DIRECTOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON PFP CHAIRMAN JAMES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001300

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2031
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON PFP CHAIRMAN JAMES
SOONG, APRIL 11, 2006


Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong
(Chu-yu) told the Director on April 11 that the PFP supports
the purchase of P-3C aircraft and submarines, and is in favor
of increasing Taiwan's military budget to three percent of
GDP. Soong says he understands that Taiwan must maintain
strong defenses to preserve the status quo while waiting for
China to democratize. The problem now, Soong claimed, is
that no party is willing to compromise for fear of appearing
weak politically. End Summary.

China Will Change Over Time
--------------


2. (C) In his introductory call on PFP Chairman James Soong,
the Director emphasized that the goal of U.S. policy is to
foster a Taiwan that is more confident about its security.
If Taiwan is coerced into reaching an agreement with China,
the agreement will be meaningless, the Director pointed out.
On the other hand, if Taiwan is capable of defending itself,
it will be in a position to keep the PRC at arms' length
until China democratizes and closer ties through dialogue
becomes a real possibility.


3. (C) Soong said he believes an increasingly educated and
affluent Chinese population will become dissatisfied with the
PRC one-party system, and he echoed the Director's idea that
an economically strong China could become an increasingly
open China. Taiwan must teach China how to democratize, but
at the same time must avoid becoming a rallying point for
Chinese nationalism. A hostile, militarized China is not in
anyone's interest, Soong and the Director agreed. Taiwan has
a vested interest in seeing China liberalize in a gradual,
stable manner, Soong said, but the liberalization process
will take longer than anyone expects. Soong said no one can
offer a solution to the question of unification today.
Therefore, Taiwan's goal should be to give PRC leaders an
excuse to tone down their nationalistic rhetoric.


4. (C) Soong recalled telling PRC President Hu Jintao in May
2005 that the Taiwan people would never accept communist
rule, and that no one, on either side of the Strait, wanted
war. Soong told the Director that, if the PRC were to become
a liberal, democratic state like Taiwan, Taiwan would
consider the prospect of unification. But, if the PRC does
not change, and insists on trying to force Taiwan to accept
rule under the communist system, unification will never be a
possibility. Soong remarked that he was taught to believe
communist governments were corrupt, inefficient, and plagued
by infighting. But, he discovered during his Beijing visit,
President Hu actually worked closely and well with Vice
President (and Jiang Zemin ally) Zeng Qinghong. Soong
assured the Director he was still anti-communist and would
never accept communist rule of Taiwan. But he admitted
gaining a greater respect for his counterparts in Beijing
after his visit.


5. (C) The Director responded that PRC leaders today are more
sophisticated, but are still very wily. Any deal offered to
the opposition Pan-Blue now might be very different from what
the PRC would offer if and when the KMT return to power. The
PRC leadership still thinks like communists and expects to
dictate the terms of Taiwan's unification with the Mainland.
Whoever the next president is, the Director said, he should
expect to encounter problems with the PRC not dissimilar to
the ones faced now by President Chen. China may liberalize
and become more flexible in dealing with Taiwan in 10, 20 or
more years. In that event, Taiwan and China may be able to
work together to fashion a new sovereignty framework to
replace the old "all or nothing" principle.

And Good Defenses Will Enable Taiwan To Wait
--------------


6. (C) The Director continued that the core U.S. concern is
to preserve the close U.S.-Taiwan relationship that has
enhanced regional stability and fostered Taiwan's democratic
and economic advances. The U.S. also wants to encourage a

TAIPEI 00001300 002 OF 003


better domestic political climate in Taiwan, so that Taiwan's
political parties are able to rise above partisan bickering
to act responsibly on Taiwan's national defense needs. The
Director stressed that Taiwan attracts less support in
Washington than it did before because there is a concern that
Taiwan is not willing to bear its fair share of the defense
burden.


7. (C) Soong said he fully understands that Taiwan needs
adequate defenses to keep its options open, and he reminded
the Director that Presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee
Teng-hui sent him to the U.S. to negotiate Taiwan's purchase
of U.S. military aircraft. Soong said he "basically
supports" arms procurement, and stated that he and LY
President Wang Jin-pyng had "worked out" an agreement that
there would be no discussion of the PAC-III missile systems,
in exchange for PFP cooperation toward the purchase of the
P-3C antisubmarine warfare aircraft. Soong denied press
reports that he was responsible for the KMT's inability to
reach consensus on an alternative arms procurement package
before Ma Ying-jeou's visit to the U.S. He claimed that he
had not had a chance to discuss the matter with Ma before his
March 19 departure to the U.S.

But Compromise Equals Weakness
--------------


8. (C) Soong said he recognizes that it is improper for
Taiwan to entrust its defense entirely to the United States,
and that leadership is necessary on the defense issue.
However, in Taiwan's current polarized political environment,
no party leader wants to give in for fear of being perceived
as weak. Soong noted that he had backed away from his
previous characterization of arms procurement as "wastrel
spending," and said he now supports increasing Taiwan's
defense budget to three percent of GDP. Surprisingly, Soong
said the PFP strongly supports the purchase of submarines
pending a favorable feasibility study. According to Soong,
the problem for the PFP is not necessarily the price of the
proposed weapons systems, but rather doubts as to whether the
proposed systems adequately meet Taiwan's defense needs.


9. (S/NF) The Director stressed that Taiwan should never feel
that it has to "go it alone" in preparing for its own
defense. Taiwan has a willing defense partner in the U.S.
In addition to major arms sales, we are working with Taiwan
on improving a host of other, smaller-ticket items like the
upgrade of existing defense and communications systems,
increasing U.S.-Taiwan joint operations capability, and
hardening of existing military emplacements and
infrastructure. The U.S. is simply waiting for a consensus
proposal from the Taiwan side. The goal is not simply to
negotiate this or that arms system, but to convince the PRC
that any attack on Taiwan would exact an unacceptably high
price. The Director urged Soong to work with DPP and KMT
leadership to reach a consensus on Taiwan's minimum defense
needs.

And There Is No Trust
--------------


10. (C) Soong said his staff had worked closely with
President Chen's advisers for several months to iron out the
terms of their February 24, 2005 10-point consensus, aimed at
increasing cross-party cooperation and reducing tensions
across the Strait. Soong said the Beijing government
responded positively only ten days later, offering to talk if
"Taiwan leaders were willing to honor their February 24
commitment." Soong claimed the U.S. missed that opportunity
to use its influence to push for cross-Strait talks, which he
said could be characterized as "America's Failure in Taiwan."
Shortly after reaching this consensus, Soong said, Chen
publicly accused him of meeting secretly in Washington with
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director Chen Yun-lin. These
accusations were false, Soong told the Director, and had
destroyed whatever good faith had been built up between Chen
and the PFP.


11. (C) Soong noted that the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green do not

TAIPEI 00001300 003 OF 003


trust each other, and the PRC does not trust President Chen.
Dialogue is needed both within Taiwan and across the Strait
to remedy this lack of trust and reduce cross-Strait tension.
Soong sought to excuse the Pan-Blues' unofficial diplomatic
sorties to the PRC by arguing that Taiwan and the PRC must
still communicate through proxies, i.e. the Pan-Blue
opposition. Soong also argued that the cross-Strait
relationship could benefit from more direct U.S.
intervention. The Director responded that sometimes the most
difficult thing in diplomacy is knowing when not to get
directly involved, and that the U.S. must avoid becoming a
wedge between Taiwan and China. Soong urged the U.S. to use
its influence to push for direct government-to-government
dialogue. The Director replied that the U.S. has repeatedly
called upon Beijing to talk directly to Taiwan's elected
officials, without preconditions.


12. (C) Comment: Soong's portrayal of his and the PFP's role
in the ongoing defense procurement stalemate bears little
resemblance to descriptions we have heard either from
Pan-Blue or Pan-Green. All, including PFP LY members, have
made clear that the PFP has been the most adamant opponent of
moving defense procurement forward in any form.
YOUNG