U.S.-UN HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 041409 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/16 TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ SUBJECT: U.S.-UN HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ (U) CLASSIFIED BY IO A/S KRISTEN SILVERBERG, REASON 1. 4 (B) AND (D). REF: BAGHDAD 565 ¶1. (U) This is an action request. The following guidance should be used by the U.S. delegation, led by Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, in the March 16, 2006 U.S.-UN High-Level Consultations on Iraq. Para 2 contains U.S. priorities for UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) activities; para 3 contains guidance on other issues expected to be raised. ¶2. (C) UN ROLE IN IRAQ: The U.S. seeks continued and expanded implementation of current UNSCR-derived UNAMI mandates, as well as further expansion of the UN presence in Iraq as soon as possible. Specifically, the U.S. hopes the UN will continue or begin work in these areas (in prioritized order): -- Electoral Process: Providing technical support for any local/provincial elections and/or referendums, including assistance with electoral laws and logistics; and support for civic participation in upcoming elections. -- Political Process (Sunni Engagement): In particular, the UN could encourage and facilitate marginalized groups, particularly Sunni Arabs, to pursue a coherent and realistic agenda peacefully through the political system, and work to ensure that such initiatives are given serious consideration by the Iraqi government. The UN could specifically seek to reassure Sunni Arabs that any constitutional review process will be structured in a way that guarantees Sunni interests will be considered fairly. This may require contact and dialogue with Iraqi elements, both Sunni and Shia, that may in the past have resorted to or be affiliated with groups currently resorting to violence (e.g., Sadr's group, the Muslim Ulema Council, and the Iraqi Islamic Party). At the same time it is vital that the UN not take on, or be seen to be taking on, a role of mediating between the insurgency and the government (or the Coalition). Also, the UN should foster dialogue between Iraqi communities (while respecting other similar initiatives). The UN should empower SRSG Qazi to play this role, and ensure Iraqis know Qazi speaks definitively for the UN. -- Constitutional Review and/or Implementation: Whether, when, and how to undertake a constitutional review is an Iraqi matter; the international community should not prejudice the outcome of this decision. UNAMI could fill an important role in providing/coordinating technical and procedural support for any constitutional review process and for legislative implementation of the constitution. Helpful activities related to the possible constitutional review would include drafting and sharing options for how a Review Committee could organize itself (i.e., membership, structure and process, schedule and secretariat); creating a resource bank of outside SIPDIS constitutional specialists; facilitating public outreach to key constituencies; and promoting national dialogue and consensus-building on any constitutional review process. The UN's assistance to any constitutional review should focus substantively on technical-legal issues, not policy issues. Regardless of whether the Iraqis undertake a review of the constitution, international assistance to legislative implementation of the constitution will be important. Some analyses estimate that hundreds of laws are called for by the constitution. The UN should design constitutional assistance to be flexible enough to support implementation alone or both implementation and review. -- Donor Coordination: Continuing coordination, both on the ground and through International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI),has proven to be an effective way to channel contributions from smaller donors. A strengthened UN coordination role on the ground under Stephan di Mistura has been very helpful. UN leadership will also be vital to getting the new GOI to reaffirm existing donor coordination mechanisms, and in expanding the scope of sectors beyond the current four sector working groups. More UN development staff on the ground STATE 00041409 002 OF 003 (vice in Amman) would help further improve coordination at the sector level. As part of its donor coordination role, the UN should work with the World Bank to advise Iraq on improving its National Development Strategy and/or another document - similar to the Afghanistan Compact - committing the new Iraqi Government to implement specific reforms, which would help donors make decisions about new commitments of support. The UN proposal for an Iraqi- shareholders meeting in May in Irbil and Iraqi/international meeting in June outside Iraq is reasonable, but we need to hear from the new Iraqi government before committing to a time or venue. -- Humanitarian and Reconstruction/Development Assistance: Urge quicker disbursement of UN IRFFI funds in the UN clusters other than elections and refugees/IDPs, where disbursements have been impressive, specifically including expanding direct provision of technical humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, particularly in primary and higher education, housing and capacity development; assisting Iraqis in donor mobilization and coordination; expanding assistance to refugee returnees and other vulnerable populations; and expanding assistance on environment/marshland operations, cultural heritage/museums and telecommunications. These activities are funded through IRFFI; express willingness to approach other donors to contribute additional funds to IRFFI. -- Governance: The UN could provide technical assistance to build capacity (via specialized agency interaction) in select ministries; and assisting with local governance capacity building,including outreach to constituents and increased transparency and accountability. The UN could provide support for civic education on citizen's political and civil rights as well as training for governmental officials on political and civil rights. -- Human Rights: The UN could provide human rights support (training) to non-governmental organizations enabling them to monitor and report on human rights situation; providing technical assistance to build the capacity of the Ministry of Human Rights, the Human Rights Commission, and the National Center for Missing Persons; and expanding assistance in the areas of mass graves exhumation and identification of missing persons. -- Rule of Law: The UN could expand direct provision of technical assistance for rule of law; and facilitating judicial and legal reform, especially to ensure such reform conforms with international standards. -- Kirkuk/Disputed Areas: The UN could assist in developing options for the resolution of the final status of disputed areas and re-drawing of some administrative boundaries, including conducting the census. If the issue of Kirkuk is raised during the constitutional review process, UN technical assistance may be helpful. The UN might also helpfully assume responsibility for assisting the Iraq Property Claims Commission. Disputed areas/Kirkuk is an exceptionally sensitive issue; the forthcoming government's views should be sought before any efforts are begun. Delegation should seek UN views on UN's contingent role in the Transitional Administrative Law Article 58 process. -- National Reconciliation: The UN could play a role in fostering community and macro-level peace and reconciliation efforts. In all cases, we will want to ensure continued, close coordination to avoid duplication of U.S. and other donor programs. In order for the UN to take on these tasks, the U.S. strongly supports deployment of UN specialized agency personnel to Iraq. Generally, we would like to see the UN conduct the range of operations it undertakes in countries around the world. ¶3. (C) OTHER ISSUES: -- U.S. POLICY: THE U.S. delegation should be prepared to brief on current components of U.S. Iraq policy, including the November "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," the December force adjustment decisions, and the budget requests in the FY 06 supplemental and for FY 07 including program rationales. -- CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW: Constitutional review should STATE 00041409 003 OF 003 not be on the agenda during government formation talks; it would be a distraction and a divisive issue at this stage. Whether, when, and how to undertake a constitutional review is an Iraqi matter; the international community should not prejudice the outcome of this decision. -- ARAB LEAGUE NATIONAL ACCORD CONFERENCE: If a national unity government is successfully formed, all concerned will need to reevaluate the usefulness of such a conference. Any conference should: be inclusive; support the existing political process; be a forum for Iraqi (vice foreign) views to be discussed and solutions to be found; and not treat political groups as equal to the Iraqi government. All arrangements for a conference should be acceptable to the Iraqi government. The U.S. continues to view UN participation in any conference as constructive. -- CONTACT GROUP: The United States remains supportive of the existing international coordination mechanisms, including the UN's Baghdad Coordination Group. However, we do not see a useful role for a Contact Group outside of Iraq. We do not see what such a group would do that existing forums for discussing Iraq - such as UNSC discussions, the donors' Core Group, donor conferences, the IRRFI Donors' Committee, and meetings of Iraq's neighboring countries and of regional organizations cannot. We believe the focus should be on encouraging the development of healthy bilateral relations between Iraq and other members of the international community, who should be represented at the Ambassadorial-level in Baghdad and fully engaged with the Iraqi government. -- MNF-I, DFI/IAMB AND UNAMI MANDATE REVIEWS: We are optimistic that the (nlt June 15) MNF-I mandate, the (nlt June 15) DFI/IAMB arrangements and (nlt August 11) UNAMI mandate reviews will go smoothly; expect PRSTs reiterating the UNSC's support will be sufficient. -- IAMB: The International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) can play an important role in urging the Iraqi government to implement transparent financial mechanisms. We urge the UN, through its chairmanship of the IAMB, to fulfill the IAMB's mandate as defined in UNSCR 1483 to ensure Iraq's oil sales "are consistent with...international market best practices...in order to serve transparency." -- DEDICATED AIRCRAFT FOR UNAMI: We still want to assist you in finding a country to donate aircraft for dedicated UNAMI use. MNF-I continues to meet requests for UN transport as needed until that time. -- MAKHMOUR: We share UNHCR's assessment that the civilian character of Makhmour Camp has been compromised by active PKK terrorists, that the camp must be closed, and that its legitimate refugees must be given a viable choice between repatriation or local integration. Security must be the responsibility of the ISF. Coordination with KRG and Iraqi Government is delayed by security and government formation concerns. RICE