Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL889
2006-03-20 06:55:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

KOREAN TAX REFORMS DRAW FIRE, PASSAGE UNCERTAIN

Tags:  EFIN ECON PGOV KS 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0889/01 0790655
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200655Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6692
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC 1389
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0304
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0386
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1488
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1586
UNCLAS SEOUL 000889 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB, EB/IFD/OMA, EB/TPP/BTA AND EAP/K
TREASURY FOR IA/ISA/DOHNER AND BUCKLEY
PASS USTR FOR CUTLER, AUGEROT AND KI
COMMERCE FOR 4431/ITA/MAC/EAP/MORGAN AND DUTTON
PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR WILSON AND KOHLI
PASS FRB NEW YORK FOR MURRAY AND HILDEBRANDT
PASS FRB SAN FRANCISCO FOR MAYEDA, CARROLL AND BAXENDALE
PARIS FOR USOECD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV KS
SUBJECT: KOREAN TAX REFORMS DRAW FIRE, PASSAGE UNCERTAIN


SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SEOUL 000889 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EB, EB/IFD/OMA, EB/TPP/BTA AND EAP/K TREASURY FOR IA/ISA/DOHNER AND BUCKLEY PASS USTR FOR CUTLER, AUGEROT AND KI COMMERCE FOR 4431/ITA/MAC/EAP/MORGAN AND DUTTON PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR WILSON AND KOHLI PASS FRB NEW YORK FOR MURRAY AND HILDEBRANDT PASS FRB SAN FRANCISCO FOR MAYEDA, CARROLL AND BAXENDALE PARIS FOR USOECD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV KS SUBJECT: KOREAN TAX REFORMS DRAW FIRE, PASSAGE UNCERTAIN SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Korean government introduced ambitious income tax reform legislation in February, proposing to raise certain value-added and excise taxes and tighten individual income tax loopholes favoring the wealthy and self-employed. But the proposals have run up against significant criticism from the public and lawmakers, and with difficult local elections looming on May 31 the ruling Uri Party appealed to the Roh Administration to postpone the controversial plan. At this stage, the National Assembly is expected to consider the tax reform plan in the latter half of this year, at which time the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) will make its best efforts to scuttle the measure. ¶2. (SBU) Some Korean economists fear the proposed tax reforms could dampen consumer sentiment and jeopardize Korea's accelerating, but still fragile and uneven, economic recovery. Self-employed professionals and small business owners, who along with childless individuals and high-income property owners would bear the brunt of the increases, worry that their future income and purchasing power will decrease. While many large business executives welcome the government's proposal for expanded corporate tax breaks, some are concerned the resulting gains will not be enough to offset an anticipated contraction in domestic consumption. In addition, some analysts are not convinced that the proposed reductions in business taxes will spur aggressive investment. Amid general public dissatisfaction about economic policy, the success of the government's proposed reforms may hinge on the ability of the Roh Administration to clearly communicate the view that this legislation would help institute a more fair tax regime. End Summary. MORE TAXES, WITH FEWER EXEMPTIONS AND SMALLER DEDUCTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) After foreshadowing new measures in December 2005, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) unveiled its long- term tax reform plan on February 5 as part of a p
lan to raise more tax revenues to compensate for mounting spending pressure. MOFE's proposed reforms slap a new 10-percent value-added tax on education and medical services. In addition, excise taxes on hard liquor with an alcohol content of 21 percent or higher would be raised to 150 percent by 2015 from the current 75 percent. Also under consideration are fresh taxes on top of the current high levies on cigarettes. ¶4. (U) MOFE's new tax proposals also trim deductions for Korean wage earners, especially the nation's 4.75 million childless and unmarried taxpayers, starting in 2007. If Korea's National Assembly endorses the MOFE proposal, single- person households could face up to 350,000 won (USD 365) more in taxes each year. Two-person households without children would have to pay up to 175,000 won (USD 182) in additional taxes. The ministry projects that it should be able to collect a total of 2 trillion won in additional revenue over the next four years by implementing the benefit reduction plan. To soften the blow, government officials also plan to increase tax refund schemes for educational and medical spending by wage earners. ¶5. (U) Reflecting demands for a crackdown on tax evasion by independent businesses and persons with well-paying jobs, certain tax benefits would also vanish for the self- employed, for example tax deductions for credit card use. According to MOFE, these measures would translate into 2.16 million self-employed Koreans being saddled with roughly 345,900 won (USD 359) in additional annual taxes. With a few exceptions, most of these revisions, as well as the reduced deductions for childless persons, would gradually kick in between 2008 and 2015. HIGHER REAL ESTATE TAXES FOR THE RICH -------------- ¶6. (U) In a related measure, revisions to Korea's Income Tax Act that were enacted in December 2005 dictate that owners of apartment units smaller than 84.8 square meters in net area, but which are worth more than 200 million won (USD 200,000) in market value, will no longer be eligible for mortgage and long-term housing purchase savings account tax breaks. Moreover, starting in 2006, Koreans with more than two houses will be required to pay income taxes on all rental income earned. According to MOFE estimates, the December legislation could net more than one trillion won (USD 1 billion) in revenue. ¶7. (U) The December 2005 tax revisions supplemented other measures announced on August 31, 2005 to help rein in real estate speculation. That plan, already being implemented, involved a drastic hike in ownership and capital gains taxes for owners of multiple homes, with taxes for owners of two or more houses hiked to 50 percent, up from 9 to 36 percent. The August 2005 policy also assessed a new Property Holdings Tax on owners of apartments or unused land in "high-rent" areas or specially-designated speculative districts in southern Seoul and its satellite cities. This tax, set at 0.15 percent of assessed value in 2005, will rise to one percent by 2009. In addition, starting in 2006, all owners of properties worth more than 600 million won (USD 600,000) became subject to Korea's composite property tax. Previously, the composite (or comprehensive) real estate tax was only applied to owners of homes worth more than 900 million won (USD 900,000). ¶8. (U) Finally, to ensure that property owners and speculators in higher-rate areas actually pay higher taxes, officials are using a more accurate "fair market value" rather than the current "assessed value" to calculate tax rates beginning in 2006. Under the new measures, the assessment base of the comprehensive real estate tax will be gradually raised, up from the current 50 percent of the standard price to 100 percent by 2009. The government has also recently hinted that it may announce even more real estate speculation control measures, since housing prices have again jumped since November 2005. LOCAL ECONOMISTS AND STAKEHOLDERS GIVE MIXED REVIEWS -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Many Korean economists and tax policy experts have welcomed MOFE's proposed combination of higher "sin" taxes, social engineering in favor of families with children, and fewer loopholes for the self-employed, as a reasonable approach to bringing in more revenue to help deal with Korea's troubling demographic future. Some economists, however, worry that significantly increased taxes may lead to a reduction in disposable household income, further weakening domestic consumption. ¶10. (SBU) Korean small business owners and self-employed persons have also spoken out against the February tax proposals, saying they are puzzled by the changing stance of the tax authorities, who lowered value-added tax (VAT) rates last year only to suggest selective increases to the VAT in ¶2006. Independent businessmen are even more distressed by MOFE's announced measures to improve its methods for identifying the income levels of self-employed business owners and professionals, while refusing to renew certain tax reduction schemes expiring in 2006. With the February tax measures still pending at the National Assembly, it is possible that small business owners may defer investments this year, while awaiting the outcome of parliamentary debate over the new tax plans. ¶11. (SBU) Opponents of Korea's 2005 real estate tax revisions are the most vocal critics of the Roh Administration's tax policies -- although their arguments tend to be partisan and politically-loaded. Such opponents assert that real estate investors are usually high income earners, who serve as significant consumers. Putting a break on real estate investment, therefore, could force the country into a severe liquidity crunch, they argue. Many rich Korean property owners, fearing heavy capital gains taxes, may become reluctant to sell their extra houses or property, instead adopting a wait-and-see attitude to observe whether the government actually implements the new tax policies as scheduled. Others are likely to look for loopholes to pass on (or donate) property to relatives, paying an as-yet-unchanged inheritance tax. PASSAGE UNCERTAIN, AS PROPOSALS STIR POLITICAL DEBATE -------------- -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The main part of MOFE's income and VAT tax reform plans will probably be submitted to the National Assembly in September 2006, following discussions between the Finance Ministry and ruling Uri party that will take place as early as June, after the May 31 regional elections. However, easy approval of MOFE's plans is far from guaranteed. In fact, fierce National Assembly debate and politicking between the legislative and executive branches appears highly likely. ¶13. (SBU) In defending its tax recommendations, MOFE noted that "considering strong requests for a government role in improving Korea's social safety net, the government has no other option but to raise taxes." MOFE Vice Minister Baik Byung-Won explained that the government had little choice but to increase some taxes to avoid growing fiscal deficits. Heo Chan-gook, a director at the Korea Economic Research Institute, observes that the new tax measures may indicate that officials -- following 2004's poor revenue-gathering performance -- may have lost their confidence in the ability of an early economic revival to top off government coffers. ¶14. (SBU) Despite MOFE's strong stance, many Koreans who paid attention to President Roh Moo-hyun's January 25 pledge of "no tax hikes" doubt that government officials have in fact explored all other options to raising taxpayer's rates. Salaried Koreans, whose full income is easily known and easily taxed, feel particularly aggrieved, and are likely to try to hold the President to his "no tax hikes" promise unless MOFE can clearly demonstrate that the new tax schemes will work to their advantage. In 2004, when the National Tax Service (NTS) failed to meet its overall tax collection goal, the NTS made up for this shortfall by zealously collecting 18.9 percent more than planned from non-self- employed Koreans, who lack the ability of professionals and self-employed Koreans to shield their true income from the taxman. ¶15. (SBU) Over the Internet and on the country's hyperactive "blog" network, Korean "netizens" are complaining vigorously about the tax reform plan, using postings to government and lawmaker websites to make their views known. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) has taken advantage of the situation to roundly criticize the tax plans, saying, "Without any effort to reduce its spending, the government is passing the burden of its tax revenue shortfalls onto the general public, especially middle-income families." GNP leaders, in fact, recently declared a "war on tax hikes," accusing the Roh Administration of trying to pass tax reforms "in order to cover-up its failed economic policies." ¶16. (SBU) Amid the criticism, some in the ruling Uri Party are also becoming uncomfortable with the rising public criticism of the Administration tax measures, although it remains unclear whether large numbers of Uri members will rebel when the new tax bills come up for a vote. With an eye on the May 31 election, however, the Uri Party prevailed on the government to remain silent about its tax plans until June. The ruling Uri Party did faithfully pass the government's eight real estate tax reform bills in late December 2005, garnering support from three minor opposition parties at the National Assembly despite a boycott from the opposition GNP. COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Serious public discord and scant political support in the National Assembly may yet scuttle Korean government attempts to modernize the tax code in 2006. The main problem is one of public communication: Officials have not yet been able to convince a majority of citizens that its proposed tax measures will advance economic recovery, stabilize the real estate market, or increase fairness in taxation. The task is made more difficult by the fact that, due to the ambitious and wide-ranging nature of MOFE's reforms, they contain a little something to hate for just about every voter. Failure to pass the 2006 tax bills will send government economic planners back to the drawing board to come up with new ideas to address Korea's growing (if still manageable by international standards) revenue shortfalls. In that event, tax reform will likely become a major project for President Roh's successor, regardless of party affiliation. VERSHBOW

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