Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SKOPJE1120
2006-11-28 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: US-EU EFFORT BRINGS PARTIES TOGETHER

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #1120/01 3321510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281510Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5463
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 001120 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: US-EU EFFORT BRINGS PARTIES TOGETHER
FOR SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE

REF: A. SKOPJE 880

B. SKOPJE 983

C. SKOPJE 1017

D. SKOPJE 1037

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 001120 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: US-EU EFFORT BRINGS PARTIES TOGETHER FOR SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE REF: A. SKOPJE 880 ¶B. SKOPJE 983 ¶C. SKOPJE 1017 ¶D. SKOPJE 1037 Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D). SUMMARY ¶1. (C) After weeks of U.S. and EU coaxing, the leaders of the four main parties in Macedonia met on November 27 for their first substantive talks on legislative and policy priorities since the new government took office in late August. The party leaders outlined some of their key priorities and agreed to meet again in early December to discuss a process for moving forward on Macedonia's NATO and EU membership reform agenda. The talks represent a small step forward toward more consensus-building engagement among the parties, especially between the government and opposition DUI. The chances for success in future discussions will be enhanced if DUI can be convinced in the meantime to accept its role as a constructive opposition party, and the government is persuaded to give DUI the political space it needs and deserves (as the biggest eAlbanian party) to influence positively Macedonia's reform agenda. GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION FINALLY AGREE TO TALKS ON NATO AND EU INTEGRATION ¶2. (SBU) After weeks of U.S. and EU coaxing, leaders of Macedonia's four main parties finally met November 27 in Skopje for their first substantive talks on legislative and policy priorities since the VMRO-DPMNE-led inter-ethnic coalition government was sworn-in on August 26. PM Gruevski and MOI Jankulovska headed the VMRO-DPMNE team, followed by eAlbanian governing coalition partner DPA's President Xhaferi and VP Thaci. The opposition side was represented by eAlbanian opposition DUI's Ali Ahmeti and VP Arifi. Newly-elected leader of the opposition SDSM Sekerinska and VP Makraduli also participated. The Ambassador moderated the 2.5 hour meeting, for which we prepared the agenda; EUSR Fouere was co-moderator. TIME TO OVERCOME PARTY DIFFERENCES TO FOCUS ON NATO AND EU REFORMS ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador outlined the goals of the meeting and welcomed the participation of the key party leaders. She congratulated the parties for constructive compromises the previous week that had avoided creating inter-ethnic tensions over the unveiling of a statue of the 15th century Albanian hero Skend
erbeg in a predominantly eAlbanian suburb of Skopje. PM Gruevski stressed that it was "time to overcome party differences" and to work on implementing NATO and EU reforms. He asked the opposition to work with the GOM to pass and implement key legislative priorities, including draft laws on a public prosecutor, and on religious communities. BADINTER VOTING KEY FOR DUI ¶4. (C) DUI's Ahmeti underscored that constructive dialogue was the only way to advance Macedonia's EU and NATO aspirations; lack thereof would only "deepen the political crisis" in the country. He called on the government to respect Badinter (qualified majority) voting on Framework Agreement-related laws, and recited a list of legislative and policy priorities for DUI, including a language law and law on the status of former NLA (insurgent group) members. He also challenged the composition of the parliamentary committee charged with determining whether laws require a Badinter vote and called for it to be disbanded. If the parties did not resolve that issue, DUI would not support constructive action on other legislative priorities. SDSM: RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH COULD WORK ¶5. (C) SDSM underscored the importance of using the talks to achieve concrete results, and to build confidence and trust among the four parties. Sekerinska said she believed there was political will to achieve results. In the spirit of constructive opposition, she said SDSM would support the SKOPJE 00001120 002 OF 003 government's reform efforts that focused on FWA implementation, combating corruption, and improved political relations. ¶6. (C) Sekerinska warned the government, however, against trying to build an artificial legislative minority by "shopping" for smaller parties that currently were a part of the opposition. She also cautioned against manipulating the draft parliamentary rulebook to limit the opposition's ability to participate in plenary debates. It would be easy for the opposition to oppose draft legislation if the government did not allow adequate debate time. DPA: THE BLAME FALLS SQUARELY ON DUI ¶7. (C) Placing the blame squarely on DUI for the lack of legislative and policy progress in the government's first 100 days, DPA leader Xhaferi said DUI had treated the lack of constructive dialogue until now "as an abstract issue." The current crisis had sprung, he said, from DUI's resentment over its exclusion from the government. Calling the Badinter principle a "pillar of DPA policy," Xhaferi urged consensual democracy as the way to move ahead on Macedonia's reform agenda. ¶8. (C) DPA VP Thaci defined Badinter, according to strict intepretation of the FWA, as requiring a vote of a majority of non-Macedonian MPs. He stressed that a valid Badinter vote did not require a majority of eAlbanian MPs, if other minority MPs (Turks, Serbs, Vlachs) were sufficient to form a majority with other eAlbanian MPs in the Parliament. (Comment: Although Thaci's interpretation is correct if one adheres only to the letter of the FWA, it clearly is at odds with the spirit of that agreement. The FWA was developed to ensure that eAlbanians and/and other ethnic minority groups would have a decisive voice in matters affecting them. End Comment.) NEXT STEPS -- A PROCESS FOR MOVING FORWARD ON LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY PRIORITIES ¶9. (SBU) Summarizing the meeting, the Ambassador called for a second meeting in early December with a clear agenda compiled by the four parties. The parties would discuss directly how to move forward on that agenda, with a view to formalizing a process for consultation and consensus-building. The agenda would consist of two or three priority issues, with a follow-on meeting later in the month or the month following to discuss additional items. The participants agreed. ¶10. (C) PM Gruevski asked if the parties would consider meeting without US and EU participation. DUI's Ahmeti objected, stressing that there were no prospects for success without International Community (IC) engagement. The Ambassador suggested, as a compromise, meeting once more with IC participation, and then deciding whether to continue subsequent meetings in that format. Participants agreed. They also approved a joint press statement, drafted by the U.S. and EU, that outlined in general terms the purpose of the meeting. GENESIS OF DIALOGUE -- ON THE PATH TO CONSENSUS ¶11. (SBU) We have been pressing the government and opposition to show greater flexibility in opening and maintaining channels of dialogue, with the goal of achieving consensus on the reform agenda required for Macedonia's NATO and EU aspirations, since the government took office in late August. The Ambassador raised with PM Gruevski and FM Milososki in early September the need for redoubled efforts to engage in constructive dialogue with DUI (ref A). Both assured her they would "work to build bridges" with the opposition. Those initial efforts led to a U.S.-brokered private meeting October 5 between Gruevski and Ahmeti on the draft law on police (ref B),their first-ever face-to-face meeting, in which they gauged each other's intentions and agreed to continue efforts to build dialogue. ¶12. (C) We followed the Gruevski-Ahmeti encounter a few days afterwards with an informal lunch with the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI VPs to press for further leadership talks, a message reinforced in mid-October by EUR/SCE Director Hoh (ref C) and SKOPJE 00001120 003 OF 003 by DAS DiCarlo during her late October visit (ref D.) When several attempts, including one co-sponsored by the local NATO and EU missions, failed to bring the political leadership together for constructive talks in a public forum, it became evident that a successful dialogue would require U.S. and EU initiative to bring them together in a private meeting. COMMENT ¶13. (C) The November 27 meeting marks a small but significant step forward in moving the parties toward more consensus-building engagement. After the failed public attempts of the parties to come together to demonstrate, albeit superficially, that there was a political will for dialogue, it took the US and EU coaxing, together with careful spadework to ensure the event would not become a glaring media event, to get the leaders to engage in substantive discussions. ¶14. (C) The tone of the discussion was civil. No heated exchanges took place and both Ahmeti and Xhaferi were uncharacteristically silent through much of the meeting. After the meeting ended, Ahmeti and Thaci, sworn enemies in the public eye, engaged in a 30-minute private discussion in a corner of the room. If the two main ethnic Albanian parties can continue talking constructively, 50 percent of the battle will have been won. The other 50 percent will consist of getting DUI to accept its role as constructive opposition, and in getting Gruevski to recognize that he must rein in DPA's efforts to cripple DUI as a political force, and must give DUI political space in which to have its concerns heard, if he hopes to advance Macedonia's NATO and EU reform agenda. MILOVANOVIC

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