BULGARIA STRUGGLES TO SHED CAVEATS ON THE ROAD TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001597 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA STRUGGLES TO SHED CAVEATS ON THE ROAD TO RIGA REF: A. SOFIA 1491 ¶B. SOFIA 1509 ¶C. SOFIA 1573 ¶D. STATE 186256 ¶E. USNATO 658 SOFIA 00001597 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In the lead-up to the Riga Summit, the GOB supports nearly every item on the U.S. agenda, but continues to struggle with a shortage of funds, equipment, and "capabilities" as it looks toward elimination of national caveats and more demanding missions overseas. Bulgaria's commitment to an additional ISAF deployment in 2007 is an important signal of political will, as is the Defense Minister's bruising, but so far successful fight to keep defense spending above 2.5% of GDP. Meeting one of SACEUR's target missions in Afghanistan, however, will depend upon a partnership that matches Bulgarian will with allied equipment and funds. On enlargement and PfP, we can expect Bulgaria to advocate a "regional approach" that pushes conditional PfP membership for Serbia and Bosnia as well as "equal encouragement" to all Adriatic Charter countries. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Bulgaria will be represented at the Riga Summit by recently reelected President Georgi Parvanov, Foreign Minister Ivaylo Kalfin, and Defense Minister Vesselin Bliznakov. All three are committed Euro-Atlanticists and have been engaged in a political fight over defense spending sparked when the government's draft budget for 2007 slashed defense expenditures from 2.6% to 2.3% of GDP. After extensive lobbying by the Ambassador and Defense Minister, parliamentarians and Finance Minister Plamen Oresharski now tell us that the coalition has agreed in principle to increase defense funding to 2.5% of GDP, but is still debating how to get there. NOTE: While Bulgarian expenditures are impressive in percentage terms, Bulgaria's low GDP per capita means that the defense budget is small in real terms. We continue to advise the GOB that both the quantity and quality of defense expenditures are important as Bulgaria struggles to meet the competing demands of modernizing equipment, professionalizing the services and deploying overseas. END NOTE. Afghanistan -------------- ¶3. (C) Current planning at the MOD calls for Bulgaria's deployment of 150 troops in Afghanistan to rise to approximately 200 in 2007 as Bulgarian forces wrap up their Kabul Airport management mission and take the place of Hungarian forces who will redeploy in a PRT. Defense Minister Bliznakov and MFA contacts (including Deputy Foreign Ministers) have repeatedly told us of their strong desire to lift caveats on their forces, emphasizing that equipment and training -- not politics -- are the obstacle and that they are trying hard to find the necessary resources. Bulgarian thinking on a PRT appears to be moving in the right direction. On October 26, Defense Minister Bliznakov told us that Bulgaria felt unprepared for a PRT (ref. A). On November 17, however, MOD Defense Policy Director Col. Ivan Milanov stated that he views a Bulgarian PRT as inevitable and that the MOD is studying participation in the Hungarian PRT in Pol-e Khomri. Enlargement/PfP -------------- ¶4. (C) Bulgaria's view on expanded membership in Partnership for Peace is closely tied to its "regional approach" toward the Western Balkans. According to MFA NATO Director Asia Davidova, Bulgaria is on board with our Kosovo policy, and understands our concerns over conditionality, but fears the consequences of any instability in neighboring Serbia and Macedonia. With this in mind, Davidova said, the GOB views "conditional PfP" for Serbia and Bosnia as essential to ensuring stability in the region in the wake of Kosovo final status. ¶5. (C) Bulgaria's regional approach extends to the Adriatic Charter nations as well. Bulgaria actively supports the NATO aspirations of all three countries, and is particularly involved in supporting military reform efforts in Macedonia. While supportive of President Bush's recent statement on Croatian membership in 2008, Davidova argued that all A3 countries should be given "equal encouragement" at Riga as SOFIA 00001597 002 OF 002 well as individualized, standards-based assessments to emphasize that membership depends on concrete progress. ¶6. (C) Davidova emphasized that Bulgaria will continue its role as NATO contact point embassy in Tbilisi, and remains a strong supporter of Intensified Dialogue for Georgia. She cautioned, however, that with such support came a Georgian responsibility to redouble efforts at democratic reform and peaceful resolution of frozen conflicts. On Ukraine, Davidova admitted to being confused by "mixed signals" from Kyiv on interest in a Membership Action Plan (ref. B). Bulgaria is open to engaging Ukraine, she said, but Kyiv must first decide what it wants. Davidova noted with concern that the issues of public support Ukraine is dealing with never arose during the candidacy of countries like Bulgaria. Partnership and Training -------------- ¶7. (C) According to Davidova, Bulgaria supports the U.S. view on global partnership, and favors opening the PfP toolbox to partners such as Australia and Japan. On training, the Bulgarian view is less defined -- the GOB is prepared to consider participation in a Mobile Training Team, but does not have a strong opinion on proposals for a permanent training center. Black Sea -------------- ¶8. (C) Bulgaria has long favored a stronger role for NATO in Black Sea security, preferably through an expansion of Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) to the Black Sea. The recent visit of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen to Bulgaria (ref. C) highlighted Bulgaria's emerging Black Sea Policy, which views NATO and the EU as instruments to advance the views of smaller littoral states such as Bulgaria in the face of what it sees as excessive Russian and Turkish influence in Black Sea affairs. Comment: Getting to yes on Afghanistan -------------- ¶9. (C) Bulgaria's leaders have taken tough political decisions (e.g., on the defense budget) to sustain their commitment to the Alliance. We have engaged them extensively on both caveats and force generation for Afghanistan; however, with a World Bank-estimated per capita GDP of approximately $3400 in 2005, Bulgaria lags behind other Allies in economic punch and faces serious resource restraints on defense. The Bulgarian military lacks armored transports (BG forces had to borrow U.S. HMMWVs for their Iraq infantry deployment in 2003-5) as well as tents, desert uniforms, and other basic equipment. ¶10. (C) If we can "partner" Allies' resources to Bulgaria's political will to lift caveats and accept more ambitious deployments, we believe that we can turn the corner on this key NATO goal. This will take commitments by Allies. We should test the proposition at Riga, and hammer home the point when FM Kalfin visits Washington on December 19. END COMMENT. BEYRLE