, Su said. This is the the "green light, yellow light, red light" proposal that Su Chi has touted in Taiwan media. P-3C's, however, would only be one element of a comprehensive defense budget that would include "other" defense items. Since the LY can only approve or cut, and only the Executive Yuan (EY) can propose budget items, Su Chi explained, developing this "other" category will necessitate negotiations between the Blue-dominated LY and the EY. ¶5. (C) The "other" category, which the KMT intends to complement the P-3C aircraft, Su continued, would focus on badly needed defense items, such as force hardening, munitions, and training. Complaining that Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) has thus far failed to provide the Legislative Yuan (LY) with a list of appropriate "other" defense items, despite repeated requests from the KMT-dominated LY Defense Committee, Su asked whether the U.S. itself might be able to provide a list of "other" defense items that the KMT could incorporate into its comprehensive defense counter-proposal. ¶6. (C) The advantage of the KMT defense budget proposal, Su told AIT, is that it will produce a package completely of Taiwan's own making, which might be more acceptable to his defense-skeptical KMT colleagues. Whereas Chairman Ma pressed Su to push the KMT counter-proposal through "as soon as possible," preferably in the current session ending late May, Su emphasized to AIT that this would be nearly impossible and would likely carry over into the Fall 2006 LY session. ¶7. (C) Comment. Chairman Ma's effort in January to develop a KMT alternative defense procurement proposal (reported Ref TAIPEI 00001339 002.2 OF 002 A) was in retrospect genuine, despite its crash landing on March 14. Ma, in fact, put himself and his leadership on the line, so that his failure to make good on his pledge (Ref B) was damaging to his reputation and his leadership persona. While Ma appears serious and determined this time around, his two recent failures to gain the support of even his own KMT legislators call for modest expectations. KMT confidence that the PFP will go along with the KMT proposal, moreover, may be wildly misplaced. Despite James Soong's tacit agreement with Ma on April 2, and despite Soong's pledge to the Director on April 11 that he "basically supports" arms procurement and is committed to P-3C aircraft (Ref C),Soong and his party have repeatedly shown they are quite capable of changing direction at the last minute to upset the KMT's best-laid plans. End Comment. YOUNG