DIRECTOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON TAIPEI MAYOR/KMT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 001222 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2031 TAGS: PREL PGOV MCAP TW SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON TAIPEI MAYOR/KMT CHAIRMAN MA YING-JEOU, APRIL 4, 2006 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Taipei mayor and Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou told the Director on April 4 that as the "majority" party in opposition, the KMT must assume greater responsibility for Taiwan's "national" welfare. Ma agreed that Taiwan's defense capability should not be treated as a political football, but he could not resist blaming President Chen for the defense impasse and Taiwan's economic difficulties. During a short one-on-one meeting, the Director impressed upon Ma the need for frank, discreet communications, the U.S. desire for cross-party cooperation, and the need for both sides to exempt defense and bilateral issues from Taiwan's POLITICAL gamesmanship. Ma admitted he would have to work with the Chen administration if there was to be any hope in resolving Taiwan's security and economic problems. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Director paid an introductory call on Taipei mayor and KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou on April 4, 2006. The Director congratulated Ma on the success of his U.S. visit, and Ma expressed appreciation for the willingness of his U.S. interlocutors to meet with him and listen to his remarks. Ma emphasized that he had not publicized the existence or contents of his private meetings in the States, which was intended to show that he understands the importance of direct, discreet communications for building mutual confidence. Find Common Ground on Defense -------------- ¶3. (C) The Director said the April 3 Ma-Chen meeting was a step in the right direction, and that both Ma and Chen deserved recognition for their participation. Decision-making is sometimes more difficult in a healthy democracy like Taiwan's, said the Director, but Taiwan's self-defense and its relationship with the United States must be excepted from partisan bickering. The United States expects Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties to take U.S. concerns about Taiwan's security seriously, and further expects Taiwan to demonstrate the resolve to defend itself. ¶4. (C) The U.S. is concerned about Taiwan's "drift" on defense, the Director continued. Although Taiwan and the U.S. have enjoyed success in areas involving sensitive technical cooperation, Taiwan's failure to maintain adequate defense spending has negatively affected Taiwan's relationship with the U.S., both psychologically and empirically. Beyond inter-operability problems, some in the U.S. fear Taiwan question whether Taiwan has the resolve to defend itself. Citing Ma's meeting with ASD Rodman, the Director urged Ma not to view defense spending as a tactical matter to be guided by partisan POLITICAL concerns, but rather as a long-term project for the good of all of Taiwan. Better relations with the PRC may be possible, but only on an equal footing, where Taiwan can demonstrate its ability to defend itself, and its strong relationship with the United States. ¶5. (C) Ma acknowledged that Taiwan should maintain adequate defenses and demonstrate the resolve to defend itself, but he blamed the decline in defense spending on President Chen's administration. Ma also blamed Chen's decision to abrogate the NUC and NUG for the KMT's inability to reach consensus on its own arms procurement proposal. More than 20 KMT caucus members were dead-set against moving forward two weeks ago, and he did not want to fight with the caucus at that time. Ma said that after the KMT caucus calms down over the NUC matter, he will revisit the arms procurement proposal. ¶6. (C) The Director remarked that Taiwan's relationship with the U.S. is still good, but could suffer if Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties remain unable to find common ground to break through the current defense/security impasse. Ma agreed, and observed that since the Pan-Blue now controls the majority of county mayor and magistrate seats (17 of 23) and holds the majority in the LY, it should begin acting more responsibly in Taiwan's "national" interest. Ma said the KMT policy is to demonstrate to the international community that TAIPEI 00001222 002 OF 004 Taiwan, like China, wants to be a "responsible stakeholder." Problem of China's Rise -------------- ¶7. (C) The Director said Taiwan attracts less support in Washington than it did five years ago, due in part to the refocusing of U.S. policy on the Middle East after 9/11. The U.S. is also paying more attention to a China that is increasingly important, responsive, and sophisticated. Ma responded that ten years ago, the PRC was firing missiles into the Strait. Today, said Ma, the "united front" tactics employed by Beijing are "very refined and effective," and the PRC is using these tactics with a "confidence" not seen before. The Director noted that the PRC is no longer making the kinds of mistakes Taiwan politicians have become accustomed to exploiting for domestic POLITICAL purposes. ¶8. (C) The Director said the challenge for the United States in acknowledging China's rise is to convince China to overcome the idea that it is an aggrieved party with claims on the rest of the world and understand that, as an important and powerful country, the PRC has responsibilities as well as rights on the world stage. If the U.S. is successful in helping China through this transition, it will be good for the U.S., Taiwan, and the global community. Ma told the Director the challenge for Taiwan is to get past China's "arrogant rise." Only recently Beijing worked to deny Taipei the chance to host the 2006 conference of the Asian Network of Major Cities (ANMC),preferring to quit the organization rather than allow Taipei to host the event. ¶9. (C) The Director responded that many outside Taiwan remain sympathetic to President Chen because, despite his early efforts at rapprochement, he never had a willing partner in Beijing. Taiwan continues to be a blind spot for an otherwise increasingly sophisticated PRC government, and it might seem time is not on Taiwan's side unless one expects China's economic liberalization to liberalize its POLITICAL environment. The U.S. hope is that in the future, five, ten, or twenty years from now, China could be more open, and perhaps more flexible in dealing with Taiwan. Throughout that period, the Director pointed out, Taiwan's democracy will be an important symbol and could be a possible engine for change inside China. Constitutional vs. Economic Reform -------------- ¶10. (C) Ma said he is worried that President Chen Shui-bian is increasingly moving away from dealing with Taiwan's economic problems, and back toward questions of constitutional reform and de jure independence. Ma said Taiwan's current constitution deserves special status because it came into effect while China was still united in 1947. After seven rounds of constitutional amendment under Presidents Lee Teng-hui and President Chen, stability is needed, not more change. ¶11. (C) The KMT is not concerned that constitutional amendments will pass through Taiwan's rigorous amendment process, Ma continued, but that the constitutional amendment process itself will divert government resources and attention from more pressing economic issues. Ma regretted that he was unable during his April 3 meeting with President Chen to convince Chen to place rectifying Taiwan's economy before constitutional reform. Chen's continued push for constitutional reform destabilizes Taiwan's economy and hurts Taiwan's prospects for improving cross-Strait economic relations. As evidence Ma cited an increasing number of Taiwan companies that now choose to register with the Hong Kong exchange in lieu of Taiwan. Taiwan also faces the threat of being marginalized if the PRC manages to reach free trade agreements with Singapore, Korea, and the like. Taiwan will face increased competition for the U.S. market, and a one-percent drop in its GDP if the "ASEAN Plus Three" agreement goes through, Ma predicted. ¶12. (C) Ma asked whether Washington had felt pressure from Beijing in opposition to a U.S.-Taiwan FTA. Young said there TAIPEI 00001222 003 OF 004 had been no pressure yet, but there would be if the idea began to attract serious attention. The U.S. is experienced in standing up to Chinese pressure, said Young, unlike some of Taiwan's other friends. However, for the U.S. to agree to an FTA with Taiwan, there would have to be a clear economic benefit to the U.S., and there could not be a disproportionate impact on U.S.-PRC relations. Young added that Taiwan would have to "give up a lot" just to get the U.S. to discuss an FTA, particularly increased access for U.S. agricultural products and enhanced IPR enforcement. ¶13. (C) Ma said former KMT Chairman Lien Chan will be attending an April 14-15 economic summit in Shanghai to take the initial steps toward forming a PRC-Taiwan "common market." The trip will give Lien a chance to meet with PRC President Hu Jintao before Hu's visit to the United States, Ma noted. The Director said he hopes Hu takes seriously the U.S. desire to foster cooperation and communication between the PRC and Taiwan's elected leadership. Ma responded that the KMT would like to facilitate such contact. Ma said he repeated the KMT's cross-Strait policies many times while in the U.S. to ensure that China understands the KMT wants Taiwan to be a peacemaker, not a troublemaker. The Director cautioned Ma that if and when the KMT assumes power, the PRC may be much less cooperative than it is now, and that the present might offer special opportunities not available in the future. Private Meeting -------------- ¶14. (C) At the Director's request, Mayor Ma went into a one-on-one format at this point. Director Young emphasized the importance of maintaining a discrete dialogue over certain issues, and sought Ma's concurrence. Toward that end, Young pointed out the problem with other recent meetings where the details -- often distorted -- quickly found their way into the Taiwan press. Ma understood this problem and pledged to respect the confidentiality of our exchanges. ¶15. (C) The Director first emphasized his desire to work closely with the mayor over the next three years on the whole range of difficult issues, in particular strengthening Taiwan's defense and preserving and deepening U.S.-Taiwan relations. The U.S. is very impressed with Taiwan's vibrant democracy, but it sometimes poses real challenges to getting the policy right. For example, there needs to be a better job done by both the government and the opposition to explain to their public the rationale behind our security cooperation and the corresponding need for higher defense spending. ¶16. (C) The Director then emphasized his commitment to work closely with the Chen administration for the remainder of its time in office, in the promotion of U.S. interests. We wanted to be seen as working constructively with the entire spectrum of POLITICAL forces on Taiwan in furtherance of U.S. interests, and would try to be an honest broker with both the government and opposition. In that regard, Young made a strong pitch to Ma to broaden areas of common interest with the DPP, especially as they concerned defense cooperation with the U.S. and the broader U.S.-Taiwan relationship. In addition to making progress on key issues more likely over the next two years, this could create a pattern for such cooperation across party lines for the future. If the KMT returned to power in 2008, it would want to draw upon such a tradition in working with the DPP in opposition to advance the island's vital interests. ¶17. (C) Ma was very receptive to this appeal, and claimed that he would be working within his own party and the pan-Blue faction to promote such cooperation. But he cautioned that he faced certain problems in persuading some of his colleagues that this was the correct path. The Director, in praising the good start made in the previous day's Ma-Chen summit, called upon Ma to exercise his leadership within the pan-Blue movement toward this end. Ma indicated that he was also working closely with former KMT Chairman Lien Chan as Lien prepares for his mid-April trip to China, to ensure that Lien's approach was fully consistent TAIPEI 00001222 004 OF 004 with Ma's priorities for cross-strait ties. This was not always so easy, Ma confided, but he continues to place high priority on wooing members of the "old KMT" like Lien. The Director urged Ma to emphasize to Lien the importance of calling upon China to deal with Taiwan's democratic leaders as well as the opposition, and Ma claimed to accept this point. ¶18. (C) The Director then offered to share his personal thoughts on dealing with Beijing. As Ma had heard in Washington, the USG is committed to trying to bring the PRC into the modern world order as a "responsible stakeholder," both because this was in our interests, and because the alternative of a strong but irresponsible China clinging to its past suspicions and complexes would threaten both the U.S. and Taiwan. That said, the way in which the PRC was treating the KMT now was likely to change if the KMT returned to power in Taiwan. While it was clearly in Beijing's interest to treat the KMT with kid gloves while in the opposition, in large part to put greater pressure on Chen Shui-bian's government, Ma could expect a very different approach if the DPP was replaced by the KMT in 2008. ¶19. (C) The Director used the example of the Dalai Lama, who had been told he could resume dialogue with China only if he met certain conditions concerning support for "separatism" in Tibet. Yet when the Dalai Lama publicly accepted these conditions, Beijing dismissed his gestures as "insincere" and raised the bar on resumed dialogue. Ma could expect something similar on the subject of "one China" if his party returned to power in 2008. He could also expect Beijing to insist to an end to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as part of any "interim agreement." ¶20. (C) Ma went to great lengths to stress he was quite aware of these tactics by the PRC. He referenced both his background as deputy head of the Mainland Affairs Council in the early 1990's, and his family history. Several members of his family back in Hunan had been persecuted and killed by the communists, Ma emphasized. He was viewed by the mainland as an "anti-communist." Ma seemed to be proud of this status, and assured the Director that he would approach relations with China with a great deal of caution. ¶21. (C) This brought the conversation back to defense issues. Ma made a real point of underscoring that he understood the importance of close defense ties with the U.S. as the essential prerequisite to negotiating with China. He also mentioned his desire to work closely with the Japanese on related security issues. He assured the Director that he wanted to work closely both with AIT and with Washington to provide for a strong defense against Chinese threats. We ended this private discussion by agreeing to continue our quiet discussion on both Taiwan defense and U.S.-Taiwan relations in the coming months. Comment -------------- ¶22. (C) This marked a good start to our dialogue with the most promising candidate at this early stage to replace Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president in 2008. Ma seemed both pleased and chastened by his visit to the United States, in which he heard from several senior U.S. officials the same points about strengthening Taiwan's defense and looking to the maintenance of strong U.S.-Taiwan RELATIONS that the Director reiterated here. That said, there was an underlying theme of skepticism and disdain for President Chen throughout our meeting, even as Ma admitted that he needed to work with the governing administration if he had serious hopes for change over the next two years. As with Chen himself, we will find ourselves battling the POLITICAL instincts of Mayor Ma to highlight partisan differences with the higher calling to address Taiwan's security needs and shelter U.S. RELATIONS from the sharpest vicissitudes of democratic infighting here. YOUNG