ROK SCHOLARS BELIEVE DPRK "CLAMPING DOWN" IN

UNCLAS SEOUL 000076 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MNUC MARR KN KS SUBJECT: ROK SCHOLARS BELIEVE DPRK "CLAMPING DOWN" IN ANTICIPATION OF STRONGER U.S. MEASURES IN 2006 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Two ROK scholars believed the DPRK'S New Year's message for 2006 showed Pyongyang planned to brace itself for hostile action from the United States and focused its attention to psychologically and ideologically prepare its citizens to maintain strong support for the Kim Jong-il regime. Although North Korea would likely remain engaged in the Six Party process, negotiations would not yield substantial progress. The scholars argued, however, that the DPRK would not take actions sufficiently bold to scuttle negotiations, such as a nuclear test. They predicted moderate progress in inter-Korean relations, as well as the possibility of North Korea agreeing to a second North-South summit. The scholars noted that, despite the emphasis on the military-first policy, the New Year's message also potentially foretold more authority being given to the DPRK cabinet, as well as the rejuvenation of the Korean Workers Party's functions. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) In separate meetings on January 3, poloff discussed the DPRK's New Year's message, which was featured in a joint editorial in three major North Korean state-run media outlets, with Dr. Choi Jin-wook, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU),and Dr. Koh Yoo-hwan, Professor of North Korea Studies at Dongguk University. Both are respected scholars of North Korean policies and society. The scholars agreed that the message for 2006, as a whole, did not allude to substantial policy changes but reflected a number of notable differences from the previous year on Pyongyang's priorities for foreign policy, inter-Korean relations, military affairs, and domestic agenda. . STRONG FOCUS ON MILITARY, NOTABLE MENTION OF PARTY, CABINET -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Both Choi and Koh stressed that repeated emphasis on North Korea's military-first policy was the most prominent aspect of the New Year's message. The text underscored the military-first policy's important role in maintaining the regime and called upon the masses to "fight to protect the 'Dear Leader.'" This meant that Pyongyang put regime stability above all goals, Choi asserted. The emphasis on the military, particularly the passage reading, "no matter how the political situation should change, the party and the state's position to place importance on military affairs remains unchanged," indicated the regime's readiness to take stronger measures against outside subversion, especially the perceived U.S. hostile policy. It was also a way for Kim Jong-il to stifle dissent by flaunting his "absolute" authority as Chairman of the National Defense Commission. ¶4. (SBU) Koh pointed out, however, that while the joint editorial strongly emphasized the military, it also mentioned the transfer of some economic authority to the cabinet and the prominent role of the Korean Workers Party (KWP). This indicated a new sense of pragmatism on the part of Kim Jong-il and his desire to minimize the military's role in managing the economy. Koh added that the expanded role of the cabinet could also signal the normalization of the KWP's political functions after being marginalized since Kim Jong-il spearheaded the military-first movement in 1995. Choi agreed, believing it was possible that Kim Jong-il might allow the KWP Central Committee to convene a plenary session in 2006 -- the first time since December 1993. The party's Central Military Affairs Committee might also resume normal operation, Choi said. . FOREIGN POLICY: INCREASED VIGILANCE ON U.S. INTENT -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Both academics noted that the editorial gave minimal hints on foreign policy objectives for the year, but instead focused largely on the military-first policy and measures to rally the public's allegiance to Kim Jong-il. The text repeatedly called for increased vigilance against "U.S. imperialism," possibly hinting at the sole foreign policy priority for 2006. The message made no mention of either the Six Party Talks or specific plans to improve relations with China, Russia, or EU countries. (NOTE: The DPRK released several specific messages on the Six Party Talks in subsequent press statements. ROK analyses of those statements will be reported septel. END NOTE.) ¶6. (SBU) Professor Koh of Dongguk University asserted that the lack of stated foreign policy goals reflected Pyongyang's sense of uncertainty regarding U.S. intent toward the DPRK and the Six Party process. As such, the Kim Jong-il government likely redirected its focus in the joint editorial to raising the profile of its military and warning its citizens to "brace themselves" for increased pressure from the United States. The timing of U.S. law enforcement actions against North Korea's financial crimes, various negative recent remarks from senior U.S. officials, and the U.S. focus on North Korean human rights conditions all contributed to the sense of uneasiness in Pyongyang, Koh said. . MISSILE TEST PREP POSSIBLE, BUT NUCLEAR TEST UNLIKELY -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The two scholars predicted that the DPRK would remain engaged in the Six Party process but would seek to bolster its negotiating position by taking bolder steps, including preparing for -- but not actually conducting -- missile launch tests. Koh dismissed the possibility of a nuclear test, noting that the DPRK knew well that conducting a nuclear test would "seal its coffin." Dr. Choi of KINU agreed, arguing that North Korea continued to believe that brinkmanship would place Pyongyang in a stronger bargaining position while simultaneously making it possible for North Korea to augment its anti-American propaganda. . LIKELY TO RETURN TO 6PT, LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Choi added that excessive belligerence from the DPRK would undermine its strategy to shift the blame for heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula to the United States. As such, the DPRK would probably return to the Six Party Talks but would not exercise any flexibility in the negotiations during the first half of the year. If the United States took stronger action in response to the lack of movement in the Six Party process, Choi argued, Pyongyang could argue in the latter half of the year that Washington was at fault for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. . N-S RELATIONS: "OUR PEOPLE," ASSISTANCE FROM ROK -------------- --- ¶9. (SBU) Choi observed that the joint editorial was generally upbeat on inter-Korean relations. The text was positive toward contact and exchanges between the two Koreas and emphasized solidarity among the Korean people. Choi noted, however, that the central theme of North-South relations appeared to be 1) honoring the spirit of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration and 2) countering American imperialism through efforts "just between our people." He pointed out that the expression "just between our people" was repeated in several paragraphs, culminating in the recommendation for designating June 15 as "Our People's Day" -- a national holiday during which Koreans from the two Koreas and abroad would rally against U.S. imperialism. The editorial also stressed the need for increased collaboration among pro-unification organizations in both Koreas to counter efforts by conservative South Koreans to delay progress in inter-Korean relations. Choi predicted that the DPRK would begin making preparations in the second half of 2006 for the 2007 festivities honoring the 95th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth. North Korea might also agree to a second inter-Korean summit in the latter part of the year to begin influencing the ROK's 2007 presidential elections. "PROGRESS" IN N-S RELATIONS LIKELY -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Professor Koh of Dongguk University believed the joint editorial's focus on solidarity among all Korean people meant two things: first, the DPRK would attempt to solicit increased economic assistance from the ROK and would plan a variety of cultural events to attract larger numbers of South Korean visitors, thereby increasing the influx of cash into North Korea. This would necessitate more frequent inter-Korean working-level talks and generally more agreements resulting from cabinet-level talks. The ROKG would certainly oblige, given its desire for progress in inter-Korean relations. Second, given that calls for unity among all Koreans were North Korea's time-tested propaganda tool for consolidating the public's allegiance to the regime, Pyongyang was signaling more public rallies honoring Kim Jong-il, the revolution, and the superiority of DPRK-style socialism. This also meant there would be a rise in anti-American propaganda. . A HINT OF THE SUCCESSION ISSUE? NOT QUITE -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Choi thought it was interesting that the joint editorial had also made multiple references to the need to uphold and maintain the DPRK's version of socialism, specifically targeting members of the military and the youth. The text warned against the corrupting and subverting influences of outside media and emphasized the need to cultivate a new generation of "ideologically pure heroes of the revolution." More importantly, however, the message emphasized preparing "the third and fourth generations of the revolution" ideologically and politically, possibly signaling Kim Jong-il's thinking that his successor must be one of his offspring. Choi nevertheless thought it was premature for Kim to discuss the successor issue publicly, arguing instead that the message suggested weakened psychological and ideological cohesion among younger citizens and members of the military. To promote socialism and absolute loyalty to the regime, the DPRK leadership would likely mobilize available government resources to crack down on any criticism of Kim Jong-il using a variety of suppression tactics. Sensitive to U.S.-led international criticism of human rights abuses, however, the DPRK would likely minimize extreme methods, such as public executions, Choi said. VERSHBOW