MTAG: TAIWAN EXPORT CONTROL TECHNICAL ISSUES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001337 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2026 TAGS: ECCT PARM MTCRE JP TW SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN EXPORT CONTROL TECHNICAL ISSUES REF: A. STATE 5106 ¶B. STATE 36441 ¶C. STATE 30954 ¶D. STATE 21176 ¶E. AIT TAIPEI 00171 ¶F. STATE 008195 ¶G. AIT TAIPEI 00141 Classified By: AIT DEPUTY DIRECTOR DAVID KEEGAN, REASONS 1.4 B, C, D. ¶1. (S) Summary: On April 10 CSI Kaohsiung Head Probo Munoz met with BOFT Export Control Taskforce Head Wally Su to discuss changes that needed to be made to Taiwan's regulatory system and the challenges of implementing the export control "gameplan." Munoz acknowledged that some of the challenges were complex and needed further research on solutions. AIT also delivered ref A demarche. Action request para 10. End summary. AIT/T Calls for Technical Assistance -------------- ¶2. (S) In an April 2 meeting with Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT),AIT Taipei delivered ref A demarche and listened to BOFT discuss its frustration over trying to meet some of the technical challenges of implementing the export control gameplan. AIT Taipei relayed the general substance of these frustrations to Container Security Initiative (CSI) Kaohsiung Head Probo Munoz, and arranged for him to meet with BOFT Export Control Taskforce Head Wally Su on April 10. ¶3. (SBU) Munoz is a veteran U.S. Customs officer now stationed in Kaohsiung, Taiwan as an AIT/K CSI consultant. He works closely with Taiwan Customs, the Port of Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau, and the shipping lines using the Port of Kaohsiung and is familiar with the atual practices at Kaohsiung Harbor and at other harbors around the world. On the morning of April 10, he noted to AIT that he had just received instructions from his headquarters in Washington to assist in helping Taiwan deal with its larger export control issues. Export Control Impossible with Current Practices -------------- --- ¶4. (S) Munoz began the discussion with Su by pointing out that Taiwan would never have effective export controls as long as it allowed goods to be added to containers after the manifest was completed, as, he said, was now commonly done in Kaohsiung. He also noted that many transit or transshipment cargoes still came into port manifested only as "general cargo" or "personal effects." Until Taiwan started requiring a complete manifest for all transit cargoes and prohibited changes to a container's contents after the manifest is completed, effective export control would be impossible, he said. He asked Su to consider issuing administrative regulations to change these two aspects of current procedures. CSI Could Improve Taiwan's Export Control -------------- ¶5. (S) When Su asked if CSI could help target ships with cargoes to or from North Korea or Iran, Munoz said that while CSI did not have data on transit cargoes manifested as going to or coming from North Korea or Iran, it did have data on companies that do business with these countries. He said that one of the most powerful features of CSI was its extensive database on trading companies, the commodities they handled, and the customers they serviced. He said that he would check with his headquarters in Washington about providing this information to Taiwan export control officials. Munoz said that all of the items that Taiwan was asked to control in transit were also controlled when they transited U.S. ports on the way to or from North Korea or Iran. Munoz suggested that Taiwan's difficulty with TAIPEI 00001337 002 OF 002 licensing transit cargoes could be overcome if Taiwan required the shipping line to provide a complete, detailed manifest to Taiwan Customs officials 24-48 hours prior to the arrival of ships in harbor. No Easy Solution to Transit License -------------- ¶6. (S) Su responded by pointing out that even a detailed advance manifest would not provide sufficient information to determine whether or not a transit/transshipment license should be issued for items on Taiwan's unique sensitive commodities lists (SCL),as required by Taiwan's export control "gameplan" commitments. Su noted that to determine whether a license should be issued, BOFT needed to know information not normally on the manifest, such as the name of the manufacturer, ultimate consignee, intended use, end user, agent, etc. Su illustrated his point with the example of a good being shipped from Japan to Hong Kong to Kaohsiung to Iran. The item might not be on any of the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) international control lists, and so not require a formal export license from Japan. However, the item might be on Taiwan's unique SCL (which contains many items not on any other control list) and require a transit license to pass through Kaohsiung. Legal Consequences All Around -------------- ¶7. (S) Su explained that in this situation the exporter would not necessarily know that the ship was routed through Kaohsiung, and captain of the ship would have no way of knowing the additional information needed for license determination, and would not risk the penalties for bringing his ship to Kaohsiung with goods that might be denied a transit license. Not only would no licensing information would be collected by Japanese authorities if no formal export license was required for export, but, Su added, Taiwan Customs had no direct channels of communication with Japan Customs and these types of information were considered highly sensitive in Japan and most places. Su noted that two Taiwan Customs officials had been sent to jail recently for revealing information on shipping manifests, and while TECRO and AIT have exchanged letters on sharing customs information, Japan has not agreed to share such information with Taiwan. Further Study Required -------------- ¶8. (S) Munoz said he did not have any ready answer for the problem Su had described, but that he would research and consult with his headquarters regarding a solution. ¶9. (S) Su said he would be holding meetings with industry representatives in the near future to discuss Taiwan's new SCL and license requirements. He said that Taiwan companies had already expressed interest in learning how U.S. companies deal with complex export control regulations and he wondered if CSI or AIT might be able to help him locate U.S. companies willing to discuss their procedures. AIT will discuss this possibility with AmCham Taipei. 10 (S) Action request: AIT requests guidance from Washington agencies on how to advise BOFT to deal with the technical issue described in para 6-7. YOUNG