SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROSEMARY DICARLO'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001273 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR FOR DAS DICARLO E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK KPKO SR YI EU BU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROSEMARY DICARLO'S VISIT TO SOFIA REF: A. SOFIA 783 ¶B. 05 SOFIA 1945 ¶C. SOFIA 557 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Two issues dominate Bulgaria's political scene and calendar: a final verdict on EU accession, framed by the September 26 European Commission report on Bulgaria's readiness for membership; and Bulgaria's October 22 Presidential election. Seized by these two overlapping events, the Bulgarian government and the political class are subordinating other policy considerations to demonstrating Bulgaria's international credibility, reliability, and regional leadership. By hosting the Contact Group, Bulgaria looks to burnish its credentials with the EU and U.S. (as well as Russia),and assert itself as a force for regional security and prosperity, especially for neighboring Serbia and Macedonia. Your meetings will provide the compass point for Bulgaria as we help it pursue a policy more forcefully constructive to U.S. strategic goals. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Much of the Bulgarian public will look past the September 11-12 Contact Group meetings to focus instead on the September 26 European Commission report on Bulgaria's EU membership. Prospective EU membership has moderated Bulgaria's view on Kosovo final status. Even more telling has been the Bulgarians' willingness, in broad measure, to line up solidly behind us on key foreign policy issues as they burnish their transatlantic credentials. Bulgaria will continue to look to us to set the direction and pace on Kosovo decisions. ¶3. (SBU) The October 22 Presidential election may complicate the political calculus. Leftist, pro-U.S. incumbent Georgi Parvanov has announced his candidacy for re-election and currently enjoys a comfortable lead in opinion polls. Though the center-right is divided (perhaps even in disarray), Parvanov is not taking re-election for granted. Powerful and charismatic Sofia mayor Borisov lurks as a possible last-minute candidate, unsettling all election prognostications. Still, one thing is clear: all candidates have eyes firmly set on how foreign policy decisions will play domestically. ¶4. (C) During recent meetings, President Parvanov and PM Stanishev have both stated their support for the Ahtisaari-led process and recognized the inevitability of an independent Kosovo. Foreign Minister Ivaylo Kalfin (the formal host of the Contact Group meeting) has also told us that the positions of the U.S. and Bulgaria on Kosovo are extremely close. Sensitive to regional politics, Bulgarian leaders have stressed that Serbia should be offered a face-saving solution, including possible fast-tracked membership in NATO and the EU as part of its acceptance of Kosovo independence. Other, lower-profile Bulgarian suggestions for potential sweeteners to an eventual settlement have included infrastructure improvements (particularly projects that would also benefit Bulgaria). ¶5. (SBU) Bulgaria has strong bilateral relations with both Serbia and the Kosovar leadership, contributing to its reputation as an honest broker in the region. Bulgarian Minister of Culture Stefan Danailov has facilitated meetings between his Serbian and Kosovar counterparts, while Bulgaria has trained Kosovar diplomats at its Diplomatic Academy and held workshops for Kosovar judges. Bulgarian troops are currently participating in NATO and EU peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. CUE SOFIA TO NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶6. (C) The Bulgarian government, while not enthusiastic about an independent Kosovo, is on board. Public opinion, on the other hand, is more pro-Serb. The government's chief concerns relate to rule of law in Kosovo and a possible radicalization of Serbian politics following final status. It also fears a spillover of any resulting instability into neighboring Macedonia, which would have a direct impact on Bulgaria. Following the April signing of a Defense Cooperation Agreement allowing for the stationing of U.S. forces in Bulgaria, many in the GOB are eager for a more intensive strategic dialogue with the U.S. to complement our enhanced security relationship. They want to be heard (and to be seen as consulting with the U.S.). ¶7. (C) To draw the Bulgarians even closer to us, you should underscore that we value their advice and support -- encourage them publicly and privately to back us and the Contact Group more forcefully, and to use their influence in SOFIA 00001273 002 OF 002 Belgrade to instill realism about Serbia's future. BEYRLE