SENATOR BOND'S MARCH 20 CALL ON MINISTER OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000935 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS ECON EAID KN KS SUBJECT: SENATOR BOND'S MARCH 20 CALL ON MINISTER OF UNIFICATION LEE JONG-SEOK Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b, d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a March 20 meeting with Senator Christopher "Kit" Bond, ROK Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok underscored the level of importance the ROKG attached to the U.S.-ROK alliance, stressing that Seoul looked to Washington to counterbalance the increasing Chinese influence in the region. Lee explained that the ROK's engagement policy toward the DPRK was aimed at persuading Pyongyang to reform and open its economy. Through inter-Korean economic projects, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),Seoul hoped to check China's growing economic clout in the DPRK. Assuring Senator Bond that the ROK was fully aware of U.S. concerns about potential human rights issues at KIC, Lee said Seoul would cooperate with Washington to address all such concerns, and urged greater U.S. support for the KIC and other inter-Korean projects. Senator Bond expressed appreciation for the bilateral discussions on a U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and for ROKG steps toward lifting the ban on U.S. beef. He called on the ROK to consider the purchase of Boeing's AWACS aircraft, underscoring that interoperability and superior ability to control air space ought to take precedence over price differences. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Lee, warmly welcoming Senator Bond to Korea on his first visit in five years, asked about his impressions of Korea, to which Bond responded by likening Seoul to the U.S.-ROK alliance -- clean, alive, vibrant and growing. Commenting on his meeting with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon (septel),Bond said he respected Ban and, alluding to Ban's UNSYG candidacy, opined that he could serve the international community well in "an appropriate position." Lee expressed gratitude for that point, urging greater support from the United States. . U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE A CORE ROK NATIONAL INTEREST -------------- - ¶3. (C) Lee briefed Senator Bond on his areas of interest both in his capacity as Chair of the National Security Council Standing Committee, as well as Minister of Unification. On the U.S.-ROK alliance, Lee said the bilateral alliance was a core component of the ROK's strategic interests. The alliance helped counterbalance the growing influence of China in the region, especially given the expanding economic ties between Seoul and Beijing. Lee opined that the alliance relationship was an important national interest for the United States as well, and that the alliance might even surpass the U.S.-Japan alliance for its contribution to regional stability in East Asia, in light of traditional animosities toward Japan on the part of other Asian countries. ¶4. (C) Bond said it was noteworthy that, in his lifetime, the United States had fought on the side of the ROK for its independence, and had fought against Japan to prevent its domination of the region. As a government servant, he had to work closely with all players in the region to advance the principles of free markets, democracy, and mutual respect for territorial integrit. He was therefore greatly interested in exploring with ROKG officials individual steps for building on the alliance. . POLICY TOWARD DPRK: GIVE THEM A TASTE OF CAPITALISM -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) On inter-Korea relations, Lee explained that the ROK's policy toward North Korea focused on encouraging the DPRK to reform and open its economy to the outside world. To do so, Seoul sought to expose as many North Koreans as possible to free-market economics through various joint economic projects, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). The deadlock in the Six Party Talks prevented the ROK from proceeding with the projects at full speed, but nevertheless the KIC represented a future vision of what the ROK hoped to do with the DPRK in the process toward reunification. The ROKG began developing the KIC in 2003. The complex, located just a few miles from the DMZ, currently had 11 companies employing 6,000 North Korean workers. Seoul expected to expand the operations to employ roughly 200,000 workers by 2012. Lee said he was confident the KIC would play a big role in giving the North Koreans a taste of capitalism and in changing North Korean views of the ROK. . GROWING CHINESE INFLUENCE IN NORTH KOREA -------------- ¶6. (C) Lee expressed concern that Beijing was using its growing economic relationship with Pyongyang to expand its influence in North Korea beyond economic issues. Although this might be positive in the short term, as it would encourage Pyongyang to reform and open its economy to the outside world, the United States and the ROK should be concerned about the spread of Chinese influence in the long term. Such a development would complicate Seoul's goal of reunifying the Korean Peninsula under democratic, market-oriented principles, negatively affecting American interests. Lee opined that the United States and South Korea potentially stood at a crossroads where actions and policies could decide whether, in ten to fifteen years, Chinese influence would spread as far south as the DMZ or the U.S.-ROK alliance would spread as far north as the Yalu River. He hoped the United States would express greater support for investing in KIC to offset China's large-scale investments in North Korea. ¶7. (C) Senator Bond agreed that China's economic adventures throughout the region were troubling. He had seen firsthand China's willingness to invest in other countries, which had no assurances or controls on how the Chinese money would be spent. This was obviously Beijing's attempt to expand hegemony. Expressing optimism that the United States could provide the necessary counterweight, the Senator nevertheless stressed the importance of cooperating with China to persuade the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks, abandon its nuclear ambitions, recognize human rights, and provide freedom and opportunity for its people. . HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN KAESONG -------------- ¶8. (C) On KIC, Senator Bond noted that human rights advocates were raising concerns about possible "slave labor," similar to those raised in the context of industrial sites just across the U.S.-Mexico border. He acknowledged, however, that the KIC could represent an opportunity to introduce free-market principles to North Korean workers. The Senator hoped that the ROK's intended message would get through to the DPRK. ¶9. (C) Lee agreed that cooperation with China and the other parties to the Six Party Talks in persuading the DPRK was important. To maintain cooperation with China but minimize its influence over North Korea, it was important to maximize the ROK's influence over the DPRK, which naturally required help from the United States. Pointing out that the KIC was situated along an important attack route used by the DPRK during the Korean War, Lee noted that KIC also played a part in ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the ROK understood the U.S. concerns on human rights and would cooperate with the USG to resolve outstanding concerns about North Korean workers in the KIC. . FTA, U.S. BEEF -------------- ¶10. (C) Senator Bond expressed appreciation for the discussions on a U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA),as well as the ROKG's steps toward reopening the Korean market to U.S. beef. The lifting of the beef import ban was a clear example of areas in which free trade benefits all people, as Korean consumers had access to good-quality beef and U.S. producers enjoyed market access and favorable prices. Agricultural issues, as challenging as they were for governments, had significant implications for developed countries like the United States and Korea, since resolving them was necessary for establishing a free and equitable global trading system for developing countries as well. ¶11. (C) Lee responded that the ROKG was firmly committed to an FTA with the United States. The FTA, in addition to offering potential economic gains for both Washington and Seoul, would also round out the bilateral alliance from its traditional focus on political, military and security interests to a more comprehensive relationship. Lee recalled that, during his tenure as Deputy National Security Advisor, he had repeatedly urged President Roh Moo-hyun's economic advisors to lift the ban on U.S. beef quickly. It made no sense for Korean consumers to be denied U.S. beef when the American public, who enjoyed the highest food safety standards in the world, obviously had no problems from consuming U.S. beef. . F-15s, AWACS -------------- ¶12. (C) Senator Bond expressed appreciation for the ROK's recent decision to purchase F-15s, which would greatly strengthen the ROK military's capabilities and enhance interoperability of the U.S. and ROK forces. Interoperability was an important element in considering the transfer of operational control from the Combined Forces Command to the ROK. In this regard, the United States would appreciate Seoul's consideration of purchasing Boeing's AWACS aircraft to enhance interoperability. ¶13. (C) Lee, carefully noting that he was not directly involved in the purchase process, opined that the fundamental problem was cost. He noted from his experience in the NSC that Boeing's AWACS cost up to 60 percent more than the alternative Israeli system. Given that the ROKG had to maintain transparency in its purchases, it was not easy to convince the taxpayers. Lee said he did not deny the superiority of Boeing's product, but many South Koreans believed that the less-sophisticated Israeli product was sufficient for the ROK's defense needs. The Senator urged Lee to consider that the two products were not comparable, that the superiority of Boeing's product was proven in combat situations, whereas the Israeli product was untested, and that the Boeing product was better in terms of interoperability. Cost ought not be the sole criterion. The ROK ought to consider interoperability, the Boeing system's capability to process a combination of information on friendly and hostile assets, and the ability to achieve effective control of airspace. ¶14. (U) Senator Bond has cleared this message. VERSHBOW