SWEDEN'S 9/17 ELECTION: ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001421

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN'S 9/17 ELECTION: ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 913


B. STOCKHOLM 952

Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (c) Sweden's 9/17 parliamentary election remains a
neck-and-neck race (ref A),too close to call. All seven
parties currently in parliament appear likely to reach the 4
percent threshold; no newcomers are likely to qualify. This
means that the most likely outcomes are either a return of
Prime Minister Goran Persson's Social Democrat-led
government, supported by the Green and Left parties, or a
government of the center-right "Alliance for Sweden" made up
of the Moderate, Liberal, Christian Democrat, and Center
parties, with Moderate leader Fredrik Reinfeldt as Prime
Minister. In terms of foreign policy, another Persson
government is likely to continue on current policy tracks. A
shift to a somewhat less Euro-Atlantic-friendly orientation
is possible (but not likely),and only if the Greens do
particularly well and have the power to make good on their
demand for ministerial posts in a Persson government. For
its part, a Reinfeldt government may be more open to
eventually considering a closer relationship with NATO, but
this is not on the screen as a policy priority (ref b).
Domestically, Reinfeldt would focus more on job creation and
seek income tax reductions, particularly in the lower income
brackets, but would not seek major restructuring of the
Swedish welfare state model. End Summary.

And the Winner is..."Undecideds"
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2. (u) Coming into the last 10 days of the campaign, this is
the tightest election Sweden has seen since 1979. The
opposition "Alliance for Sweden" has led virtually all polls
since the end of June, and for most of the past two years,
although the size of the leads have varied from fractions of
a percent to a few percentage points. However the most
recent poll by the Sifo polling institute published on 9/6
gave the governing SDP and its support parties a 0.7% lead.


3. (c) With the SDP having governed 65 of the past 74 years,
the opposition is encouraged to be running even. Key factors
contributing to the opposition,s relative strength include
their success in creating a united front (the Alliance for
Sweden),and the Moderate's effective rebranding as a
worker-friendly party, which has made it much more difficult
for the SDP to turn the campaign into a traditional "workers
versus capitalists" debate. Additionally the central
question of unemployment has for the first time favored the
opposition, with a majority of Swedes having greater trust in
Moderate Party leader Reinfeldt on the labor market issue
than in Prime Minister Persson. Disenchantment with the
self-serving ways of the long-entrenched SDP has also
benefited the opposition. Many voters are tired of the
autocratic style of Prime Minister Persson, who has been in
office for 10 years. Add in a number of minor political
scandals on the SDP side, and even Sweden,s traditionally
pro-SDP electorate has become wobbly.


4. (u) With significantly more undecided voters at this stage
than there were in recent elections, the outcome if far from
certain. Opinion polls indicate that none of the seven
parliamentary parties are likely to fall below the 4 percent
threshold required to win seats in parliament, with the
result that the most likely outcomes are that one of the
existing blocks, the SDP-led government (with Green and Left
support) or the Alliance for Sweden, will win the elections.

Small Parties on the Fringes
--------------

5. (sbu) We do not expect any of the small parties not
currently in parliament to pass the 4 percent threshold. The
most significant of the small parties is the right-wing and
nationalistic Sweden Democrats, who focus on restricting
immigration. They were the largest party outside parliament
in the 2002 election, garnering 1.4 percent of the votes.
Most recent opinion polls have given them 1-2 percent, but
one poll published on 9/5 put their support at 2.9 percent.
Local pollsters tell us that opinion polls generally
underestimate support for the Sweden Democrats, because
people are reluctant to admit they will vote for them. For
the first time, the Sweden Democrats will be widely
distributing campaign material, canvassing nearly all of
Sweden's voters with campaign material and election ballots
(making it easier to vote for them on election day). In the
unexpected event that they actually enter parliament, they
could hold the balance of power between the socialist and
non-socialist blocks.


6. (sbu) The EU-skeptical June List ticket has never got
traction. The Feminist Initiative, which recently enlisted

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Jane Fonda to support its campaign, has been registering less
than one percent in recent polls.

Wild Cards
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7. (c) Political scandals are usually pretty mild in Sweden,
but they can, particularly at late stages of the campaign,
affect the election's outcome. The current scandal involves
some prominent Liberal Party (the second-largest party in the
Alliance for Sweden) officials who were caught after having
hacked the SDP's internal files via the internet. The SDP
waited until near the end of the campaign to pounce on this,
which has been going on for long months, and the effects are
certainly damaging to the Liberals, but not as much to the
Alliance for Sweden. Most guesses are that most
disillusioned Liberal votes will go to Moderates.
Nonetheless, the scandal is a net negative for the Alliance.
The SDP has been tainted with numerous earlier minor
scandals, including one involving the use of the internet by
high-level party insiders to spread false rumors.

Foreign Policy Implications
--------------

8. (c) The Government in Sweden takes all major decisions
collectively, that is to say each minister has a say on a big
decision, even if it does not fall in his or her porfolio.
Therefore, having a Green or Left party minister could make a
big difference in foreign policy. The Greens and the Left
are both Euro and Euro-Atlantic skeptic. The Left and
especially Greens are demanding ministerial posts if the SDP
forms a new government, but are unlikely to get them. For
the Left (former Communist) party, voter support is limited,
and they are more focused on staying above the 4 percent
threshold. The Greens have been more adamant, but would
likely have to settle for second and third-tier positions in
ministeries in another Persson-led government.


9. (c) For its part, a Reinfeldt government may be more open
to eventually considering a closer relationship with NATO,
but this is not on the screen as a policy priority.
Domestically, Reinfeldt would focus more on job creation and
seek income tax reductions, particularly in the lower income
brackets, but would not seek major restructuring of the
Swedish welfare state model.
WOOD