ROK FOREIGN MINISTER THROWS HAT INTO UNSYG RING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 000509 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KS SUBJECT: ROK FOREIGN MINISTER THROWS HAT INTO UNSYG RING Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On February 14, the ROK formally announced Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon's candidacy for UN Secretary General. Ban, who has been actively campaigning for several weeks, has apparently been encouraged by initial reactions to his candidacy. MOFAT DG Kim Won-soo, who was recently tapped to become special assistant to Minister Ban and coordinate efforts for a UNSYG campaign, told POL M/C recently that one of Ban's strengths is that he has no enemies. As the representative of a democratic, market-oriented Asian country, said Kim, Ban should be a strong candidate. Kim also portrayed Ban as having engineered significant reforms to the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Well-liked by his staff, Ban Ki-moon is a diplomat's diplomat: urbane, intelligent, and unfailingly polite. He is proof that "nice guys" don't always finish last, but sometimes rise to the top of their profession. These very qualities, however, could cause some to wonder whether he would have the willingness to fight the serious bureaucratic battles that UN reform would require. END SUMMARY. GENIE IS OUT OF THE BOTTLE -------------- ¶2. (U) In a statement to the press on February 14, Vice Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan announced that his boss, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, will seek election to be Secretary General of the United Nations. Foreign Minister Ban SIPDIS "brings to his candidacy nearly four decades of extensive experience and an untarnished reputation as a diplomat and administrator, much of it directly related to issues of peace and security, development, and human rights and democracy, the three pillars on which the United Nations stands," said Yu. In a subsequent press conference, Ban highlighted the need for reform of the UN and his own professional experience with the organization. ¶3. (SBU) In a February 8 meeting with POL M/C, MOFAT Director-General for Policy Planning Kim Won-soo explained that Seoul has been trying to dampen South Korean media speculation and coverage of Foreign Minister Ban's campaign to be the next UNSYG candidate. The ROK had embargoed news of Ban's candidacy, but would lift the embargo on February 14, primarily because it could not keep the silence any longer, having already extended the embargo twice. The embargo has allowed Minister Ban to campaign quietly without having reporters clamor for initial foreign reactions and thereby possibly limit flexibility in other capitals. Kim said ROKG officials have told South Korean media that it would be in Ban's, and thus Seoul's, interest if the press did not get too carried away too soon in the game. In fact, MOFAT would have preferred to keep the embargo, but that was not possible, Kim said. ¶4. (SBU) Despite the uncertainty of when the official campaign would formally start, Seoul has begun initial preparations. For example, on the day the embargo was lifted, ROKG officials distributed press backgrounders that framed Seoul's view of what South Korea and Minister Ban could do for the UN. . BAN USES TRAVEL TO DISCUSS UNSYG SCENARIO -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Over the past several weeks, Minister Ban has also moved to plant the seeds for his campaign. Ban last week returned from a 14-day trip to Europe and Africa, including stops in Davos for the World Economic Forum January 26-27; Ghana, January 28-30; London, for the ministerial conference on Afghanistan reconstruction January 31 to February 1; Congo, February 2-3; and France, February 4-6, returning in time to meet with the visiting Indian President in Seoul on February 7. In Paris, Minister Ban delivered a speech in SEOUL 00000509 002 OF 003 French to journalists and political science students and answered questions in English, demonstrating his ability in two working languages of the United Nations. ¶6. (C) In a February 9 conversation with the Ambassador, Minister Ban said he was encouraged by the reaction he received from his recent travels, especially that of the French. Seoul, he said, had also sent a heads-up message to Pyongyang and had thus far received no reply, indicating no immediate objections. He added that he personally was worried about East Timor's Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta potentially emerging as an eleventh-hour compromise choice. ¶7. (C) On February 6, Minister Ban sent a letter to the Secretary informing her of his candidacy. Ban argued that SIPDIS the next Secretary-General should come from the Asian region; that as a vibrant market economy and emerging donor, as well as a democracy fully committee to human rights, the rule of law, peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts, South Korea hoped to honor the contribution it has received from the UN; and that Ban's experience on the global stage for more than three decades, ten years with UN affairs, made him the right man from Korea for the UN job. . INITIAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGY -------------- ¶8. (SBU) During the February 8 meeting, DG Kim made the case for Minister Ban, emphasizing that one of his biggest strengths was that "no one dislikes" Ban. Kim claimed that so far there were no negative responses from Beijing, Moscow, or Paris. Noting that in the straw polls, capitals were not limited to the number of candidates they supported, Kim speculated that China probably would not vote against Asian candidates because of its efforts to improve its image in the region. Kim opined that the U.S. alliance need not block Ban's candidacy in Beijing's view, at worst, China might support several Asian candidates rather than veto his candidacy. When asked about Tokyo, DG Kim responded that Japanese leaders might be reluctant to vote against Seoul's candidate, and thereby risk further inflaming anti-Japanese sentiments in Korea. (NOTE: During a February 13 meeting with POL M/C, however, Japanese Embassy Political Minister Counselor Koji Tomita noted Seoul's strong opposition to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council and predicted Tokyo would withhold a decision on the Secretary-General race until the UN reform picture became SIPDIS clearer. END NOTE.) ¶9. (SBU) Acknowledging the importance of UN management reform, DG Kim pointed to Ban's accomplishments in reforming the Foreign Ministry. Minister Ban had essentially strengthened term limits for South Korean ambassadors by reducing the numbers of missions they could head to two from three or four. Ban had mandated a retirement age of sixty. And, he reduced the amount of time returning foreign service officers could look for a job from a one-year paid period to four months. These were controversial and tough decisions, quite unpopular among MOFAT senior staff, Kim said. ¶10. (SBU) Kim said that another initiative was Ban's decision to hold weekly press conferences. Minister Ban was the only South Korean cabinet minister who did this, which reflected his confidence and ability to handle and organize a gamut of issues. Ban's ability to handle the tough Korean press corps reportedly earned him a nickname akin to Mr. Teflon. ¶11. (SBU) Kim asserted that the division of the Korean Peninsula, rather than a negative for his candidacy, could be turned into a strength because it might be argued that no one knew more about the value of conflict management, international cooperation, and the role of the United Nations than the South Korean Foreign Minister. South Korea, for example, represented the ideals of the United Nations and understood the value of free markets, freedom, and democracy. Minister Ban's December 2005 announcement that Seoul sought SEOUL 00000509 003 OF 003 to double its official Development Assistance allocations by 2009, combined with Seoul's contributions to supporting reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and experience with peacekeeping operations, might be cited to demonstrate South Korea's growing international role. VERSHBOW