SCENESETTER FOR COMMERCE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

UNCLAS SINGAPORE 001530 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR A/S DARRYL JACKSON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETTC PREL ETRD KSTC SN SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COMMERCE ASSISTANT SECRETARY DARRYL JACKSON'S VISIT TO SINGAPORE ¶1. (SBU) We look forward to your May 23-25 visit to Singapore. Your meetings with key Singapore government officials are an important opportunity to solidify our deepening cooperative relationship on developing and enforcing trade controls and combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their components. Your visit should encourage Singapore to take further steps to expand the scope of its trade control regime to ensure that proliferators and terrorists do not misuse its port. A Strong Partner -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Our bilateral ties with Singapore are at a historical high point -- in particular our security relationship. Counterterrorism cooperation has been especially close. Singapore is also home to a U.S. military logistics hub, and has strongly supported our actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Lee signed the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) to expand our military and counterterrorism ties; the agreement specifically notes the importance of enhanced cooperation on nonproliferation and export controls. ¶3. (SBU) Counterproliferation and export controls are a new and rapidly growing facet to our security relationship. Singapore strongly supports the United States, global nonproliferation agenda and trade security initiatives. It was the first country in the region to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI) (2002) and the Megaports Initiative (2005),and it participates enthusiastically in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Singapore has worked with us in the IAEA Board of Governors to hold Iran accountable for its violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2003 it instituted a new strategic goods control law that imposes controls on a range of sensitive goods and technology, including transshipment cargoes. Since then, our bilateral cooperation on countering proliferation has grown substantially, and Singapore has improved its own enforcement efforts through strengthened regulations, extensive training for its customs and checkpoints officials, and improved cooperation with other countries, including the United States. Next Steps -------------- ¶4. (SBU) While these measures are a vast improvement, the legal framework provided by Singapore's strategic goods control law still falls short of international best practices and has hindered efforts to improve law enforcement cooperation on proliferation matters. Singapore does not yet adhere to key multilateral control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group, and controls only a subset of the items controlled by these regimes. Singapore also does not collect manifest data on transshipment or transit shipments (80 percent of the containers passing through the port) unless they are bound for the United States (under CSI). Law enforcement cooperation is good, but is hampered by the Singapore government's resistance to sharing law enforcement information and the absence of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The United States and Singapore have been discussing an MLAT for four years, but our approaches remain far apart. ¶5. (SBU) Singapore is interested in addressing these shortfalls, and in October 2005 the United States and Singapore held a bilateral dialogue on improving our counterproliferation cooperation. Singapore has stated its intention to improve its export controls and adhere to the multilateral regimes, but has identified several areas where it lacks the technical expertise, experience, or processes necessary to effectively enforce its current -- and eventually expanded -- export control laws. It has asked the United States for assistance in addressing these gaps, particularly in helping licensing enforcement officials better understand nuclear and dual-use commodities, so they can better identify products requiring a license and pursue violations when they occur. ¶6. (SBU) The United States and Singapore have agreed to pursue an aggressive training program -- including programs run by the State Department, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Defense, and the FBI -- for Singapore Customs and other security agencies aimed to improve their ability to understand, recognize, and control Strategic Goods. Singapore officials have been enthusiastic participants in all of the courses offered thus far, and they will be eager to learn from you about how your organization balances the need to control strategic goods with the need to facilitate legitimate trade. They will also benefit from discussions about the actual mechanisms of reviewing and approving license applications. ¶7. (SBU) Themes for your meetings include: -- Exchanging best practices on export control implementation; -- Expanding the scope of Singapore's control laws; -- Improving export control mechanisms; and -- Exploring further areas of cooperation. HERBOLD