NGO PROJECT TARGETS FAMILY REUNION FOR

UNCLAS SEOUL 000609 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL SOCI EAID KN KS SUBJECT: NGO PROJECT TARGETS FAMILY REUNION FOR KOREAN-AMERICANS WITH FAMILY TIES TO DPRK SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On February 22, Stephen W. Linton, Chair of the Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF),an NGO with a long history of providing humanitarian assistance to DPRK medical institutions, told the Ambassador about his organization's new project to help Korean-Americans locate relatives in the DPRK. Linton and project leader Alice Suh said the project had received initially positive responses from contacts in both the ROKG and the DPRK. Linton urged USG endorsement of the project, as it could help improve Washington's image in South Korea and curb Pyongyang's practice of charging exorbitant fees to Korean-Americans desiring reunion with their North Korean family members. Linton expressed frustration at the DPRK's gradual restriction of site visits for EBF's tuberculosis assistance programs, adding that without site visits, the programs would collapse in less than four years. He did not believe that even large-scale health crises could force the DPRK to allow better access for foreign aid workers. Linton asserted that the DPRK was as shocked by the shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea with the election of the Bush Administration in 2000 as the United States was by the events of 9/11, and that the resultant fear of Washington prevented it from accepting any security assurances from the USG absent high-level contact. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) In a February 22 office call, Stephen W. Linton, Chair of the Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF),briefed the Ambassador on "Saemsori" -- his organization's new project for assisting Korean-Americans locate relatives in the DPRK -- and shared his thoughts on working with DPRK officials on humanitarian projects in general. EBF Korea Representative James Lim and Washington Office Director Alice Jean Suh accompanied Dr. Linton. DCM and emboffs also attended. (NOTE: EBF is an NGO that has been serving since 1995 as liaison between North Korean medical facilities and international donors. The organization helps facilitate the delivery of medicine, equipment and supplies to tuberculosis centers in North Korea. END NOTE.) . FAMILY REUNION FOR AMCITS WITH DPRK FAMILY TIES -------------- -- ¶3. (SBU) According to Linton and Suh, EBF launched Saemsori to address the concerns of Amcits with close family ties to the DPRK. Korean-Americans could not participate in either the inter-Korean family reunion events at Mt. Geumgang or the digital video reunions launched by the ROK's Ministry of Unification (MOU) due to their U.S. citizenship. As a result, these individuals had to go through private channels and pay exorbitant fees to DPRK officials in order to arrange individual family reunions. Suh estimated that ten percent of the two million people of Korean descent in the United States either traced their roots to North Korea or had family members who had relocated to the DPRK and could not return after the Korean War. . NO OFFICIAL RESPONSE FROM DPRK YET -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Saemsori project would conduct a nationwide survey in the United States for an accurate estimate of the number of Amcits with family ties to North Korea; create a central database of specific cases of divided Korean-American families; maintain an archive of letters, photographs and oral histories of first-generation Korean-Americans to share with surviving generations and families in North Korea; and engage DPRK officials to negotiate agreement on actual reunions and hometown visits. Linton said EBF's contacts in both Koreas responded positively to the Saemsori initiative, although to date the DPRK had not delivered an official response to the proposal. ¶5. (SBU) MOU, in particular, showed interest in Saemsori because additional arrangements for family reunions could potentially bring the cost down for the ROK and relieve some of its own burdens in arranging family reunions. Linton added, however, that even if the DPRK rejected EBF's proposal, the project would at least allow aging first-generation Korean-Americans to be registered in a database that could be used at some point in the future, after North Korea became more open. . USG INTEREST: IMPROVED IMAGE IN ROK, CURB CASH FLOW TO DPRK -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Linton underscored that the project also had implications for the USG and urged Washington's endorsement. First, a proactive role by the USG in arranging reunions by separated Korean families, regardless of their nationality, could have a positive effect on both U.S.-ROK relations as well as the South Korean public's opinion of the United States. Considering that no other country with Korean immigrants had a program like Saemsori, the image of Washington taking the initiative before others could counter anti-American sentiments among some South Koreans. ¶7. (SBU) Second, USG endorsement for the project could potentially reduce the enormous price tag (up to USD 90,000 in some instances, according to Linton) for individual family visits by Korean-Americans, which was also a potential a source of questionable funds for the DPRK. If the DPRK viewed the project as an avenue of dialogue with the United States, it could also make it easier for Korean-American staff to participate in EBF visits to project sites, currently forbidden by North Korea. ¶8. (SBU) Moreover, potential donors could support EBF's projects with less concern about tensions between the USG and the DPRK. This was particularly true with the Korean-American community, which tended to work quietly for fear of rousing suspicions in the United States for showing interest in North Korea, even though this group was one of the biggest and most steadfast donors of humanitarian aid to North Korea, Linton said. . GRADUAL DECREASE IN SITE VISITS FOR TB PROGRAMS -------------- -- ¶9. (BU) Linton noted that EBF took a big risk in undertaking Saemsori, as DPRK officials could impose roadblocks on EBF's existing tuberculosis assistance programs out of suspicion. Linton and his delegation could only visit 15 out of 19 sites during the fall site visits, which reflected a gradual decrease in the number of site visits permitted. The problem, Linton asserted, was that DPRK authorities looked upon EBF's site visits as monitoring activities even though they involved merely routine maintenance of medical equipment. ¶10. (SBU) This, said Linton, was likely part of the overall trend of the DPRK reducing the number of foreign aid organizations operating in the country. If the trend continued, EBF would not be able to sustain its tuberculosis programs. Donors mandated site visits, without which they would not provide funding. Linton predicted that, without site visits and equipment maintenance, existing programs would fail in increments of 30 percent per year due to equipment failure. Unfortunately, the DPRK Ministry of Public Health did not wield sufficient influence to counter the competing interests of the State Security Department and other government agencies that sought to minimize foreign monitoring, particularly in rural sites. ¶11. (SBU) Linton opined that little could be done to address the difficulty in getting access to the DPRK, especially since Pyongyang was in the business of selling access to foreigners. The ROK, in particular, continued to pay generously for access. Until that market dried up, the DPRK would have no motivation to conduct business differently. Linton noted, however, that his ROKG interlocutors were increasingly frustrated with the DPRK and predicted that Seoul, at some point, would drive a harder bargain in its dealings with Pyongyang. He believed that Seoul was, for the time being, willing to tolerate the DPRK's rigid, old-school officials until they made way for younger leaders who had no memory of the Kim Il Sung era, and might be flexible on liberalizing North Korea's society and economy. Allowing changes gradually with a generational shift was more characteristic of Korean culture than a large-scale revolution, Linton added. . HEALTH CRISES WOULD NOT INCREASE ACCESS TO DPRK -------------- -- ¶12. (SBU) In response to the DCM's question about how the DPRK would act in the event of a large-scale health crisis, such as an avian flu pandemic, Linton responded that Pyongyang would fear a large influx of outsiders more than the outbreak. The DPRK would likely contact UN agencies, pretend to allow increased access for international aid workers, but pre-select them from those who spoke no Korean, as it did in 1995, when it reached out for emergency food assistance. Linton did not believe the DPRK elite would have any problems getting access to medicine or treatment, unlike ordinary citizens. He also noted that Pyongyang had learned from its experience in 1995 when international donors took more than two months to respond to its call for emergency food assistance. DPRK authorities would instead reach out to China and the ROK. ¶13. (SBU) Econoff asked whether ordinary citizens would accept vaccinations or other assistance from foreign organizations. Linton responded that ordinary citizens would not resist, but local authorities and elites could be obstructionist if outsiders did not fully consider existing practices or protocol. He cited the contrast between the DPRK's receptivity to EBF's programs and its rejection of Doctors Without Borders (MSF),stressing that MSF was forced to leave because it criticized medical practices by North Korean doctors and staff, and existing facilities, thus causing many local elites to lose face and many health authorities to lose their jobs. . LACK OF ACCESS TO RURAL DPRK PARTLY DUE TO EMBARRASSMENT -------------- -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Linton stressed that the DPRK was as paranoid about what foreigners saw in North Korea as it was about their activities. It restricted outsiders from most rural areas out of concern that they would see just how miserably it has failed to provide basic necessities to its citizens, which was a source of great embarrassment for the regime. In contrast, access to the relatively more prosperous Pyongyang was now relatively easy, especially during the annual Arirang Festival, during which the regime sought to have as many foreigners as possible see the reenactment of its national myth. . PYONGYANG WON'T ACCEPT ASSURANCES ABSENT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT -------------- -------------- ¶15. (SBU) On U.S.-DPRK relations, Linton asserted that North Korea awaited direct contact with the USG at the highest level, adding that the DPRK had been "waiting for Kissinger for years." After years of believing that the U.S. electoral process was just an act, Pyongyang found to its surprise in 2000 that the USG could indeed pursue radically different policies toward it with the election of a new administration every four or eight years. The DPRK was, Linton opined, as shocked by the 2000 elections as the United States was by the events of 9/11. Given the level of fear in Pyongyang, no amount of security guarantees or assurances would suffice until Pyongyang felt that its "Kissinger" had arrived. VERSHBOW