Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SOFIA1491
2006-10-26 13:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIAN MOD COMMITTED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO BU 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #1491/01 2991354
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261354Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2739
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001491 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN MOD COMMITTED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,
WORRIED ABOUT BUDGET

REF: SOFIA E-GRAM NO. 4 (10/26/06)

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001491 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO BU SUBJECT: BULGARIAN MOD COMMITTED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, WORRIED ABOUT BUDGET REF: SOFIA E-GRAM NO. 4 (10/26/06) Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an October 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Defense Minister Veselin Bliznakov confirmed the GOB's willingness to extend its current mission in Iraq, and discussed plans to increase the Bulgarian deployment in Afghanistan. He also outlined the challenges the ministry will face if the National Assembly implements proposed cuts to Bulgaria's defense budget, and requested our help in lobbying the government to keep its NATO commitment of spending 2.6% of GDP on defense. END SUMMARY. FORWARD-LEANING ON IRAQ... -------------- ¶2. (C) Bliznakov and his deputy, Sonia Yankulova, were confident in the Bulgarian government's willingness to extend the military's current mission at Camp Ashraf in Iraq after their current mission expires in March 2007. In their words, planning for an extended mission has already begun, and the government is only awaiting approval of an extended UN mandate before making the decision official. ...BUT NOT READY FOR AFGHAN PRT -------------- ¶3. (C) On Afghanistan, the Minister confirmed reports that Bulgaria plans to send an additional company to Afghanistan in 2007. These troops would be placed under Italian command, taking the place of Hungarian forces who will be departing to join a PRT. Bliznakov demurred on the question of a future Bulgarian PRT. The MoD could provide the military component, he said, but "these teams demand other capabilities which we do not have," including equipment, logistics, and appropriately-trained civilian personnel. ¶4. (C) In fact, Bliznakov continued, even the more modest additional deployment proposed by Bulgaria could be cast into doubt unless outstanding defense procurement issues were quickly resolved. He referred in particular to the GOB's contract with Daimler Chrysler for jeeps, which is currently on hold due to a dispute with the Ministry of Energy and Economy over offset investments. Bliznakov argued that failure to resolve this issue could derail a future Afghan deployment, as Bulgarian troops would rely on these vehicles for mobility. Deploying without appropriate transport would be senseless, he said, as the troops would have to
be subject to such severe national caveats as to be almost useless. ¶5. (C) Further to the issue of caveats, Bliznakov and Yankulova acknowledged SG de Hoop Scheffer's call for Allies to eliminate national caveats, and announced that they were looking at ways of doing so. The chief obstacle was not national will, they said, but making sure their forces were prepared and equipped for any contingency. HEADING TO RIGA "WITH HANDS TIED" -------------- ¶6. (C) Looking toward the upcoming NATO Summit in Riga, Bliznakov lamented the lack of coordination between the NATO summit schedule and national budget cycles, complaining that decisions affecting the next two years would be taken, but that budgets would already be set -- effectively tying the GOB's hands. ¶7. (C) Bliznakov outlined budget discussions currently under way in the National Assembly, saying that a cut in defense spending from 2.6% to 2.28% of GDP was currently being discussed. (NOTE: While greater as a percentage of GDP than many NATO Allies, 2.28% of Bulgarian GDP would amount to little more than $600m annually -- sufficiently low to stall foreign deployments and make meaningful defense procurement impossible. END NOTE.) Bliznakov intends to use an appearance before Parliament during the week of Oct. 30 to press opposition parties and coalition partners alike on the importance of meeting Bulgaria's NATO commitments and maintaining expenditures at the 2.6% level. ¶8. (C) The Minister, a representative of the center-right National Movement for Simeon the Second (NMSS) said that he had "the full support" of his party on the issue, and that he expected support from right-wing opposition parties as well. The position of fellow coalition members in the Bulgarian SOFIA 00001491 002 OF 002 Socialist Party (BSP) and ethnic-Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) remained an open question -- while the BSP Prime Minister had recently agreed to negotiate a multi-year plan for Bulgarian deployments abroad, the plan was wishful thinking unless sufficient funds were allocated. Bliznakov said he did not intend to rock the coalition's boat on this issue, but invoked a Bulgarian expression: "clean accounts, good friends." ¶9. (C) The Ambassador responded that we would not get involved in the coalition's internal politics, but that our Allies' defense spending was a matter of U.S. national interest as well. In that spirit, we would be making the case for 2.6% at the highest levels of the government and parliamentary leadership. SLOW AND STEADY PROCESS ON JOINT BASES -------------- ¶10. (C) Bliznakov praised the results of a recent poll (ref.) showing a dramatic decline in opposition to joint bases, and announced the appointment of highly-regarded Deputy Minister Yankulova as coordinator for negotiation of Implementing Arrangements to the Defense Cooperation Agreement. ¶11. (C) On the issue of fighter aircraft procurement, Bliznakov indicated that the ministry's budget woes would make this a back-burner issue for the time being. While the Bulgarian Air Force has previously scoffed at the idea of replacing Bulgaria's aging MiGs with used aircraft, the Minister indicated for the first time that used F-16s were an option they were willing to consider. In Deputy Minister Yankulova's words, "the General Staff's preference (for new aircraft) is clear, but both options are possible." COMMENT: -------------- ¶12. (C) The Ministry of Defense has been a consistent supporter of Bulgaria's engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, though perhaps a bit skittish about taking off the training wheels in an Afghan PRT. The budget obstacles they face are serious, and we are serious about pushing the government to maintain current levels of spending. There may be a silver lining to this scare, however, if a budgetary reality check forces the GOB to look more critically at defense procurement. Our experts have long advised the Bulgarian military that money spent on high-profile, high-dollar projects would be better invested in boots and tents. The encouraging results of recent polling shows that our investment in public diplomacy outreach is paying off -- we will redouble our efforts as we move through final negotiations and look to the "proof of principle" deployment in summer 2007. BEYRLE

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