GNP ELDERS REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE, FORECAST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000905 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015 TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN SUBJECT: GNP ELDERS REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE, FORECAST VICTORY AT POLLS REF: SEOUL 822 Classified By: DCM Mark C. Minton. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Stressing the primacy of the U.S.-ROK alliance, four elder statesmen of the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) told the DCM March 16 that the alliance's current state of "disrepair" could only be reversed when the GNP retook the Blue House and Kim Jong-il fell. Expressing broad dissatisfaction with President Roh and the ruling Uri Party, they were confident that GNP would prevail in the May 31 local elections and beyond. END SUMMARY. DCM HOSTS FORMER GNP POLICY CHIEFS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The DCM on March 16 hosted a dinner for the following former Grand National Party (GNP) policy chiefs: Lee Kang-too, who is serving his fourth term in the National Assembly; Maeng Hyung-kyu, a leading candidate in the Seoul mayoral race; Lee Sei-kee, a former three-term member of the Assembly and current president of the Korea-China Friendship Association; and Park Sei-hwan, a retired Lieutenant General of the ROK Army and former two-term member of the National Assembly. All are respected senior members of the conservative political establishment. GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S., NEIGHBORS IMPORTANT -------------- ¶3. (SBU) All four veteran lawmakers stressed the centrality of the U.S.-ROK relationship for the ROK's continued prosperity and security. According to Lee Kang-too, the majority of South Koreans understood that a strong relationship with the U.S. was in the interest of the people and the security of the nation. Unfortunately, some Koreans, including those in the Roh administration, undervalued the relationship. The Korean people had not noticed in the early stages of the Roh administration, but now most Koreans had come to the conclusion that Roh's foreign policy was a failure, Lee stated. ¶4. (SBU) Maeng decried President Roh's failure to maintain good relations with neighbors and great powers, specifically blaming him for weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance and destroying the ROK-Japan ties. The ROK needed to pursue a more realistic and practical approach in keeping with the ancient Chinese maxim of "won gyo geun gong," which prescribed good relations with distant powers in order to attack neighbors. Although the ROK had no intention of attacking anyone, Maeng stressed, it was critical for the ROK to have a strong alliance with the United States in order to defend itself against China and Japan. ¶5. (SBU) Responding to the DCM's query as to how to improve the bilateral relationship, Lee Sei-kee stated that the relationship would return to health once the GNP returned to power and the Kim Jong-il regime collapsed, an assertion met with approval by the other three lawmakers. ¶6. (SBU) The DCM expressed appreciation to the group for their strong support for the U.S.-ROK alliance and noted that, despite appearances of strained relations, Seoul and Washington had accomplished much in recent years. Not only had we made progress on modernizing the alliance, we were now working on an FTA, which, if achieved, would be a key element to strengthening U.S.-ROK ties. An FTA would reinforce the value of the relationship by delivering real benefits to both sides, the DCM observed. Lee Sei-kee agreed that the FTA was important, but insisted that the real key to improving the future of the alliance was the return of the GNP coupled with the demise of Kim Jong-il. DPRK COUNTERFEITING -------------- ¶7. (C) Responding to a query from Lee Kang-too, the DCM said that it was difficult to determine the exact dollar amounts involved in the DPRK's counterfeiting activities, but that, as a matter of principle, counterfeiting of any amount of currency was unacceptable. The DCM pointed out that U.S. defensive measures against Banco Delta Asia in Macao had the effect of shutting down the DPRK's entire international financial system, an impact far greater than most people had expected. The counterfeiting issue was now a complex international banking issue, and the DPRK would have to convince not only the United States, but also international banks, that it had stopped counterfeiting currency and that its international financial practices were sound. Satisfying international bankers, predicted the DCM, would be a very difficult undertaking. Lee urged Washington to continue to apply pressure on the DPRK. GNP POSITIONED FOR VICTORY -------------- ¶8. (SBU) All the lawmakers agreed that the GNP was poised for victory in the May 31 regional elections. They also expressed optimism about the party's prospects in the 2007 presidential election. Lee Sei-kee said that the 2002 election had divided typical Korean families, with parents generally voting for the GNP while their children voted for the Uri Party. Now, after three years under the Roh Administration, the younger generation accepted that they deserved to be reprimanded for having put Roh Moo-hyun in the Blue House. In other words, the average Korean had no further illusions about Roh, and now only a small group of extreme leftists supported the president. ¶9. (SBU) Maeng, himself a candidate for the Seoul mayorship, agreed that the overall atmosphere was favorable to the GNP. The local elections would be, in essence, a midterm evaluation for President Roh's performance. President Roh would have difficulty recovering from the scandal that resulted in PM Lee Hae-chan's resignation (reftel) and would be unable to win back the hearts of the people prior to the election. Meanwhile, the GNP had learned from its mistakes in the 2002 presidential race. For example, to remedy its failure then to communicate with young voters, the GNP had invested heavily in its website and other tools to reach "netizens." Maeng boasted that the GNP now had the best website among all the ROK political parties. If the presidential race were held now, he said, he was 100 percent confident that the GNP would win. ¶10. (SBU) Asked about the hostility between the ruling and opposition parties, Lee Kang-too observed that the history of democratic politics in the ROK was relatively short, and the unique situation of the North-South divide made political discourse even more challenging. Jumping in, Maeng said that these characteristics caused ROK politics to be "revolutionary," in that a party that won an election tended to want to vanquish its opponent. For many years those in the ruling party were excluded from politics and felt victimized. Now that these outsiders were in power, others were fearful. A complete lack of communication among the parties in the National Assembly was contributing to this problem, he said. ¶11. (SBU) The DCM noted that over time in a healthy democracy, politics was tempered by power-sharing between those in and out of office. Indeed, it was important that the former opposition party now had an opportunity to govern, as it would help them evolve. Praising the speed and enthusiasm with which the ROK had become a full-fledged democracy, the DCM expressed confidence that Korea's political parties would eventually develop more civil relations among themselves. VERSHBOW