MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S NEW

UNCLAS TAIPEI 000104 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S NEW YEAR'S DAY SPEECH ¶1. Summary: Major Chinese-language Taiwan dailies shifted the focus of their coverage back to local scandals and local political issues January 12, such as the upcoming race for DPP chairmanship and the year-end Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections. The pro-independence "Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, however, is the only paper that reported on its page two a U.S. Congressional Research Service report which says China will have submarines capable of deterring the United States from coming to Taiwan's aid by 2010. ¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, "China Times" Washington correspondent Norman Fu criticized President Chen Shui-bian's two-pronged strategy formulated in his New Year's Day address. Fu said that as president, Chen "is capable of declaring Taiwan independence before he steps down, and his timetable to launch a `referendum on a new constitution' in 2007 may serve as a harbinger for plans to build an independent nation." End summary. "Chen Shui-bian's Two-Pronged Strategy" Washington correspondent Norman Fu said in the "Washington Outlook" column in the centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] (1/12): "One New Year's Day speech [by President Chen Shui-bian] has created uncertainties for both cross-Strait and Taiwan-U.S. relations. Beijing did not react strongly to Chen's speech possibly because it has seen through Chen's deceptive personality; it saw no need to say much about Chen's speech unless he really starts to take action. Washington's reactions, however, were instant and strong, because it was afraid that it would be dragged into [possible confrontation with China] since the United States is obligated to protect Taiwan's safety. . "Chen's speech was mainly meant to target an audience inside Taiwan, especially his loyal followers, so that he can secure their unwavering support for him. The United States was clearly aware of Chen's motive, and that's why an [unnamed] U.S. official said during his interview with a Taiwan media outlet that [Washington] understands that Chen is sometimes compelled to say or do something out of consideration for Taiwan's DOMESTIC situation. But as long as Taiwan's cross-Strait policy remains unchanged and Chen adheres to his pledge to the United States, [the official said,] Washington can still exercise leniency with regard to Chen's `freedom of speech' inside Taiwan. "This is, however, a very dangerous move in reality. To put it more candidly, it is akin to appeasing Chen only to encourage him to do something he originally planned to do. One must be aware that under the worst case scenario, Chen is capable of taking risks in desperation and going right ahead in changing Taiwan's national title in public and declaring independence. As president, Chen is entitled to make such a decision. .. "Some Westerners and some Taiwan people believed that Chen could become the [Richard] Nixon across the Taiwan Strait, meaning that he is able to break the cross-Strait impasse and push for normalization of cross-Strait relations. But Chen chose to walk in the opposite direction. If Chen takes a calculated risk, desiring to accomplish a glorious mission that will make him go down in history, he is capable of declaring Taiwan independence before he steps down; his timetable to launch a `referendum on a new constitution' in 2007 may as well serve as a harbinger for plans to build an independent nation. ." PAAL