SWEDES ON 11/12 DECEMBER GAERC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001921 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNAUS EUN VY SR BK IS LE IR SW SUBJECT: SWEDES ON 11/12 DECEMBER GAERC REF: A. STATE 195044 ¶B. STATE 194456 Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (c) Polcouns discussed 12/7 with MFA deputy European Correspondent Niclas Kvarnstrom the 12/11-12 GAERC topics (reftels). Responses are keyed to the agenda items. Turkey/EU Accession -------------- ¶2. (c) Sweden considers itself to be one of the most enlargement-friendly countries; FM Bildt has publicly called for the EU to keep the EU door open for Turkey. Bildt released a statement 11/8 welcoming the Turkish report that Turkey intended to open a harbor to Cypriot ships. He said "this would be a positive step," and was "very significant for Turkey's continued process toward membership." In the internal EU debate, Kvarnstrom said Sweden had hoped to reduce the number of chapters of "acquis communitaires" affected to less than eight, but this might not be possible. Western Balkans -------------- ¶3. (c) Kvarnstrom said Sweden's views on Kosovo track very closely with our own. Sweden wants status issue to be resolved as early as possible. According to Kvarnstrom, FM Bildt, who has extensive experience in the Balkans, is taking a very hands-on approach to all Balkan issues. According to Kvarnstrom, Bildt intervened with UN Envoy Ahtasaari on the timing of the submission of his proposals to the parties, seeking to ensure that Serbian parliamentary elections did not detrimentally affect the status issue. Sweden wants the status issue to be resolved as quickly as possible following the Serbian elections. ¶4. (c) On Serbia, Sweden believes it will be important for the EU to send a signal to Serbia giving it a clear prospect of eventually joining the EU. This could be in the form of visa facilitation, for example. At the same time, it was important not to compromise on ICTY cooperation. ¶5. (c) Sweden does not expect Bosnia to be a focus of discussion, pending formation of a government there. Israeli-Palestinian Issues -------------- ¶6. (c) Sweden does not believe the Zapatero/Chirac initiative will find sufficient backing in the EU. Some of the proposals, such as to appoint an EU special representative, might be supported. Sweden remains committed to the Road Map, the Quartet principles, and a two-state solution. Swedes are concerned about the humanitarian effect of continued freezing of the Palestinian customs revenues. In the event of the formation of a unity government, and if the right signals are sent in regard to adhesion to Quartet principles, Sweden believes a greater opening to the Palestinians should be considered. Lebanon -------------- ¶7. (c) Sweden believes it is very important to support the Siniora government, and has committed a corvette to UNIFIL for marine patrolling. Iran -------------- ¶8. (c) Iran is not expected to be a major topic of discussion, with action at the UNSC. Afghanistan -------------- ¶9. (c) Sweden is a large donor to Afghanistan, has a long history of a presence there, and currently leads a PRT. Sweden believes it is time for the EU to increase its engagement in Afghanistan, and will argue for this. Sweden support an increased role in rule of law, and notes there is an EU rule of law mission currently reviewing the situation in Afghanistan. China Arms -------------- ¶10. (c) Kvarnstrom said the Sweden felt isolated in December 2004 when it was "the last country" holding out against the French initiative to remove the EU arms embargo against China. Sweden eventually caved in on the issue, but eventually reversed its position, and noted that many other EU countries did the same following high-level U.S. diplomatic interventions underscoring the importance of the embargo to the U.S. and Asian security interests. Kvarnstrom welcomed information that this issue was again being raised by the U.S. in other EU capitals (ref b),as it would serve STOCKHOLM 00001921 002 OF 002 to prevent another situation where Sweden could find itself isolated in opposing a lifting of the EU's China arms embargo. WOOD