MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS DICARLO'S VISITTO SKOPJE,

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 04 SKOPJE 000983 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER AND DAS DICARLO) SARAJEVO PLS PASS TO DAS DICARLO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016 BY STEPHEN A. HUBLER REASON 1.4 (b,d) TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS DICARLO'S VISITTO SKOPJE, OCTOBER 22-25REF: SKOPJE 953CORE MESSAGES ¶1. (U) Your visit comes at the right time, two months into the new VMRO-DPMNE-led government of PM Gruevski, to deliver the following core messages to the government and opposition: Government: --Need broad consultations and consensus-building with DUI and opposition parties on key legislation and implementation of reforms. Need genuine will on both sides to reach compromise, not just meeting and talking without results. --Demonstrate through results your commitment to Framework Agreement (FWA) implementation, in close consultation with opposition parties and parties not in government (DUI). --Need broad political consensus now to implement your ambitious economic growth and reform agenda and to fulfill key criteria for NATO and EU membership, including combating corruption and strengthening rule of law in a balanced, non-partisan manner. --The PM is responsible for ensuring coalition partners play as members of one team -- individual efforts not coordinated within the government can derail talks with opposition and delay reforms. Opposition/Party Not in Government (DUI): --Need to play constructive, positive role as opposition. The country needs a loyal opposition, not efforts to undermine the government and delay reform efforts. --Genuine dialogue and willingness to compromise are essential if opposition expects government to include it in consultation and consensus-building process. --Strong opposition is healthy for democracy, but any suggestion that failure to reach compromises on important legislation will jeopardize political stability or lead to violence is unacceptable. POLITICAL CONTEXT -- DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD, BUT WHAT IS THE END GAME? ¶2. (SBU/NF) You arrive in Skopje nearly 60 days after the new government was sworn-in on August 26. In those two months, the government has implemented little of its ambitious legislative and economic growth agenda. Part of the reason for that is the government's inability so far to work effectively with the ethnic Albanian DUI party, led by Ali Ahmeti, which won the majority of eAlbanian votes in the July parliamentary elections but was not included in the governing coalition. (Having won the majority of eAlbanian votes, DUI considers itself "out of government" but not in the opposition.) In addition, the government has failed to rein in its eAlbanian DPA coalition partner, whose ministers have engaged in haphazard, poorly-coordinated actions, some of which targeted DUI supporters and further alienated DUI leaders. Ahmeti and other DUI leaders believe DPA's intent is to destroy DUI as a political force. Also hampering progress is the fact that the government has dismissed or downgraded many civil servants, and has not yet replaced them, or has replaced them with neophytes. ¶3. (SBU/NF) There have been recent efforts by the VMRO-DPMNE-led government and DUI to discuss their differences, in a variety of settings (reftel),but the dialogue has not produced any practical positive results. The GOM needs to acknowledge that it must work differently with DUI, which, given its eAlbanian majority support, cannot be considered just a "typical" opposition party. Consultation and compromise with DUI on key legislative initiatives, especially those related to the FWA, must begin early on, and the government should demonstrate flexibility and generosity in reaching consensus on those initiatives; that has not been the case so far. At the same time, DUI needs to show it can engage in genuine dialogue and is prepared to reach compromises before negotiations conclude; it cannot assume it has veto power over legislative proposals. SKOPJE 00000983 002 OF 004 DRAFT POLICE LAW -- LITMUS TEST ¶4. (SBU/NF) The government has been debating for the past several weeks a draft police law intended to enhance the professionalism of the police and implement FWA provisions for the selection of municipal police chiefs. The draft law was originally compiled by the former SDSM-led government, and SDSM (now in opposition) initially indicated it would support the law. I was not put to a vote under the previous government because there was no agreement with DUI on key elements of the bill. When the new government took up the bill, DUI complained that Gruevski did not intend to pass the law with a qualified (Badinter) majority. Ahmeti said the party either would boycott the vote or would vote against the legislation (reftel). ¶5. (SBU/NF) Eventually, DPA suggested two DUI-backed amendments -- one that would reduce the number of years required to qualify for nomination as a police chief (opening more opportunities to eAlbanian police),and another amendment proposing the addition of a ninth regional police district headquartered in the eAlbanian-dominated city of Struga. DUI had pressed for both amendments when it was in earlier in government. SDSM immediately objected to the latter amendment. Fearing the loss of SDSM support, the government immediately allowed DPA to withdraw the Struga amendment, irritating DUI in the process. ¶6. (SBU/NF) Since then, there have been confidential discussions between DUI and government representatives on the police law, but without concrete results. DUI claims the government is not negotiating in good faith, while the government accuses DUI of submitting frivolous amendments to the law that would not improve policing. DUI would like to see an amended law that, inter alia, would enhance external oversight of police action and eliminate regional police districts as unnecessary layers of authority between the central government and municipalities. The government has responded that those changes could be incorporated into the implementing by-laws of the final legislation, but does not want to make any changes to the existing draft law. DUI fears this is a GOM tactic and that once the law passes the GOM will not necessarily implement its pledge to include the DUI recommendations in the by-laws. ¶7. (SBU/NF) Whether the government and DUI can reach some sort of modus vivendi on the draft law before it goes to a vote is likely to determine, to a large extent, whether they can move on to dealing with other issues in a positive, constructive manner. If DUI feels its concerns are completely overlooked in passing the legislation, it may feel pressured to take action that could be politically destabilizing. We should firmly and clearly let Ahmeti know that such an approach is both unconstructive and unacceptable. At the same time, we should tell the GOM that it must publicly commit to including DUI's requested changes to the police law in the implementing by-laws, and should implement those changes in short order. FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION -- MISSION NOT YET ACCOMPLISHED ¶8. (SBU) The new government has on more than one occasion tried to claim that FWA implementation is complete. In fact, all FWA-related legislative requirements have been met. Implementation of decentralization and equitable representation are proceeding well but are in the initial stages only. Moreover, FWA-related requirements -- including the police law and a law on languages -- remain to be completed. Both DUI and DPA believe there is still much to do before the FWA chapter can be closed; DPA leader Arben Xhaferi has even stated that the government needs to go beyond the FWA in meeting eAlbanian demands. The government needs to be reminded that FWA implementation is not a closed chapter; it must demonstrate results in implementing FWA-related reforms, including decentralization and equitable representation. NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP -- REFORMS MUTUALLY REINFORCING ¶9. (SBU) The government has stated its commitment to NATO and SKOPJE 00000983 003 OF 004 EU membership as top foreign policy priorities, and is supported by opinion polls showing 90 percent or higher public support for membership in both organizations. Nevertheless, the impasse with DUI over the police law, and the government's general inability to manage effectively intra-coalition and government-opposition relations, have hampered progress on the rule of law, judicial reform, and other political and economic criteria Macedonia needs to fulfill to be considered a strong candidate for membership in either organization. ¶10. (SBU) Macedonia could be a strong candidate for a NATO invitation at the next enlargement summit. The government is hoping for positive language at Riga recognizing its achievements and indicating that enlargement will be a topic at any 2008 summit. Government interlocutors need to hear that, in order to achieve those goals, they must work with DUI to overcome the current impasse, and must find a mechanism for building broad consensus with other opposition members for economic and other reforms. In addition, the government must avoid using its declared commitment to fight corruption as cover for launching witch hunts against members of the former government. ¶11. (SBU) Although Macedonia received EU candidate status last December, it is unlikely to receive the invitation it hopes for from the EU to begin accession negotiations in ¶2007. The government will receive an assessment from the EU in November on its progress in meeting the EU acquis; that assessment is likely to point to the current standoff with DUI, lackluster results in combating corruption, and slow progress in implementing judicial reforms as some of the main reasons for not beginning accession negotiations next year. KOSOVO FINAL STATUS -- KEEPING BORDER DEMARCATION OFF THE FRONT PAGE ¶12. (U) The government's official position on Kosovo final status has been closely aligned with ours -- support for Ahtisaari and the Contact Group, for a settlement by the end of the year, and resolution of the demarcation issue in the context of a final status settlement. PM Ceku visited Skopje shortly after the Gruevski government took office, Deputy Prime Minister Selmani (DPA) recently led a small delegation to Pristina, and PM Gruevski plans to visit Kosovo in early ¶2007. ¶13. (SBU/NF) Despite these positive indications, however, some GOM officials have been off-message on the border demarcation issue, and on a final status outcome (Selmani reportedly said in Pristina that the US and EU should resolve the final status issue). The government needs to hear yet again that it should avoid discussing these issues in the media, but that, if its officials do so, they need to ensure they speak in one voice and deliver only messages consistent with the GOM's official policy. ¶14. (SBU/NF) MFA contacts recently told us that they are developing language they think should be included in a Kosovo final status settlement that would specify in greater detail how the border demarcation issue should be resolved. FM Milososki likely will run that language by you for reaction. They have not shared a draft of the proposed language with us, but we suspect it will reference, perhaps indirectly, the 2001 Skopje-Belgrade border accord and the need for demarcation to proceed in accordance with that agreement. NAME DISPUTE -- CONTINUED UN PROCESS, BUT NO RESOLUTION ON THE HORIZON ¶15. (SBU/NF) The government has reiterated its "dual name" formula as the basis for further discussions with the Greek government on the name dispute, and has indicated willingness to proceed on that basis with negotiations under UN auspices mediated by Ambassador Nimetz. Nimetz is expected to visit Skopje in November, but MFA interlocutors do not expect any major developments in the discussions this year. ECONOMIC GROWTH -- NEED STABLE POLITICAL BASE SKOPJE 00000983 004 OF 004 ¶16. (SBU) When he first came to office, PM Gruevski called for a moratorium on inter-ethnic issues so as to allow the government to focus on its top-priority economic growth goal. That position disregarded the fact that political stability has helped to undergird Macedonia's recent economic growth and will be necessary for the economy to reach the 6-8 percent annual GDP growth targets the government has set for itself. ¶17. (SBU/NF) The macro-economic climate remains positive, with low inflation and a stable exchange rate, and a US firm (Johnson Controls) recently broke ground for the first major greenfield investment in Macedonia's free trade zone near Skopje. Nevertheless, Gruevski needs to accept and fully internalize that there can be no economic growth without the political stability that will accompany improved inter-ethnic relations. UNGA PRESIDENCY CANDIDATE SRDJAN KERIM ¶18. (SBU) Macedonia has proposed former foreign minister Srdjan Kerim as a candidate for the UNGA Presidency in 2007-2008. Kerim had a distinguished diplomatic career in the former Yugoslavia and in the early days of Macedonia's independence. He currently works as general director of a local media consortium that is a member of the German WAZ group. MFA officials have told us that only two other countries, Georgia and Armenia, may propose candidates, and FM Milososki might ask you for USG support for Kerim. We sent Kerim's bio data to USUN for information, but have reminded MFA contacts that we do not commit in advance to support such candidates. MILOVANOVIC