Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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06SOFIA1667 | 2006-12-15 09:33:00 | SECRET | Embassy Sofia |
VZCZCXRO6156 OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHSF #1667/01 3490933 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 150933Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2958 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001667 |
1. (S) SUMMARY: Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev and Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin visited Iraq on December 12-13, meeting senior Iraqi officials and sending early Christmas greetings to Bulgarian troops at Camp Ashraf. FM Kalfin described a worrying security situation, but stated that Bulgaria is ready to extend its current mission in Iraq. END SUMMARY. 2. (S) During a meeting upon his return to Sofia on Dec. 13, Kalfin thanked the Ambassador for U.S. support in arranging meetings with Iraqi leaders and getting to and from Ashraf to meet Bulgarian troops. He gave a sober assessment of government leaders (President Talabani, PM Maliki and Council of Representatives Speaker al-Attiya) and expressed concern about on-the-ground conditions and prospects, though he predicted Bulgaria would honor a U.S. request to extend its Ashraf deployment. His impression of Iraqi leadership: --Understandably divergent viewpoints between the President, Prime Minister and Speaker, which disappointingly broke along sectarian lines; --Repeated Iraqi assertions that the U.S. does not know how to handle security, and that the Iraqis do, but without any evidence or action that suggests that is the case, leading Kalfin to doubt the leadership's will and ability to handle security; --Strategic and tactical differences of opinion on dealing with Iran, but no enthusiasm that involving Iran or Syria would bring appreciable change and no clarity on what "bringing the Iranians on board" (Talabani's position) would mean in any real sense; --Disconcerting and inflammatory populist statements (especially by the Speaker) that are anti-U.S. and anti- international presence; --Disconnect between leaders' acknowledgment that the government must take ownership and control of security and lack of action to that effect; --Heavy criticism of outside actors (to include rejection of parts of Baker-Hamilton, e.g., control of army, training) without offering alternatives. 3. (S) According to the Foreign Minister, the Iraqis did not/not raise the issue of a Bulgarian extension at Camp Ashraf. They applauded Bulgaria's support and friendship and welcomed continued cooperation without making any specific requests. Kalfin said that the Ashraf base itself is safe, but that the province is not, noting recent attacks on convoys. Iranian behavior and pressure would be key to an eventual decision on extension, he said -- Iranians continually raise the issue of Camp Ashraf and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq with Baghdad. Kalfin confided that the Iraqi FM had told him in October that the Iraqi government had decided to close Ashraf, but agreed it was hard to credit this with no decision about what to do with the detainees there. 4. (C) The Iraqis told the visiting Bulgarians that they appreciated friends who helped them without asking for anything in return (Kalfin took this as an allusion to debt relief). On debt, the Iraqis are open to a commercial deal with international debt/equity firms whereby Bulgaria could immediately recoup a discounted percentage of Iraq's obligation under the 20% Paris Club formula rather than waiting for full payment over 23 years. The respective Finance Ministers agreed to continue discussions. 5. (S) On 13 December, DCM and PolEcCouns met Valeri Ratchev, Bulgarian ambassador to Iraq. Ratchev is resident in Sofia as BG does not yet have an embassy in Baghdad. He confirmed Kalfin's readout and added additional detail. His key points: --The PM and FM viewed the trip as successful and productive. --The PM's goal was to send a strong signal of political support. President Talabani understood this; Maliki and al-Attiya somewhat less so. --Talabani is several grades above the other leaders; Ratchev's perception is that Maliki is shrinking as a leader. --Everyone was struck by the anti-U.S. and anti-international presence remarks by Speaker al-Attiya. --The PM and FM were "shocked" at the condition of the country, especially as viewed by helicopter. It was Ratchev's fourth trip this year -- he believes that SOFIA 00001667 002 OF 002 conditions for ordinary Iraqis have gotten worse. --Without mentioning Ashraf, the Iraqis made general statements commending Bulgarian participation. This is helpful to the GoB as it enlists support for an extended deployment; they will work closely with us on this. --Iraqi leaders talked at length about the need for Iraqi control of the security forces and budget and appeared much more upset about Baker-Hamilton recommendations on budgetary control than anything else; however, they were unable to offer an alternative plan. 6. (S) According to Ratchev, progress on setting up a Bulgarian Embassy in Baghdad seemed to be off course. Maliki spoke of signing a paper within two weeks to allow identification of a suitable building, suggesting the process was just in its initial stages. Ratchev had been under the impression that the selection process was completed two months ago (since a building had been identified and US and Iraqi security forces had signed off on it) and the GoB was simply awaiting final bureaucratic approval before gaining access to the site and building. Comment: -------------------------- 7. (S) The Bulgarians may have been unprepared for what they saw in Iraq, but the Foreign Minister clearly signaled their political resolve to extend their presence at Camp Ashraf through 2007. Kalfin's Dec. 18-21 visit to the U.S. presents the chance to lock that commitment in, while continuing to work closely with the GoB to get a Bulgarian Embassy up and running in Baghdad. 8. (S) We want to take this opportunity again to express our great appreciation and admiration for our colleagues at Embassy Baghdad. The Bulgarians clearly recognized the indispensable role you played in pulling this visit off. Many thanks from all of us. BEYRLE |