MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S NEW

UNCLAS TAIPEI 000104

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC
BARBORIAK
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S NEW
YEAR'S DAY SPEECH


1. Summary: Major Chinese-language Taiwan dailies shifted
the focus of their coverage back to local scandals and local
political issues January 12, such as the upcoming race for
DPP chairmanship and the year-end Taipei and Kaohsiung
mayoral elections. The pro-independence "Liberty Times,"
Taiwan's biggest daily, however, is the only paper that
reported on its page two a U.S. Congressional Research
Service report which says China will have submarines capable
of deterring the United States from coming to Taiwan's aid
by 2010.


2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, "China Times"
Washington correspondent Norman Fu criticized President Chen
Shui-bian's two-pronged strategy formulated in his New
Year's Day address. Fu said that as president, Chen "is
capable of declaring Taiwan independence before he steps
down, and his timetable to launch a `referendum on a new
constitution' in 2007 may serve as a harbinger for plans to
build an independent nation." End summary.

"Chen Shui-bian's Two-Pronged Strategy"

Washington correspondent Norman Fu said in the "Washington
Outlook" column in the centrist, pro-status quo "China
Times" [circulation: 400,000] (1/12):

"One New Year's Day speech [by President Chen Shui-bian] has
created uncertainties for both cross-Strait and Taiwan-U.S.
relations. Beijing did not react strongly to Chen's speech
possibly because it has seen through Chen's deceptive
personality; it saw no need to say much about Chen's speech
unless he really starts to take action. Washington's
reactions, however, were instant and strong, because it was
afraid that it would be dragged into [possible confrontation
with China] since the United States is obligated to protect
Taiwan's safety. .

"Chen's speech was mainly meant to target an audience inside
Taiwan, especially his loyal followers, so that he can
secure their unwavering support for him. The United States
was clearly aware of Chen's motive, and that's why an
[unnamed] U.S. official said during his interview with a
Taiwan media outlet that [Washington] understands that Chen
is sometimes compelled to say or do something out of
consideration for Taiwan's domestic situation. But as long
as Taiwan's cross-Strait policy remains unchanged and Chen
adheres to his pledge to the United States, [the official
said,] Washington can still exercise leniency with regard to
Chen's `freedom of speech' inside Taiwan.

"This is, however, a very dangerous move in reality. To put
it more candidly, it is akin to appeasing Chen only to
encourage him to do something he originally planned to do.
One must be aware that under the worst case scenario, Chen
is capable of taking risks in desperation and going right
ahead in changing Taiwan's national title in public and
declaring independence. As president, Chen is entitled to
make such a decision. ..

"Some Westerners and some Taiwan people believed that Chen
could become the [Richard] Nixon across the Taiwan Strait,
meaning that he is able to break the cross-Strait impasse
and push for normalization of cross-Strait relations. But
Chen chose to walk in the opposite direction. If Chen takes
a calculated risk, desiring to accomplish a glorious mission
that will make him go down in history, he is capable of
declaring Taiwan independence before he steps down; his
timetable to launch a `referendum on a new constitution' in
2007 may as well serve as a harbinger for plans to build an
independent nation. ."

PAAL