SINGAPORE'S RESPONSE TO U.S. STATEMENT ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SINGAPORE 001795 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/IR E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SN SUBJECT: SINGAPORE'S RESPONSE TO U.S. STATEMENT ON IRAN REF: A. STATE 87682 ¶B. STATE 89325 Classified By: Economic/Political Counselor Laurent D. Charbonnet for r easons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On June 1, the Economic and Political Counselor called on Tan Yee Woan, Director of the International Organisations Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss Secretary Rice's May 31 statement on Iran. Tan expressed interest in the United States' new approach, and asked for further details on the benefits the United States is offering Iran. She also offered insight into the dynamics of the recent NAM conference and urged the EU and the United States to strengthen their outreach to non-aligned countries. End summary. ¶2. (C) Per reftel, EPCouns outlined the United States' offer to join the EU3's negotiations with Iran if Iran verifiably ceases its enrichment activities, emphasizing that the benefits of these negotiations could go beyond civil nuclear energy and include greater economic cooperation; he urged Singapore to publicly support this initiative. Tan welcomed this new approach, but asked what specific benefits the United States was offering, particularly with regard to the EU3's earlier offer of a light water reactor. Tan urged the United States to be as specific as possible with regard to the technology we are offering, as it was not nuclear energy per se, but access to technology that is at issue in the NAM. She said that Iran's tactic in the NAM has been to convince developing countries that the United States and the EU are treating them as "second class citizens" by denying them access to the nuclear technology that is their "right." Being clear about the technology we are offering, Tan said, could allay some of these concerns. ¶3. (C) Tan, who had attended the NAM conference in Putrajaya, Malaysia as a part of the Singapore delegation headed by MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan, noted that Iran's efforts to emphasize the right to nuclear technology without reference to related obligations had been clearly reflected in the NAM statement. She noted that Singapore had been surprised that the many countries who expressed dissatisfaction with the statement in the corridors had failed to speak up during the meeting, despite the fact that several had voted for the February 4th IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) resolution on Iran or were aligned with the United States. Specifically, she mentioned: -- Egypt: despite having voted for the BOG resolution, Egypt made several comments in favor of Iran and stated that any country trying to inject balance into the statement was "not helpful." -- Indonesia: the Indonesian delegation was largely silent, except for encouraging the NAM to not deviate from the Vienna position. -- Zambia: argued that any proposal made by only one country (e.g., Singapore) should be excised. -- South Africa: stated that any delegation trying to change or "balance" the NAM statement in Vienna was "negotiating in bad faith." -- India and Pakistan: only made statements emphasizing that any obligations under the NPT apply only to states parties. -- Ghana: while Ghana privately acknowledged difficulties with the text, their delegation told the Singaporeans they were unwilling to argue publicly with South Africa, but would speak with them in private. However, Tan noted, if they did privately try to convince South Africa, it had little effect. -- Chile and Peru: showed up only to declare that they did not support a NAM statement on Iran, then left. -- Jamaica: was initially helpful, but seemed to change their position mid-stream. Tan said it was not clear if they had gotten new instructions from their capital, or if they had just noted the lack of support for Singapore's position and decided to back off. When Singapore told Jamaica of their intention to issue an explanation of vote, Jamaica initially indicated they would do the same, but ultimately did not. -- Malaysia: Tan said that the Malaysians had been somewhat helpful during the negotiation of the text, but seemed unwilling to check or contradict the Iranians. For example, the Malaysians had told the Singapore delegation that Iran had asked them and the NAM troika to initiate the statement, but did not contradict the Iranian delegation in the meeting when it stated that the statement was not Iran's idea. Also, the Malaysian chair had agreed to give Singapore the floor to make a statement explaining their vote after the adoption of the statement, but when the time came, pointedly ignored the Singapore delegation until it vociferously demanded the floor. ¶4. (C) Tan expressed frustration that NAM countries had allowed such a statement, which implies consensus within the NAM -- except for Singapore -- when this is far from the case. Such a statement also bolsters Iran's efforts to make this about the West's supposed efforts to deny the developing world access to technology, which will make progress on our nonproliferation goals harder. The European Union and the United States need to make a more sustained and concerted effort to talk to the members of the NAM, she argued. Most members of the NAM do not care about legal obligations, she noted -- these countries sign onto all sorts of treaties and agreements with no real intention of implementing them. Many also do not want to be seen as not supporting another NAM member. Despite this, she said, many NAM members are not supportive of Iran, and could have been persuaded to do the right thing, had they been pushed. Tan noted, for example, that she had received our demarche on the NAM statement only two or three days prior to the NAM meeting in Malaysia, which is far too little notice, particularly given that some NAM delegations would have already left their capitals for Malaysia at that time. She urged the United States and the EU to be more active in working this issue with the developing world. HERBOLD