IRAQ: RESPONSE TO GOJ REQUEST ON SECURITY ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 046975 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ UK JA SUBJECT: IRAQ: RESPONSE TO GOJ REQUEST ON SECURITY ASSESSMENT REF: A) TOKYO 000757 B) TOKYO 001493 Classified By: Classified by EAP PDAS Kathleen Stephens for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary. In response to reftel B, the Department provides points to emphasize regarding USG priorities for Japanese support of Iraq. We are also sending by email a province by province situational assessment which Embassy can draw on. In the most recent quadrilateral meeting in London, the U.S., UK, Australia and Japan agreed that force adjustments by any member of the coalition will be conditions-based, and will be keyed to conditions identified by the Joint Task Force on Transfer of Security Responsibility. USG communications with the GOJ on Iraq should emphasize that the USG and the Iraqi Government urge that the ASDF C-130 mission expand to include Baghdad and Balad airports, that projects drawing on the USD 3.5 billion in concessional loans be quickly finalized, and that the GOJ continue a presence on the ground, perhaps as a part of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) Background. Various GOJ interlocutors have indicated that the GOJ is near a decision to approve the expansion of the ASDF C-130 mission to include Baghdad and Balad airports. Further, these interlocutors have emphasized that the GOJ needs a clear statement of priorities from the USG. In meeting with the GOJ, Embassy should draw upon points outlined in a recent action memorandum for the Secretary describing interagency thinking on this SIPDIS matter: the USG should continue to seek expansion of the ASDF C-130 mission, urge quick finalization of projects drawing on the USD 3.5 billion in concessional loans, and urge a continued Japanese presence after the adjustment of Ground SDF troops in as-Samawah. We understand Japan has deployed site survey teams to evaluate the two airfields and the environment for the PRTs, notably in Basrah. End Background. -------------- ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION -------------- ¶3. (S/REL USA AND UK AND AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN) In responding to GOJ inquiry on current status of security and governance in Iraq, Embassy can draw on provincial assessments developed by our Mission in Baghdad and emailed to Marc Shaw and Carol Reynolds. These should not be provided in hard copy. For up to date assessments GOJ interlocutors should be encouraged to have Japanese Embassy Baghdad, a Liaison Officer (LNO) or site evaluation teams approach counterparts in Iraq. General Assessment -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Following the election of the Council of Representatives, leaders of all the major political parties and communities are participating in the negotiations to form a government of national unity. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) announced certified final election results February 10, 2006. With the announcement of final, certified results, political parties and leaders entered negotiations to form the executive branch. Progress on government formation, however, slowed in part, due to an upsurge in sectarian violence that began with the February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The attack was followed by a cycle of retaliatory sectarian violence that continues. Those who attacked the mosque sought to aggravate divisions among the Iraqi people and political leadership with the aim of making Iraq ungovernable. However, Iraqi government and religious leaders, in a demonstration of national unity, condemned the attacks, called for an end to sectarian unrest, and for security forces free from sectarian and militia loyalties. They also reaffirmed their engagement in the political process and demonstrated increased focus on government formation. The convening of the Council of Representative March 16 was a symbol of the Iraqi leadership's intent to move forward. STATE 00046975 002 OF 003 ¶5. (SBU) The goal of basic training and equipping of Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces is 86 percent complete (goal is 130,000). This does not include unit or larger organizational operational readiness. To inculcate operational readiness, U.S. military transition teams are embedded in ISF groups. Current troop strength includes 101 Iraqi battalions involved in counter insurgency operations, of which 59 are "in the lead" with MNF-I support. The amount of territory under ISF control (with USG oversight) is increasing; 65 percent of Baghdad is under ISF control. ¶6. (SBU) The goal of equipping and basic training of Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel is 66 percent complete, with a headcount of 195,000 envisioned (this includes police, special police commandos, public order divisions, mechanized brigade, and border enforcement). Because of the need to instill rule of law and basic due process at all levels of the MOI personnel, the pace of progress is more deliberate, with assessments made at the conclusion of training. Similar to the military training teams, special police training teams are being embedded with police as mentors. Transition planning -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Much of recent discussions in Washington and London (i.e., the quadrilateral meetings of the U.S., the UK, Japan and Australia) have focused on addressing the plans for transition of al-Muthanna province to Iraqi Security responsibility, and the adjustment of re-missioning of troops in the area. Japan has made clear its desire for a coordinated and contemporaneous adjustment of its SDF presence with that of Australian and British forces, anticipated late this Spring. Australia has signaled that it is prepared to re-mission its troops, and adjust their location and structure as needed. Please note that "adjustment of forces" and "re-missioning" are the accurate and correct terms for describing the transition. ¶8. (S/REL USA AND UK AND AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN) The Joint Task Force on Transfer of Security Responsibility has developed a process outlining four elements to be considered in assessing whether conditions are appropriate for the transfer of overall security responsibility for a given city or province from coalition forces to Iraq Security Forces (ISF - army and police). In assessing the suitability of a region for transition to Iraqi security responsibility, the following elements need to be evaluated: 1) the threat to security; 2) the capabilities of the relevant ISF; 3) the ability of MNF-I to assist and support the local ISF; and 4) the strength and capacity of the regional government to effectively govern and coordinate ISF activities. The Joint Task Force on Transfer of Security Responsibility recently briefed the provincial governors and divisional commanders. Depending on approval from Joint Task Force Principals, including the Iraqi Prime Minister, assessments could commence in April, including in al-Muthanna province. Following conclusion of assessments, Task Force principals, including the Iraqi Prime Minister, need to draw conclusions and agree on any transitions of security responsibility. Transition would occur approximately 30 days after final agreement. As discussed in the February Quad meeting in London, it is still possible that this process would conclude in time to make transition possible in late May or the first half of June, but such a time line is still indicative, at best. The continuing delays in the formation of the Iraqi Government are likely to delay the process. Points to Emphasize -------------- ¶9. (S/REL JAPAN) The Department asks that communications with the GOJ on Iraq should emphasize the Iraqi Government request the Japan sustain its support for Iraq's stability and transition and the USG priorities for Japan's support: -- the ASDF C-130 mission expand its mission in support of the coalition to include Baghdad and Balad airports; -- projects drawing on the USD 3.5 billion in concessional loans will quickly be finalized and proceed to implementation; and STATE 00046975 003 OF 003 -- the GOJ continue a presence on the ground, perhaps as a part of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). (If asked) The USG prefers a military presence, but will gladly integrate whatever presence Japan decides can best deliver relevant capacity building and humanitarian reconstruction capabilities. RICE