AMB. BEYRLE'S 6/30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARVANOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000918 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KNAR EUN LY BU SUBJECT: AMB. BEYRLE'S 6/30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARVANOV REF: A. WHITEHOUSE 271616Z JUN 06 ¶B. SECSTATE 108110 Classified By: Amb. John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador on June 30 delivered Ref A letter from President Bush to President Parvanov reiterating U.S. support for Bulgaria's European Union accession. In the ensuing 40-minute discussion, Parvanov expressed deep appreciation for the President's timely response and vowed Bulgaria's ongoing efforts to meet EU concerns would justify U.S. support. Parvanov also expressed hope that improving U.S.-Libyan relations would assist in freeing the Bulgarian medics held in Tripoli. Ambassador thanked Parvanov for formation of the government commission studying Jewish community restitution issues and raised continuing problems in Bulgaria's business climate. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Parvanov appeared upbeat about Bulgaria's EU progress and noted that the government's "action plan" -- while perhaps overly ambitious and detailed -- demonstrated Bulgaria's determination to address weaknesses raised by the European Commission report in a number of areas -- not just the "red-card" issues. He predicted a positive review in the EU's fall report and was hopeful that Bulgaria would be spared from safeguard clauses. Citing President Bush's letter, the Ambassador urged continued efforts -- especially in the key areas of organized crime and corruption. Parvanov and the Ambassador agreed that the new Prosecutor General (Boris Velchev) was a good fit for the job. Parvanov noted that while Velchev was starting with the first priority -- making personnel changes to clean up the prosecution service itself -- he ultimately intended to address problems throughout the government. This was already leading to overt and covert attempts to undermine him, Parvanov said, but Velchev would persevere. The Ambassador said Velchev's July 10-13 visit to Washington would allow us to identify concrete ways to support his efforts. ¶3. (C) To support Bulgaria's EU accession, the Ambassador reassured Parvanov that for the immediate future, he would be stressing Bulgaria's progress in public statements, saving criticism for private discussions. The Embassy, the Ambassador said, will continue to highlight growing U.S. investment in Bulgaria as a sign of support for Bulgaria's political stability and economic potential. But this should not be taken as a sign that our concerns over the business climate were weakening. On the contrary, the Ambassador said, most Western investors agreed that the "cost" of doing business in Bulgaria had increased under the current government. He cited the long battle to conclude the privatization of the Boyana Film Studio as a conspicuous bad example in this regard that weakened our ability and even desire to advocate for more investment. Parvanov said he would check on the state of play of the "notorious" Boyana deal. ¶4. (C) Reflecting on the upcoming presidential elections, Parvanov thought foreign affairs would play a very small role -- but a negative EU decision would clearly have an effect. Parvanov (a former leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party) was certain the fractured rightist parties would be unable to unify behind a single candidate. The rightist parties' frustration over this, he observed, was leading to increasingly bitter battles between them. (Note: Only a trace of Schadenfreude was evident in that observation.) ¶5. (C) Turning to Libya, Parvanov expressed hope this year would see release of the nurses after more than six years of detention. The Ambassador reassured Parvanov that the issue is always included in our discussions with the Libyans and they understand that truly full relations with the U.S. will not be possible until the case is successfully resolved. Parvanov again expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts. ¶6. (C) In closing, the Ambassador thanked the President for formation of the government commission studying Jewish property restitution issues (ref B). Parvanov responded that he had made a personal commitment on this issue and would continue to follow the commission's work closely. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: As in public, Parvanov in private exudes the confidence of an experienced incumbent entering a Presidential campaign with approval ratings of 60-70% and facing a divided and fractious opposition. Weeks of media scrutiny and opposition attacks surrounding his alleged work as an "agent" of the communist-era state security seem to have petered out, following his strong public denial of the allegations in which he dramatically read exculpatory excerpts from his security file. He continues to voice SOFIA 00000918 002 OF 002 public support for Bulgaria's participation in Iraq and Afghanistan and the military basing agreement with the U.S., while conceding privately that this helps him little in political terms with his conservative socialist voter base. Parvanov's statements supporting stronger measures against crime and corruption hit all the right notes, but there is still little serious progress that he can point to on this front. Although clearly possessed of the political skills and probably even the will to promote progress against these traditional Bulgarian ills, Parvanov's history of political / business associations compromise his ability to be a truly effective crusader against them. END COMMENT. Beyrle